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Notes on Romanisation and Translation  
 
Korean words are romanised according to the principles of the National 
Institute of the Korean Language; Korean names that are widely acknowledged in 
historical studies, such as Rhee Syng-Man and Park Chung-hee, are exceptions to 
this. Regarding the presentation of Korean names, surnames precede given names in 
the main text, while this is reversed in the citations in footnotes.  
Titles of Korean materials translated into English and all of the Korean texts 
















CCA Christian Conference of Asia 
CCIA Commissions of the Churches on International Affairs 
CCK Christian Council of Korea (Hankuk kidokgyo chong 
yeonhaphoi) 
DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) 
EKD Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland 
KCF Korean Christian Federation 
NCCCUSA National Council of Churches of Christ in the USA 
NCCK National Council of Churches in Korea (Hankuk kyohoi 
Hyeopuihoi) 
PCK Presbyterian Church of Korea (Tonghap) 
PCK Presbyterian Church in Korea (Hapdong) 
PCRK Presbyterian Church in the Republic of Korea (Kijang) 
ROK Republic of Korea (South Korea) 
UK United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
UMC United Methodist Church 
USA United States of America 
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
WARC World Alliance of Reformed Churches  





Glossary of Korean Terms 
 
Korean Pronunciation Meaning 
빨갱이	 Bbal-gaeng-i a disparaging term that refers to 
communists as well as those who are 
‘suspected’ of collaborating with North 
Korean communists 
반공	 Bangong anti-communism 
인민	 Inmin the mass or commoners; mostly used in 
North Korea 
재야	 Jaeya literally means ‘staying in the 
wilderness’ but refers to the groups of 
social activists against authoritarian 
governments in South Korea 
종북	 Jongbuk working for North Korean communists 
and following North Korean ideology 
조선	 Joseon the name of the dynasty (1392-1910) that 
existed before modern Korea 
주체	 Juche being independent and determinative   
기독교	 Kidokgyo Christianity 
국민	 Kukmin people of a state 
민족	 Minjok nation 
민주	 Minju democracy 
민중	 Minjung the mass or commoners 
평화	 Pyeong-hwa peace 
승공	 Seung-gong defeating North Korean communism 
시민	 Simin citizen 






The main argument of this thesis is that neither ethnic-centred Christian 
nationalism, minjung discourse, nor an evangelism-focused approach toward the 
unification of Korea of South Korean Protestant churches has provided a 
theologically effective basis for the reconciliation and unification of the two Koreas 
among the South Korean populace who have been deeply influenced by anti-
communism and anti-North Korean sentiment constructed through the modern 
history of Korea. Therefore, a critical assessment of, and a serious engagement with 
their manipulated memory and sentiment toward North Korea are essential for 
seeking justice, reconciliation and unification of Korea in accordance with the ethical 
imperatives of Christian tradition.  
 Starting with the general history of political turmoil in South Korea after the 
division of Korea, and the emergence of nationalist discourses as well as the 
development of Minjung theology by South Korean liberal Christians, chapters 2 and 
4 describe the unification discourses of the liberal camp of South Korean protestant 
churches which strove for the unification of Korea from a nationalist and minjung 
perspective.   Chapters 3 and 5 examine the unification discourse of more 
conservative churches consisting of the majority of South Korean protestants who 
searched for national evangelisation which would make the North Korean communist 
regime collapse and eventually bring about the unification of Korea. Those chapters 
2 to 5 show how the unification movement of the liberal camp of South Korean 
churches resulted in fractions and debates on anti-communism and the social 
responsibility of churches of South Korea, while that of conservative churches 
strengthened anti-communism among the South Korean populace as well as churches 
and impeded Christian discourse for peace and reconciliation of Korea.  
Following a historical and critical assessment of the unification discourse of 
the South Korean Protestant churches, chapter 7 explores how a Christian theology 
of memory and reconciliation could contribute to continuance of Christians’ longing 
for reconciliation and the unification of Korea according to the changing scope of the 
 
 ix 
social and political realms of South Korea in the 21st century.  The thesis concludes 
with an argument that South Korean Christians could contribute to reshaping 
discourses of reconciliation and unification of Korea by searching for just, truthful, 
and communal memory, which has been neglected by previous theological 






Since the division of Korea, South Koreans have dreamt of its unification no 
matter the method for the unification. However, the unification discourse has always 
raised implicit and explicit questions about the subjectivity of who will bring about 
the unification of Korea: the government, nation (minjok), minjung, or citizens? The 
subjectivity of unification discourses in South Korea has, in turn, been related to the 
ideologies of the two Koreas, as well as the attitude of the South Korean populace 
toward North Koreans, which has been seriously influenced by their selective or 
distorted remembrance of North Korea since the division of the Korean peninsula. 
South Korean Christians have not been immune from these phenomena in 
progressing in their engagement with the unification of Korea. There have been two 
main unification movements among South Korean Protestants: a socio-political 
approach, and an evangelical approach. The former was developed from Minjung 
theology and a nationalist agenda, which embraces the North Korean communists in 
order to create one single nation-state in the Korean peninsula, resulting in socio-
political engagement. In contrast, the evangelical approach arose from a spiritual 
opposition to communism and the desire to Christianise the North and the South in 
order to provide a common spiritual and moral basis on which North Koreans could 
change the Northern regime from within; its goal was for the South to peacefully 
absorb the North, and for South Koreans to promote missions to and humanitarian 
works for North Koreans. However, as South Korean churches entered the 21st 
century and faced the challenge of the nuclear and missile tests of North Korea the 
unification discourse was gradually eroded by different discourses, such as the 
proposed peaceful coexistence of the two Koreas.  
 
1. Anti-communism in South Korea and the Churches’ Engagement in the 
Unification Movement  
 
The unification of South and North Korea has long been a major goal of 
many Koreans, as is attested by the popular song that runs, “The unification is our 





even to speak about unification was considered treacherous in South Korea. 
Immediately after the Korean War, there was little thought of unifying the divided 
nation peacefully because of the hatred instilled by the war, and anti-communism 
was rife in South Korea. According to a guideline for teachers published in 1975, one 
purpose of public education was to inform students of the cruelty of communists and 
instil in them an ethos of anti-communism.1 Meanwhile, many politicians were 
arrested and purged for insisting that the South Korean government should engage in 
an effort to peacefully unify Korea. Anti-communism became a national ideology 
and any voices promoting unification were oppressed by the government. Various 
Christian religious bodies also collaborated with governmental anti-communist 
policies. The Catholic Church proclaimed that anti-communism was a national 
ideology and it embraced an anti-communist agenda.2 Many pastors of the 
conservative Protestant churches preached that communists were manifestations of 
the anti-Christ as described in the Book of Revelation.3 They also preached that 
North Korean communists were damned by God and the country should disappear 
from the face of the Earth. Hence, speaking about the peaceful unification of North 
and South Korea immediately after the Korean War meant risking imprisonment and 
death. 
Alongside the economic progress of South Korea in the 1970s, however, 
which had the potential to strengthen people’s desire for democracy in South Korea, 
the authoritarian government tried to draw people’s attention to unification through a 
dialogue with the North on the subject. As a result, in July 1972 the Northern and 
Southern governments agreed to the 7.4 Joint Communiqué:4  
                                               
1 Ministry of Education, Source Book for Ideology (Anti-Communism) Education in General  
Elementary School, Middle School, and High School, Teachers’ Guide vol. 1, 1975. Cited in Jung-Seok 
Seo, Korean Nationalism Betrayed and Distorted. (Seoul: Sungkyunkwan University Press, 2004), p. 
16.	
2 Catholic Bishops’ Conference of Korea, “Letters of Catholic Bishops’ Conference of Korea”, 
Kyung-Hyang Jabji, no. 1076 (1957), pp. 13-14. 
3 Han Kyung-Chik, born in North Korea, fled to the South seeking religious freedom. He preached, 
“This ideology [communism] is like the Dragon of Revelations. Who will conquer this dragon? Man 
does not live on bread alone, but on every word that comes from the mouth of God.” Kyung-Chik Han, 
“Christianity and Communism”, in Kyung-Chik Han Collection, ed. Eun-Seop Kim (Seoul: Kyung-
Chik Han Foundation, 1947), p. 437.	
4 Ministry of Unification of ROK, The 30 Years' History of the Ministry of Unification, ed. Ministry of 





First, we achieve the unification without any interference of foreign powers. 
Second, we achieve the unification peacefully without any efforts of 
militarism. Third, we promote unification with a nationalist agenda 
overcoming ideological, social, and political differences. 
 
After signing the Communiqué, the North Korean government enacted the Socialist 
Constitution, which acknowledged the Labourers’ Party as the ruling power and the 
rulership of the Kim dynasty. 5 Since the agreement, the South Korean government 
has promoted the unification movement, but it has discouraged any involvement 
from non-governmental organisations. Although this is significant for being the first 
official agreement between the two Korean governments since the Korean War, the 
constitutional amendments undertaken by the two Koreas following the agreement 
have diluted the effectiveness and meaning of the Joint Communiqué. In 1972, the 
South Korean parliament passed an amendment to the Yusin Constitution, allowing 
for the life-long dictatorship of President Park Chung-hee. Many South Koreans 
consequently began to consider the agreement no more than a political gesture to 
hide a governmental purpose of facilitating dictatorship in South Korea. The 
constitution thus sparked the South Korean people’s interest in the unification 
movement and a number of non-governmental organisations began to find their own 
ways to promote the unification of Korea. The Kwangju Democratisation Uprising in 
1980 in particular was a popular uprising for democratisation and the unification of 
Korea.6  
In the tide of the unification movement that followed the Kwangju 
Democratisation Uprising, South Korean Protestants took the initiative and from 
1981 they began to meet North Korean Christians in Switzerland, Germany and 
Austria. The crucial stimulus giving momentum to Christians’ involvement in the 
unification movement was the 88 Declaration of Korean Churches for the Promotion 
of the Peace and Unification of Korea, led by the National Council of Churches of 
Korea in 1988. In the declaration, the participating churches indicated that the 
                                               
5  Man-Yeol Lee, A Study in the History of Korean Churches: Korean Christianity and National 
Unification Movement, Research Collections (Seoul: The Institute of the History of Christianity in 
Korea, 2001), p. 368. 





unification movement was based on Minjung theology7 and a nationalist agenda. It 
was also stated that the unification movement should involve political and social 
agendas.8 Therefore, during the 1980s the unification movement promoted by the 
South Korean Protestant churches became a political and social movement and a 
nationalist agenda and Minjung theology inspired South Korean Protestant churches 
to become involved in the movement.  
Among South Korean churches there were various different voices and 
approaches to the unification of Korea depending on their theological and political 
positions. The spectrum of Korean Protestant churches was so wide that it is difficult 
to define the characteristics of each denomination. Regarding the definitions of the 
‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’ Korean Christian churches, Lee Deok-Joo, a professor of 
church history at Methodist Theological University, has argued that the terms 
generally referred to the theological differences between the Presbyterian Church in 
the Republic of Korea (Kijang) and other major Presbyterian denominations, based 
on the fact that Kijang was the first denomination to leave the Presbyterian Church 
because of theological differences. This division of the Presbyterian churches 
occurred in 1953 when the General Assembly of the Korean Presbyterian Church 
decided to punish Kim Jae-Joon, a pastor and professor of the Korean Theological 
Seminary. He was charged for questioning the inerrancy of Scripture and the Mosaic 
authorship of the Pentateuch. He and his supporters protested the decision and 
organised their own denomination, Kijang, under the banner of ‘freedom’ and 
                                               
7 Influenced by the liberation theology of Latin America, Minjung theology is a contextualised 
theology of South Korea constructed under the military dictatorship after the Korean War, which 
sought a theological system based on the liberation offered by minjung. ‘Minjung’ generally means 
‘common people’, but in this context it specifically refers “to people who are politically oppressed, 
economically deprived and exploited.” Sam Kyung Park, “Towards an Ethics of Korean 
Reunification” (PhD, Drew University, 2009), p. 67. For minjung thinkers, then, the freedom and 
wellbeing of minjung in the Korean context are best served by the democratisation and unification of 
Korea, because this would generally reduce the manipulative influence of unjust powers, such as 
dictators, and reduce the risk of war. Minjung theologians also believe that the unification of Korea 
would directly reveal God’s concern and compassion for the ten million Koreans whose families have 
been dispersed between the North and the South since the Korean War. 
8 For instance, the declaration requests that the South Korean and American governments withdraw 
US troops from South Korea and it asserts that the division of Korea was instigated by the imperialism 
of the Soviet Union and the United States. National Council of Churches in Korea, “The Declaration 
of Korean Churches for the Promotion of the Peace and Unification of Korea”: 






‘tolerance’. Henceforth, Kijang represented the liberal churches in South Korea and 
it actively participated in the global ecumenical movement and human rights 
movements in South Korea. They also contributed to the emergence of Minjung 
theology in the 1980s.9 However, through the rapid growth of the South Korean 
economy and the expanding number of South Korean churches and the Christian 
population, the theological boundaries between denominations became increasingly 
blurred. Instead, the criterion for the definition of ‘liberal’ or ‘conservative’ came to 
be applicable to their political positions, especially with regard to the attitude toward 
North Korea and unification. The liberal South Korean churches emphasise social 
context and negotiations with North Koreans, while the conservatives refuse to 
change according to the social and political context, instead trying to preserve their 
beliefs and principles, such as anti-communist attitudes toward North Korea.10 
Therefore, some generalities can be outlined regarding the unification of Korea: the 
more conservative denominations emphasise Christian missions to North Korea and 
evangelism rather than social and political involvement, while the more liberal 
churches tend to pursue social and political methods to promote the unification 
movement. 
Due to the fact that the unification movement of Korean Protestant churches 
has generally been presumed to be conducted in the socio-political realm, historical 
research on the involvement of Korean Protestants in this movement is biased toward 
more liberal churches that are most prominent and prima facie active. The tendency 
has been to separate the unification movement from Christian missions to North 
Korea that have attracted the support of conservative denominations, but for 
conservatives, such missions themselves constitute the only promising route towards 
eventual unification. They prayed that it was God’s will that North Korean 
communism would collapse and believed that they had to prepare to rebuild churches 
in North Korea after the South absorbed the North. After the collapse of the Soviet 
                                               
9 Deok-Joo Lee, “Theological Conflicts and Division of the Korean Presbyterian Church in the Post-
Liberal Era”, Christianity and History in Korea 44 (2016), pp. 135-138. 
10 “From Conflict toward Reconciliation: Liberals and Conservatives in the History of Korean 
Churches”, Kidokgyo Sasang (Christian Thoughts) 46, no. 1 (2002), pp. 43-44: Jong-Won Lee, “A 
Study on the Conflict between Liberalism and Conservativism of the Korean Church and its Solution- 





Union, they preached that the North Korean communist regime would soon end and 
that South Korean Christians should prepare for unification. However, there has been 
no sign that the North Korean regime will end in spite of the death of Kim Il-Sung in 
1994 and the famine in the mid-1990s, known as ‘the Arduous March’. After this, 
South Korean mission efforts towards North Korea began to take such forms as 
humanitarian efforts through various NGOs like World Vision, and caring for North 
Korean defectors, while the South Korean leadership also began to plan for the future 
unification of Korea.11  
This research primarily focuses on two interdenominational organisations that 
have been particularly influential in the unification movement of Korean Protestant 
churches: the National Council of Churches in Korea (NCCK), representing the more 
liberal Protestant churches, and the Christian Council of Korea (CCK), representing 
the more conservative Protestant churches. In order to research the theological basis 
for the unification movement, four major figures of the Korean Protestant churches 
were selected: two pastors who have been influential in South Korean churches as 
well as South Korean society, and two theologians who have developed their own 
theological approaches to the unification of Korea. Han Kyung-Chik (1902-2000) of 
the Presbyterian Church of Korea was acknowledged as the chief Protestant anti-
communist voice and he led national evangelism. He was born in the Northern part 
of Korea and organised a political party with a vision for a Christianised and 
democratised Korean nation. Han was nationalist and anti-communist and he became 
an influential figure in South Korea after his evacuation from the North. He is 
regarded as an ecumenist who once worked for the NCCK, but he founded the CCK 
in 1989 in opposition to the social policy of the NCCK. Kim Young-Han, born in 
1946, is a conservative theologian who emphasises peaceful unification through 
spiritual transformation and social development and focuses on the human rights 
issues of North Koreans. Kim’s theological approach to the unification of Korea is 
the best example of the unification discourse of the conservative South Korean 
churches that pursue unification through absorbing North Korea. Moon Ik-hwan 
                                               
11 Hee-Mo Yim, “A Study on Changes of Unification Policy and North Korea Mission Policy”, 





(1918-1994) was a Presbyterian pastor and theologian and a passionate social activist 
who worked for the unification and democratisation of Korea. In 1989, he violated a 
national security law of South Korea and met Kim Il-Sung (1912-1994), the 
preeminent North Korean leader from 1948, to discuss the unification of Korea. Park 
Soon-Kyung, born in 1923, a member of Korean Methodist Church and a former 
professor of Ewha Womans University in Seoul is a liberal theologian and social 
activist who worked for the NCCK and initiated theological discourse on the 
unification of Korea, particularly based on the idea of the ‘nation’.  
The main focus of this study will be the period from 1972 through to 2010. 
As noted above, 1972 has a significant meaning with regard to the 7.4 Joint 
Communiqué, but at that time the Korean Protestant churches could not officially 
engage in the unification movement because the Korean government strictly 
enforced a principle that only the government could work for unification with the 
North Korean government. In the 1980s, liberal Protestant churches tried to find a 
pathway to create a unification movement through international networks such as the 
World Council of Churches (WCC) and the World Alliance of Reformed Churches 
(WARC) and they issued the 88 Declaration. In the 1990s, South Korean Protestant 
churches started to work together on humanitarian projects for North Korea, whose 
people had suffered from a serious famine. In the first decade of the new millennium, 
the number of North Korean defectors grew rapidly due to the economic crisis in 
North Korea.12 As a result, Protestant churches started to think about the differences 
between North and South Koreans for the purposes of ministering to the defectors. 
2010 was also a significant year in the relationship between the South and the North. 
On November 23, North Korean artillery struck Yeonpyeong Island, which is located 
in the Yellow Sea and belongs to South Korea. This was the first ground attack by 
the North Korean army since the Korean War and it resulted in bitter confrontation 
between the two countries. After the strike, the South Korean Government ended all 
official dialogue with the North Korean Government and NGOs faced difficulties 
                                               
12 The number of North Korean defectors who lived in South Korea in 1998 was 947. In the first decade 
of the new millennium, the number grew rapidly to 20,400. Ministry of Unification, “Statistics of North 





continuing their humanitarian work for North Koreans. As a further result of the 
attack in 2010, anti-communism and anti-North Korean sentiment again became rife 
in South Korea, and unification discourses, especially based on the homogeneity of 
the Korean nation, were strongly challenged.  
With the growing influence of anti-communism and antagonism against 
North Koreans in the South, many South Koreans began to doubt the feasibility of 
the unification of the North and South. In a national survey in 2006, 65% of South 
Koreans answered that unification should be achieved, but by 2010 this percentage 
had dropped to 54%. It should be noted that the older generation who experienced 
the Korean War still exhibit strong antagonism towards the North Korean regime and 
claim that South Korea has to absorb the North for unification to be politically and 
socially possible.13 This antagonistic attitude toward the North Korean regime also 
extends to religious spheres and can be found in the majority of South Korean 
Protestant churches, meaning it remains difficult for South Korean Protestants to 
work for the reconciliation and unification of the two Koreas. It is significant that 
Protestants constitute around 15% of the South Korean population and they are 
highly influential in South Korean society because Protestants comprise a high 
proportion of the leadership in government, social organisations and private 
companies. In these circumstances, it is vital to discover how Christian theology can 
contribute to redeeming the manipulated memory of war and the division of Korea, 
helping to dissolve the remaining antagonism towards North Koreans and the North 
Korean regime in order for reconciliation and, eventually, unification to be achieved. 
 
2. Research Questions 
 
The current research project sets out to ask a number of questions about the 
national unification movement among Korean Protestant churches. The primary 
questions will be: “How far and in what ways have nationalist and evangelical 
agendas intertwined with South Korean anti-communism to shape the different 
                                               
13 Centre for Peace and Unification, Seoul University, 2014 National Survey of South Korean’s 





theological thinking and pathways taken by Korean Protestant churches towards the 
ultimate goal of the unification of Korea since the Korean War?” Five subsidiary 
questions are as follows:  
 
• First, in what ways has a nationalist agenda influenced historical 
analysis of the movement for the unification of Korea?  
• Second, how have Korean Protestant churches promoted the 
unification movement since 1972, the year of the 7.4 Joint 
Communiqué between the governments of the South and North?  
• Third, has the nationalist agenda contributed to the divisions among 
Korean Protestants in promoting the unification movement, and if so, 
how did evangelical churches respond to the nationalist agenda, 
particularly with regard to their anti-communism?  
• Fourth, what differences are apparent between the respective 
theological standpoints adopted by the Protestant leaders Park Soon-
Kyung (Methodist), Moon Ik-Hwan (Presbyterian), Han Kyung-Chik 
(Presbyterian) and Kim Young-Han (Presbyterian) on the movement 
for the unification of Korea?  
• Fifth, to what extent could cooperation in constructing a Christian 
theology of memory and reconciliation contribute to the continuance 
of the Christian longing for the reconciliation and unification of Korea 
and to overcoming the disunity of South Korean churches in their 
responses to the problems of a divided Korea? 
 
3. Literature Review 
 
Until recently, there have not been many historical studies in Christian 
academic circles that focus entirely on the unification movement. Rather, many 
scholars of Korean church history have devoted just one or two chapters to the 
history of the unification movement as a part of works on the churches’ involvement 





History of Unification Movements in Korean Churches,14 which is a revised version 
of his doctoral dissertation submitted to the Presbyterian College and Theological 
Seminary in Seoul. In his book, Jeong presented a long historical trajectory of the 
unification movement of South Korean Protestant churches in parallel with the 
history of South Korean society. He highlighted the unification efforts of the 
Presbyterian Church of Korea (Tonghap) as a compromising endeavour between the 
unification movements of liberal and conservative South Korean churches.  
Among the academy of South Korean Christian scholars, the unification of 
Korea has been an important subject for Christian ethics. In 1999 Cho Eun-Sik wrote 
a history of the unification movement in Korea from the division of the Korean 
peninsula to the end of the 1990s. In his thesis,15 he describes the churches’ 
involvement in the unification movement and analyses the relationship between 
Christianity and the Juche ideology of North Korea, considering how Korean 
churches encountered North Korea’s national ideology and tried to solve ideological 
problems. However, his research mostly deals with the unification movement of the 
more liberal churches represented by the NCCK.  
Ha Chung-Yoube’s work16 highlights the differences between North Koreans 
and South Koreans through interviews with North Korean defectors and social-
anthropological research on the Youngnak Church, the founding members of which 
are refugees from Northern Korea who fled to the South just after the division in 
1945. This church has tried to embrace North Korean defectors. Ha argues that 
hostile ideological positions created differences in lifestyle and beliefs between 
North Koreans and South Koreans and that these differences have become so 
significant that it is hard for both groups to exist in one space. In his thesis, Ha 
criticises anti-communism, which he believes has overwhelmed conservative 
churches in South Korea and led the immigrant group of the church to explicitly and 
implicitly put pressure on North Korean defectors to assimilate into South Korean 
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society. He further suggests that we need to put aside the patronising attitude toward 
North Korean defectors to make a space for North Koreans to adjust on their own 
terms into South Korean society. His thesis is valuable as an illustration of the role of 
anti-communism as a basis for wolnammin (referring to the people who were 
evacuated from northern Korea before and during the Korean War) to discriminate 
against North Korean defectors, even within a Christian congregation. However, his 
study fails to explain the essence of anti-communism and its influence on the 
unification discourse in the broader community. Yoo Kyoung-Dong17 approaches 
unification using Reinhold Niebuhr’s thoughts on Christian realism. He argues that 
Koreans should find a moral foundation for unification that can be shared by the two 
Koreas. He proposes an “Agape love” of giving and sacrifice that promotes pacifism 
and overcomes violence in the Korean peninsula. This “Agape love” is not only 
rational, but also serves as the practical foundation for a potential unification.  
Jeong Gyoung-Ho18 traces the history of the division of Korea and describes 
how the division created ‘han’ (a feeling of suffering and oppression) among the 
minjung in both the North and the South. The problem with the division is that this 
tragic situation was caused by imperial powers with interests in the peninsula: the 
United States, the Soviet Union, Japan and China. Thus, the minjung are the victims 
of the division and the Cold War. The only resolution for this han among the 
minjung is unification as God is the liberator and Jesus the reviver of the minjung. 
Park Sam-Kyung19 also argues that the unification movement of Korea should focus 
on the resolution of han based on a synthesis of Minjung theology, sangsaeng (living 
together) theology, and tongil (unification) theology, and she concludes that the 
unification of Korea would not only be a political integration, but also the 
construction of a society of justice and peace.   
 Ha, Yoo, Jeong and Park have aptly analysed the current context of Korea. 
Ha delineates the critical differences between people in the two Koreas and Jeong 
and Park trace the reasons for the division and the meaning of unification for the 
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minjung. Yoo attempts to present fundamental ground upon which to overcome 
ideological differences and conflicts in Korea and tends to emphasise peace more 
than unification. In spite of the various discussions on the reconciliation and 
unification of Korea, none of these, however, provide a relevant assessment of how 
South Korean anti-communism and anti-North Korean prejudice manipulated the 
memory and sentiment of the South Korean populace toward North Korea, as well as 
the Christian identity of South Korean Christians. Moreover, their arguments are 
unable to provide a specific theological explanation for how truthful and just 
memory could lead to justice, reconciliation and the eventual unification of Korea.  
As mentioned above, one of the main themes of this study is the complex 
relationship between nationalism, minjung and unification from a Christian 
perspective. Western scholars have developed various approaches toward the 
concepts of the ‘nation state’ and ‘nationalism’, most of them tracing the origins of 
these concepts to  the 19th century.20 Among these, modernist theories on the roots of 
nation, which became the most influential in the late 20th century, focus on the 
economic and political reasons for the emergence of nationhood in the modern 
period. The most influential scholarly advocates of this theory are Ernst Gellner, Eric 
J. Hobsbawm and Benedict Anderson; Anderson argued that the ideas of nation and 
nationalism are “cultural artefacts of a particular kind”,21 whilst Gellner suggested 
that “nations are artefacts of men’s convictions and loyalties and solidarities.”22 
However, Adrian Hastings has defined ethnicity and nation by focusing on the 
history, language, literature and even religion of specific groups of people:  
An ethnicity is a group of people with a shared cultural identity and spoken 
language...a nation is a far more self-conscious community than an 
ethnicity...it possesses or claims the right to political identity and autonomy 
as a people, together with the control of specific territory, comparable to that 
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of biblical Israel and of other independent entities in a world thought of as 
one nation-state.23  
Upon this premise and against the modernist theory of the origin of nations, 
therefore, Hastings argued that for the English at least, nationalism already existed in 
the fourteenth century.24 Hastings’ arguments highlight the uniqueness of the origin 
of nations in accordance with the specific circumstances and histories of particular 
groups of people.  
The dominant Western theories of nations and their origins can be criticised 
for their Eurocentric arguments, narrow sampling of European nations, and 
ignorance about the importance of genealogical history for people in other parts of 
the world, including Korea. On the basis of his research into the history of Korea 
circa 1895 through to 1919, Andre Schmid criticised the Western theories of nations 
and their origins, suggesting they could not adequately explain the Korean case and 
they were prone to “oversimplifying the genealogy of the modern nation”.25 
Nationalism in Korea has developed along very different pathways from those 
outlined in Western models. For instance, while German nationalism based on strong 
ethnic loyalties became propaganda for right-wing parties and the grounds for 
German Nazism before the Second World War, Korean nationalism based on ethnic 
homogeneity was a strong propaganda tool favoured by political liberals who pursed 
the unification of Korea by overcoming the ideological fractions of the Korean 
people.26 Therefore, it would be inappropriate to apply a Western understanding of 
nation and nationalism to the divided Korea and I will not develop a broader 
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discussion of the ideas of nation and nationalism from a Western modernist 
perspective in this thesis.  
Moreover, an ideological cleavage,27 which has been strengthened by the 
authoritarian regime, has also caused a cleavage in the understanding of ‘nation’ in 
South Korea, as well as conflicts of identity among the South Korean people. 
Consequently, some researches have challenged the conventional interpretation of 
nationalism in Korea and argued that these approaches to Korean nationalism should 
be developed into a new understanding of the Korean nation that relegates the ethnic 
homogeneity of the Korean people to a place of secondary importance, instead 
searching for a new identity of the Korean nation based on shared values for a better 
future, which would include the unified Korea.28 This thesis will illustrate that South 
Korean churches have not been unaffected by the ideological fractions of South 
Korea, and it will then seek a way to provide communal values to overcome 
ideological fractions in South Korea through a theological approach to truthful 
memory, forgiveness, restorative justice, and reconciliation for the unification of 
Korea. 
It should also be emphasised that minjung sentiment was not confined to 
certain Korean Christian theologians, but was widely shared among social activists, 
intellectuals and students who participated in the democratisation movement under 
the authoritarian governments in South Korea. South Korean theologians developed 
this widespread minjung sentiment into a unique contextual and liberation theology 
of South Korea: minjung theology. In 1984, scholars in socio-political sciences and 
theology published a book entitled, Essays on Minjung,29 to explain what minjung 
meant in terms of Korean history; they defined the minjung as ‘politically oppressed, 
and economically manipulated’ masses, arguing minjung should reflect the 
subjectivity of the history of Korea and be able to achieve the democratisation of 
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South Korea. In 2009, Lee Nam-Hee published a book developing her doctoral 
dissertation on the origin of minjung sentiment and its movement in the 1980s.  She 
argues  that minjung sentiment was an artefact of the social culture of jaeya activists 
and scholars grounded on a revisionist history, in order to emphasise the history of 
Korea as a history of resistance to unjust imperial powers and social structures.30 
However, minjung and national sentiment and discourse in South Korea have been 
facing challenges in the changing socio-political landscape in South Korea in the 21st 
century, especially with regard to the unification discourse.  
As a result, there have been growing doubts about the relevance of 
nationalism and Minjung theology as a basis for reshaping South Koreans’ 
enthusiasm for the reconciliation and unification of Korea in accordance with the 
socio-political changes in 21st century South Korea. Among Christian scholars, 
Sebastian Chang-Hwan Kim and Kirsteen Kim present pertinent questions regarding 
the limitations of mono-ethnic nationalism in the Korean Protestant churches’ 
promotion of the unification of Korea. In their A History of Korean Christianity, they 
challenge the current state of historical scholarship on Korean churches.31 They 
argue that historical research on Korean Christianity should overcome the limits of 
mono-ethnic nationalism and Minjung theology whose limited identification of the 
Korean people is inappropriate within the current context of Korea. More than seven 
million Koreans live in foreign countries and even in Korea there is a large 
immigrant population. Compared to the social context in which Minjung theology 
first developed, they claim, Korean people have achieved significant progress in 
politics, economics and social welfare. The Kims also outline the history of 
Christianity in North Korea. Their presentation of the limitations of mono-ethnic 
nationalism and minjung theology is followed by a discussion of the unification 
movement. The Kims’ book presents a general and insightful history of Korean 
Christianity, particularly given that they are living in the West, writing in English.   
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Even though the works of secular scholars are not directly related to 
theological reflection on South Korean churches’ involvement in unification 
discourses, some of their works are worth mentioning in developing an 
understanding of how South Korean nationalism has limitations as a basis for 
continued unification discourse. Seo Jung-Seok in particular questions the nationalist 
agenda in the unification movement. In his book, Korean Nationalism Betrayed and 
Distorted,32 he insists that nationalism in Korea after the Korean War has not 
promoted the cause of unification, but rather has been a cause of conflict and 
sectarianism. Hence, with the nationalist agenda reinstated after the Korean War, it 
became difficult to find a new direction for unification in the Korean context. His 
research, as a secular historian, underlines the need for a new approach to 
nationalism and unification in which there is a dialogue between church historians 
and secular historians with a view to overcoming the current methodological 
impediments of the unification movements.  
Kwon Hyuk-Beom33 has also illustrated the risks of nationalism in modern 
South Korea, segregating ‘others’ from ‘us’ and the ‘individual’ from the ‘nation’. 
Based on this phenomenon, people who have a strong sense of what ties a ‘nation’ 
together tend to discriminate against ‘others’ and to ignore the individual’s freedom 
and rights for national development and security. Applied to the modern unification 
discourse in South Korea, this approach generally ignores individual freedoms and 
rights since only the unification of Korea is believed to have the potential to bring 
about the flourishing of the nation. Choo Yong-Shik approaches the unification 
movement from a socio-political perspective. He claims that the unification 
movement of Korea faces a difficult dilemma in so far as the movement aims to 
create one nation of ethnic homogeneity. He argues that even though the majority of 
people in the two countries do not doubt their identity as a homogeneous people, 
their leaderships have alienated each other, naming their counterparts “alien-
installed, anti-national traitors”.34 Choo analyses the division of Korea into two 
                                               
32 Jung-Seok Seo, Korean Nationalism Betrayed and Distorted (Seoul: Sungkyunkwan University Press, 
2004).	
33 Hyuk-Beom Kwon, Nationalism and an Illusion of Development (Seoul: Sol Publication, 2000). 
34 Yong Shik Choo, “Rethinking Ethnic Homogeneity: A Dilemma of Reconciliation and Unification 





countries with different ideologies and economies and concludes that in this 
dilemma, an ethnic homogeneous nationalism, a driving force toward the unification, 




This study is a predominantly historical survey that traces the trajectory of the 
unification movement driven by various churches represented by two major inter-
denominational organisations: the NCCK and the CCK. Nevertheless, this study will 
also include a suggestion for an alternative theological approach to the unification 
movement, as an alternative to Minjung theology and the nationalism and North 
Korean missions of conservative Protestant churches that have been prevalent in 
discourses on the unification of Korea. Therefore, my analysis will rely on very few 
sources written in the West or written in English, instead focusing on resources 
written in Korean and by the Koreans who have worked for and studied the peace 
and unification of Korea. Chapter 7 is the exception to this, where I attempt to apply 
theologies of memory, healing and reconciliation from Western perspectives to the 
Korean context. 
First, this study will question whether nationalism is a suitable basis for 
Christian thinking about unification by reviewing the literature of ‘revisionist’ and 
governmental documents. Scholars of revisionist Korean history have emphasised a 
nationalism that dominated during the Japanese occupation, rooting it in a 
homogenous ethnic identity that embraces North Korean communists and could be 
used to formulate an ideological basis for discourse on unification. In contrast, the 
anti-communist South Korean governments excommunicated the North Korean 
leadership and identified nationalism with anti-communism. Hence, the thesis will 
examine the two models of Christian nationalism in Korea – the ethnic model and the 
state model – applying these to the different approaches of South Korean Protestants 
and to the historiographies of revisionist historians and official governmental 
documents, such as the annual white papers of the Ministry of Unification, 
presidential inaugural speeches, congress papers and reports and so on, all issued 





Second, I will study the documents of the two inter-denominational 
organisations (the NCCK and the CCK) on the unification movement, including their 
resource books, the minutes of their meetings and their official reports on unification 
endeavours to search for the trajectories of the two distinct unification movements. 
Conservative Protestant churches did not engage in the unification movement in 
cooperation with other churches before the foundation of the CCK in 1989. 
However, even before 1989, a prototype for their unification movement can be found 
in their humanitarian concern for North Korean people via prayer meetings. 
Therefore, this part of the thesis is heavily dependent on the pamphlets and 
proceedings of the meetings and preliminary meeting reports. In contrast, the NCCK 
constructed their unification movement at an organisational level from the beginning. 
They held various conferences abroad with other churches in the world and released 
numerous proclamations. For instance, the Commission of Churches on International 
Affairs of the WCC met in Tokyo in November 1984 with the agenda of: Peace and 
Justice in North-East Asia: Prospects for Peaceful Resolution of Conflict.35  
Third, in order to assess how far a nationalist agenda since 1972 has shaped 
the unification movement among the Korean Protestant churches, I will study 
primary sources relating to the main figures in the two groups. Park Soon-Kyung and 
Moon Ik-Hwan were prominent in the first generation of the unification movement 
(the liberal group) and are regarded as pioneers of a unification theology under the 
influence of a nationalist agenda of liberals and Minjung theology. Park published a 
few books on unification theology from a feminist perspective. Moon, meanwhile, 
published books and articles on unification, as well as actively engaging in social 
movements, as a result of which he was arrested and spent many years in prison. In 
contrast, Han Kyung-Chik was a well-known Christian leader who ministered in the 
North before the division and he founded Youngnak Church in Seoul in 1946 with 
other North Korean refugees. He dreamt of a Christianised and democratised nation 
and initiated various revival campaigns in Korea. He emphasised an approach to 
unification premised on Christian faith and love prevailing in the South as well as the 
North. He was a strong proponent of anti-communism, attacking communism as the 
                                               





ruling system of the North, and he launched various humanitarian activities for North 
Koreans. Most of his primary sources are held in the Kyung-Chik Han Memorial 
Library in Seoul and many of them are accessible online. Finally, Kim Young-Han is 
a professor at Soongsil University in Seoul and still works in the Korean Society of 
Christian Philosophy. In addition to engaging with his written work, I interviewed 
him so I was able to fully study his theological approach to the unification.  
One challenge I faced in researching the unification thoughts of conservative 
and liberal Protestants was that I could not obtain enough written sources. In 
particular, as the conservative Christian churches considered unification a political 
agenda and they did not develop a theology fully dedicated to the unification of 
Korea, I had difficulty in finding written sources by conservative theologians and 
church leaders. Moreover, theologians who participated in unification movements 
were prone to be hesitant about frankly explaining their arguments in their written 
sources because the unification of Korea has long been a very sensitive issue, even 
among South Korean Protestant churches. Hence, to collect their stories relating to 
unification issues I tried to interview those who currently work for inter-
denominational committees for the unification of Korea and who represent academic 
society. To reach the interviewees who worked for the unification within academic 
and Christian society, I communicated with personnel from interdenominational 
organisations such as the NCCK. The lists of the interviewees are included in the 
bibliography section of this thesis. 
 
Fourth, I will present an alternative and constructive approach to Christian 
discourse on the unification movement in Korea. Many of the unification discourses 
focus on the goal of resolution without paying much attention to the preliminary 
steps to unification. Without resolving the historical conflicts between the two 
countries and even among South Koreans themselves, all efforts toward unification 
will be superficial. As stated in the literature review, scholars in Christian ethics 
argue that South Koreans have to overcome the South Korean anti-communism that 
was strengthened by the Korean War and the Cold War era, but they do not present 
satisfactory methods by which to achieve such a goal. I expect to find that anti-





ideological conviction as an experiential hatred of the North Korean regime, as well 
as being influenced by statist propagation of anti-communism and manipulation of 
their memories. Hence, I will describe how Christian belief can contribute to the 
current context of Korea in resolving these conflicts and hatreds in a realistic way 
with reference to theological studies of memory and reconciliation, particularly those 
of Miroslav Volf.  Moreover, as the last chapter explores how memory of war and 
militant confrontations between the two Koreas influenced the South Korean 
population, I was curious about what the younger generations think of North Korea 
and North Koreans, as well as what happens when they physically engage with North 
Koreans. Hence, I communicated with a department director of the Training Centre 
for the National Team of South Korea in Jincheon where the South Korean Ladies’ 
Ice Hockey Team trained with North Korean athletes for the 2018 PyeongChang 
Olympic Games. I interviewed six young athletes who actually played with North 
Korean players to find answers to my questions. 
 
5. Contributions of the study 
 
Existing historical analysis of the unification movement in Korea has focused 
on the work of liberal churches and their political and social involvement in the 
movement. Nationalism and Minjung theology has provided frameworks for 
historical research into the unification movement. The work of conservative groups 
has therefore been neglected and insufficiently researched. Rather, their activities 
have been treated as wholly separate from the unification movement and labelled as 
missions to North Korea. However, I argue that their mission activities have been 
shaped by a vision that the two Koreas should become one based on biblical 
teachings of love. Even though their activities have attracted some suspicion and 
discontent among more liberal groups, their initial insights are worthy of attention in 
the current context of Korea. Moreover, without dialogue between secular historians 
and church historians and because of the supposition that unification can be realised 
only by political, social and educational endeavour, it has been hard to find an 
alternative theological approach to that of Minjung theology in the historical research 





Due to the fast economic development and a partially successful 
democratisation movement in South Korea, Minjung theology and the nationalist 
agenda for the unification movement are facing challenges. There has not been any 
satisfactory research on the unification movement since 2000 and Minjung 
theologians are struggling to find an alternative or supplementary theology by which 
to make Minjung theology appropriate for and relevant to contemporary Korea. 
Neglecting the growth of churches and the fulfilment of people’s expectation for 
spiritual discipline, the churches supporting Minjung theology – mostly members of 
the NCCK – are experiencing stagnation in their numbers of church members, as 
well as numbers of churches themselves. Evangelical churches represented by the 
CCK are in the meantime engaging in the unification movement more passionately 
than before as the South Korean government attempts to open dialogue with the 
North Korean government. In the historical research, the evangelical churches’ 
endeavours for the unification of Korea have not been satisfactorily studied. This 
work will therefore seek to compile and analyse the scattered historical materials 
dealing with the North Korean missions of Korean evangelical churches. Through 
historical research into the unification movement of evangelical churches, the thesis 
will reflect critically on their work and suggest an appropriate direction for the 
unification movement in the future. 
It is hoped that this study of the unification movement in Korea, with its 
particular emphasis on evangelical approaches, will pave the way for the expansion 
of the sphere of the unification movement and lay the ground for liberal churches of 
Minjung theology and evangelical churches to cooperate in the future on the 
unification movement. In particular, this study argues for the need to deal with the 
inner conflicts and hatred against North Koreans among South Koreans that are due 
to traumatic experiences during the division and the war in the Korean peninsula and 
based on a collective memory constructed by authoritarian governments. This can be 
done by seeking a just and truthful memory as a step toward the reconciliation of 
Korea. This would perhaps mean overcoming South Koreans’ anti-communist, anti-
North Korean sentiments and even their absolute belief in the homogeneity of the 





South Korean Anti-communism and the Birth of Minjung Theology 
among South Korean Protestant Churches 
 
After the division of Korea, South Korea fell under an authoritarian regime. 
Although the country achieved enormous economic growth under this regime, the 
population did not have freedom of publication and their human rights were limited 
by the government, ostensibly due to the need for state security against North Korean 
communists. In the political turmoil of South Korea, anti-communism became an 
ideology that dominated people’s attitudes toward North Korea and manipulated 
their memories. South Korean anti-communism was also intertwined with statist 
nationalism that segregated North and South Koreans into salutary kukmin (referring 
people who live in a state with legitimate citizenship) and virulent kukmin, 
oppressing and persecuting the latter for their involvement in democratisation and 
human rights movements against the authoritarian governments. Against the 
nationalist discourse of authoritarian governments, social activists and scholars 
proposed an ethnic-centred nationalism that emphasised the homogenous national 
identity of Koreans for the future unification of Korea. Cooperating with social 
activists working towards the democratisation of Korea, liberal Christians and 
theologians developed minjung theology as a theological basis for the 
democratisation and unification of Korea.  
 
1.1. The Age of Political Turmoil and People’s Demand for Democracy 
 
 With the end of the Korean War in July 1953, Rhee Syng-Man accelerated 
his dictatorship through various political moves. First, he and the ruling party 
(Jayudang) imposed a constitutional amendment that illegally allowed Rhee life-time 
presidency. Second, after the decisive defeat of his ruling party at the general 
election in 1958, the government rigged the presidential election in 1960 using 
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political terrorist tactics against the opposition party and “oppressive measures”.1 To 
ensure the security of their regime, Rhee’s government regarded people who stood 
against them as communist collaborators and enemies of South Korea. Regarding a 
relationship with North Korea, Rhee’s government announced that the only way to 
unification was by military methods and it supressed public calls for a peaceful 
unification of Korea. In 1959, for instance, Rhee’s government purged a prominent 
politician, Cho Bong-Am, who proposed a peaceful unification of the two Koreas. 
The government made anti-communism a national ideology and insisted on the 
absorption of North Korea. However, when the 4.19 Revolution broke out against 
Rhee’s government, Rhee resigned from the presidency in 1960.  
 After the resignation of Rhee Syng-Man, Chang Myeon became prime 
minister of the second government of South Korea. He tried to progress democracy 
in Korea and to construct some consensus for the unification of the Koreas.2 
However, his experiments were unsuccessful and South Korean politics fell into 
chaos. On May 16, 1961, Park Chung-hee and his troops established a new regime 
through a military coup.3 The majority of the military officials who took part in the 
military coup were in fact from North Korea, threatened by the unification dialogues 
of the Chang Myeon government. It was widely reported among immigrants from the 
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Northern Korea that six million North Korean refugees would be executed if South 
Korea became a communist country.4 According to the difference between the two 
economies after the Korean War, it is understandable that the majority of South 
Koreans feared the South would be occupied by the communists from the North. 
With the end of the Korean War, the North Korean economy was rapidly restored 
because it grew fast from heavy industries put in place by the Japanese 
administration during the Japanese occupation. Compared with the growth of the 
North Korean economy, South Koreans still suffered from shortages of food and 
daily necessaries.5 Therefore, with an underdeveloped economy, and facing the rapid 
restoration of North Korea, South Koreans worried about the influence of North 
Korea over South Korea. Against this social context, Park Chung-hee and his 
military companions took power with anti-communist and economic development 
propaganda designed to attract South Koreans.6 The South Koreans who 
acknowledged the military government believed that it was acceptable for their rights 
to be limited for the sake of economic development and victory over the North 
Korean communists. Park often proclaimed, “[we should regard] myself as a part of 
our nation and state, and a national development is my growth. Therefore, my service 
and sacrifice for our nation and state is eventually for myself.”7  
 The governmental propaganda emphasising anti-communism and economic 
development successfully attracted South Koreans. Even liberal politicians and NGO 
workers thought that Park’s government was a nationalist and democratic 
                                               
4 Myeong-Jin Chae, “Autobiography of Chae Myeong-Jin: Across the Death-Line”, p. 389, recited 
from Jung-Lan Yoon, The Korean War and Korean Protestant Churches (Seoul: Han-Eol Academy, 
2015), p. 291. 
5 As of 1961, the GNP of South Korea was 82 dollars, while that of North Korea was 195. In 1962, the 
gap between the GNP of the two countries grew bigger: in South Korea 87 and in the North, 211. Ki-
Deok Park and Jong-Seok Lee, Comparative Studies on the Governmental Systems of Two Koreas and 
on an Unification Methology (Seoul: Sejong Research Center, 1995), p. 274. 
6 Even the leaders of civil organisations welcomed the military coup. For instance, Jang Joon-Ha, who 
fiercely opposed Park’s regime in the early 1970s, wrote, “If 4.19 Revolution was a democratic 
revolution which brought about an improvement in politics and the social rights of South Koreans, 
5.16 Revolution is a military revolution which devastates corruption, disorder and communists’ 
influence in South Korea. In a word, the military revolution is a nationalist movement to straighten a 
way forward into a right future for South Koreans.” Myung-Lim Park, “Resistance of Jaeya under the 
Park Chung-hee Regime: Focusing on the Rise and Expansion of Issues, ” Journal of Korean Political 
and Diplomatic History 30, no. 1 (Aug. 2008), p. 32. 
7 A New Year’s Presidential Inauguration at a media conference January 9, 1970. “Editor’s Note: 
Pathway toward Unifying Our Mind and Calling, ” Kyung Hyang Newspaper January 10, 1970. 
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government. The NCCK published an official statement welcoming the military 
coup:  
The 5.16 Military Revolution was an inevitable solution to corruption and 
chaotic social order and will bring about a reconstruction of South Korea. We 
welcome the principles of the military coup and hope that they will drive 
these principles without any hesitation.8  
However, this support for Park’s government ceased when the government drew up a 
treaty with the Japanese government regarding the victims of the Japanese 
occupation. NGO leaders and students claimed that the Park’s government was 
collaborating with the Japanese government and it was “anti-nationalist and anti-
democratic”, launching political protests against the government. 
 Even though Park’s government achieved significant growth of the economy, 
they had no plan to hand over power through democratic elections. They began to 
purge opponents and amended the South Korean constitution to take a step toward a 
life-long presidency for Park Chung-hee. In 1969, Park’s ruling party proposed an 
amendment of the constitution that enabled Park to remain in the presidency for three 
terms. Against the amendment, various NGOs gathered together and founded a 
People’s League for Protesting the Amendment of the Constitution (Samseon Gae 
Heon Bandae Beom Kukmin Tujaeng Wiwonhoi) on July 17, 1969. The league 
selected pastor Kim Jae-Jun as chairperson and announced that Park’s government 
had been driving against the tide of the people’s hope for democracy and economic 
justice.9 The participants argued that Park’s regime had become a dictatorship and 
was trying to make South Korea a totalitarian state. Nonetheless, a referendum on the 
amendment of the constitution on October 17, 1969 resulted in the amendment being 
allowed. With the result of the referendum, the protests against the government were 
rapidly weakened.10 Along with a political protest against Park’s government, liberal 
NGO leaders strongly drove civil right movements concerning the rights of labourers 
and the democracy of South Korea. On April 19 in 1971, they organised the People’s 
                                               
8 Yoon, The Korean War and Korean Protestant Churches, p. 292.  
9 Park, “Resistance of Jaeya under the Park Chung-hee Regime: Focusing on the Rise and Expansion 




League to Protect the Democracy of South Korea (Minju Suho Kukmin Hyeopuihoi). 
In spite of these efforts, however, Park won the presidential election in 1972. 
 Starting his new presidency in 1972, Park’s government put in place various 
plans for economic development and advertised Park’s dictatorship and totalitarian 
governance as a ‘productive democracy’. They also denounced the election system, a 
basic method of democracy, insisting that North Korea regarded elections in South 
Korea as an opportunity to penetrate South Korea because election campaigns could 
divide people and create havoc. Therefore, they propagated the message that the life-
long presidency of Park without elections would create a genuine and productive 
South Korean democracy against North Korean communism.11  
 
1.2. Developing a National Ideology: Anti-Communism (Bangong) 
  
 In his discussion of the particular meaning that anti-communism assumed in 
South Korea, Kwon Hyuk-Beom has defined anti-communism in South Korea as the 
“oversocialised hostility toward North Korea through which the North Korean 
regime and government are defined as evil, and in which is embedded a desire that 
the evil North Korean regime and government should be destroyed or collapse, and it 
is justified to militantly oppress the left’s ideology and thoughts…” He also insists 
that anti-communism is “an ideological expression of fierce hostile sentiment toward 
all the thoughts of leftists regardless of [the] social virtues” of the diverse political 
and sociological ideas.12 Therefore, in this thesis, the term ‘anti-communism’ is used 
in a quite specific sense that differs from the general opposition to communism as an 
ideology. Rather, it reflects the individual, social and national sentiment in South 
                                               
11 Ji-Hyung Kim, “The Dismantling and Continuance of the Governing Ideology of Park Chung-hee 
from 1960s to 1970s: Centering Found Mutual Constraints of Anti-Communism and Democracy,” 
Journal of Democracy and Human Rights 13, no. 2 (2013), p. 180. 
12 Kwon, Nationalism and an Illusion of Development , p. 141: Similarly, anti-communism in Korea 
has coalesced with the various issues in South Korea, such as the continuance of American military 
bases in South Korea, regionalism and the National Security Law. For a further political analysis of 
these phenomena in political sciences, see Youngmi Kim, “Ideological cleavages and the debate over 
the National Security Law”. 
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Korea expressed in militant hatred of North Korea and North Korean people and 
those who pursue progressive political agendas.  
As noted above, the first governmental policy under Park Chung-hee was 
anti-communism, which was intertwined with state nationalism and 
developmentalism,13 and the government used anti-communism to prolong their stay 
in power. First, Park’s government and his ruling party legislated the anti-
communism law that Rhee’s government had tried to enact. The anti-communism 
law was used by Park’s government to oppress people who resisted the government: 
around 2,000 people were arrested and taken to court on the basis of this law.14 
Second, in addition to the national security law enacted by Rhee’s government, Park 
Chung-hee established the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) in 1961. The 
KCIA had the critical role of supporting Park’s regime, rather than simply providing 
intelligence operations, and it showed significant skill in oppressing political activists 
and presenting them as anti-state organisations or communists.15 With the support of 
the KCIA, the anti-communist law and the national security law, Park’s government 
limited civil rights and punished people who protested against the government. They 
even fabricated cases of anti-state and communist activity in order to sway public 
opinion. One of the famous fraudulent cases was the Inhyokdang (People’s 
Revolution Party) case, which resulted in the executions of eight innocent people.16  
                                               
13 Kun-Woo Kim, “The Discourse Topography of 1964 : Anti-Communism, Nationalism, Democracy, 
Liberalism, and Developmentism,” Journal of Popular Narative 15, no. 2 (2009), p. 74. 
14 Park, “Resistance of Jaeya under the Park Chung-hee Regime: Focusing on the Rise and Expansion 
of Issues.”, p. 37. 
15 Nam-Hee Lee, “Making Minjung Subjectivity: Crisis of Subjectivity and Rewriting History, 1960--
1988” (PhD, University of Chicago, 2001), p. 221. 
16 The Inhyokdang case was a fraud case brought by KCIA. They reported that some social activists 
had created a party named Inhyukdang and tried to overthrow the government. The first case took 
place in 1964 and the court sentenced 12 of the accused to be put in jail. The second case was in 1974 
when political demonstrations against Park Chung-hee were fiercely fuelled after the amendment of 
the constitution, enabling the life-long presidency of Park. The KCIA announced that the people of the 
first Inhyokdang case had tried to restore the party and plotted against the government for the North 
Korean communist party. 23 people were found guilty and eight of them were executed just 18 hours 
after sentencing by the supreme court. In 2001, the Presidential Truth Commission on Suspicious 
Deaths reinvestigated the Inhyokdang cases: the Seoul District Court announced that the cases were a 
fraud and lacked evidence and the accused were innocent. Myung-Hyuk Jun, “A Study on People's 
Revolution Party in 1960s,” Critical Review of History, no. 95 (2011), Hyongtae Kim "The Case of 
the Restoration Movement of People's Revolution Party," (Seoul: Forum Truth & Justice, 2007). 
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 Park’s government denounced both liberalism and communism, insisting that 
they were both the products of western culture and could be ignored in the South 
Korean context.17 The government also blamed communism as it was a major cause 
of the Korean War and an ideology used to justify people being killed.18 Park’s 
government strongly encouraged anti-communism in the field of education. In 
particular, one third of the contents of ethics classes for junior and high school 
students were related to anti-communism. Anti-communist terminology appeared in 
the Charter of National Education in 1968, and in 1971 the charter identified a free 
democracy with anti-communism.19 
 Even though Park’s regime strongly oppressed public opinion and limited 
human rights in South Korea, the majority of South Koreans agreed with the 
governmental policy of developmentalism and modernisation because they were 
facing the rapid economic growth of North Korea after the Korean War, while South 
Koreans were being challenged by a shortage of food supplies and poverty. 
Therefore, the most important governmental propaganda in the 1960s focused on 
how to achieve economic growth. Park outlined ‘national modernisation’ in 
November 1961 and strongly emphasised the terminology, mentioning it over 50 
times in his public conferences and addresses in 1964.20 The authoritarian 
government thus drove national modernisation policy to overcome North Korean 
communism in the Korean peninsula, disregarding democracy in South Korea.  
                                               
17 Park Chung-hee presented Korean nationalist democracy rather than ‘westernised’ democracy, 
arguing that a western democracy is not economically productive, it would cause harsh conflicts 
among people and be wasteful with regard to economic progress. Therefore, he insisted that South 
Korea needed a new type of democracy that could guarantee economic development. He used the term 
‘administrative democracy’ when he led a military coup in 1961. The term has an ironic double 
meaning in that even though Park’s regime politically yearned for democracy, the human rights of 
South Koreans could be limited for economic development. Later he emphasised independent 
economy, modernisation and nationalism in using the term ‘nationalist democracy’. Kim, “The 
Dismantling and Continuance of the Governing Ideology of Park Chung-hee from 1960s to 1970s: 
Centering Found Mutual Constraints of Anti-Communism and Democracy.”, pp. 174-177. 
18 Kun-Woo Kim, “The Discourse Topography of 1964: Anti-Communism, Nationalism, Democracy, 
Liberalism, and Developmentism,” Journal of Popular Narative 15, no. 2 (2009), p. 75. 
19 Lee, “Park Chung-hee's Regime and Regression of Korean Conservatism.”, p. 49.  
20 Byung-Ju Hwang, “The Ruling Discourse of Park Chung-hee Regime: Focused on the 
Modernisation Discourse” (Hanyang University, 2008), pp. 130-105, cited from Kim, “The Discourse 
Topography of 1964: Anti-Communism, Nationalism, Democracy, Liberalism, and 
Developmentism.”, p. 75.  
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Park’s government took advantage of its relationship with North Korea to 
make the regime stable. In August 1972, the North and South Korean Red Cross 
organisation held a conference and, in the following year, both governments signed 
the 7.4. Joint Communiqué. The South Korean people were surprised by the meeting 
because the government was believed to be a strong anti-communist government. 
Soon afterwards, Park’s government published a special presidential announcement 
on October 17, 1972, which stated that the National Assembly would be dissolved as 
of 7pm that day and all kinds of political activities by political parties were 
prohibited. The government declared martial law and issued a constitutional 
amendment entitled, “A Proposal of Constitutional Amendment for a Peaceful 
Unification’. Park argued that all the measures the government enacted were rooted 
in his personal will to continue South and North Korean dialogues in favour of 
creating rapid change in the world.21 In this declaration, he mentioned the unification 
of the two Koreas 18 times and stated that the Yushin regime was essential for 
unification. Thus, ironically, a dictatorship was needed for peaceful unification.22 
 The unification policies of Park Chung-hee aimed at confrontational co-
existence rather than the unification of Korea. These policies represented a move 
toward a ‘peace and then unification’ governmental plan. Park’s regime tried to 
lower the risk of war in the Korean peninsula through various dialogues with the 
North Korean regime to ensure a stable economic development and to continue 
military tensions to secure the regime. They believed that outstanding growth by the 
South Korean economy would lead to a unification of the Korean peninsula and 
defeat of the North Korean communist regime.23 Therefore, the government 
oppressed the unification movements of NGOs and leaders of civil organisations 
such as Moon Ik-Hwan who believed that Park’s government did not want the 
unification of Korea and that it was using South and North Korean relations to 
                                               
21 Dong-Ah Newspaper 1972. 10. 18. 
22 Ji-Hyung Kim, “The Park Chung-hee Regime's Plans for South-North Korean Relations During 
Yushin Period, and Reality,” Quarterly Review of Korean History 88, p. 72. 
23 Ibid., p. 72. 
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strengthen Park’s regime. They also questioned whether the unification of Korea 
would be possible without democracy.24 
 
1. 3. Anti-Communism, Memory and Identity in South Korea 
 
The backlash against the development of a national ideology under an 
authoritarian government is still influential in South Korean society as the process 
uncovered the weaknesses of human memory and identity. There has been much 
suspicion about the accuracy and integrity of human memory because it is vulnerable 
to errors and distortions when people recall the past, and vulnerable collective 
memory influences people’s conviction of their identity. They remember their past 
through a process of reconstruction according to present conditions, which includes 
emotions, environments and social relations. Sue Campbell has argued that modern 
philosophers and scientists generally differentiate between two different types of 
memory activity, “archival and multi-causal account of memory”,25 which they use 
to explain the contents and activities of memory. Paul Ricœur has argued that there 
are stages in the activities of memory: “the memory that one has before the mind, the 
stage of the search for a given memory, the stage of anamnesis, of recollection…and 
move from memory as it is given and exercised to reflective memory, to memory of 
oneself.”26 Therefore, memory of the past is followed by the reconstruction of what 
we remember as the past and these activities of memory have a significant potential 
to be distorted as the stages progress; as Campbell insists, “memory is malleable and 
prone to distortion”.27 Agreeing with Campbell, Daniel Schacter identifies the 
process of remembering as “adaptive constructive processes” that “play a functional 
role in memory and cognition but produce distortions, errors, or illusions.”28 Ricœur 
                                               
24 Ibid., p. 97. 
25 Sue Campbell, Our Faithfulness to the Past: Reconstructing Memory Value (Oxford University 
Press, 2014), p. 14. 
26 Paul Ricœur, Memory, History, Forgetting (Chicago ; London: Chicago ; London : University of 
Chicago Press, 2004), p. xvi. 
27 Campbell, Our Faithfulness to the Past: Reconstructing Memory Value, p. 20.  
28 Daniel L. Schacter, “Adaptive Constructive Processes and the Future of Memory,” American 
Psychologist 67, no. 8 (2012), p. 604. 
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also differentiates memory and imagination as the latter is intended to “direct toward 
the fantastic, the fictional, the unreal, the possible, the utopian”.29  
Another approach to human memory suggests that personal remembering is 
part of the complexity of collective memory, as “shared memory activity is central to 
our lives as rememberers”.30 While collective memory can reconstruct accurate and 
faithful memories of the past, according to Ricœur, it can also contribute to a 
manipulation of the past when it leads to the fragility of identity that results from 
“the proximity between memory and imagination”; imagination in particular 
becomes memory’s “spur and its helper”.31 Ricœur presents causes of fragile 
identity: “confrontation with others especially feeling of threat, and the heritage of 
founding violence”.32 This fragility and demand for identity often tends to spark 
ideological phenomena that legitimate order and power, and efforts to manipulate the 
memory of people are a part of identity formation. In summary, this ideology is 
aimed at order and the authority of a society or a state, as Ricœur argues:  
Ideology…revolves around power… In fact, what ideology aims to legitimate 
is the authority of order or power-order, in the sense of an organic relation 
between the whole and the past; power, in the sense of a hierarchical relation 
between governing and governed.33 
In a state that strongly emphasises its identity against that of a rival state, with which 
a war has occurred and militant confrontation continues, an energetic ideology is 
developed. Once such an ideology integrates into a community, it develops into more 
visible phenomena, including conflicts and identity purification that demands 
members of society test their identity.   
Since an ideological phenomenon of this kind “runs from top to bottom” of a 
society, various types of violence to sustain this static ideology against the enemy 
can also be found in a “bottom to top movement” in South Korea in which the South 
Korean people passionately collaborated with the state’s demand for ideological 
purification. Professor Park Young-Gyun and Kim Seong-Min of the Centre for 
                                               
29 Ricœur, Memory, History, Forgetting, p. 6. 
30 Campbell, Our Faithfulness to the Past: Reconstructing Memory Value, p. 32. 
31 Ricœur, Memory, History, Forgetting, p. 81.  
32 Ibid., pp. 81-82. 
33 Ibid., p. 83.  
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Humanities Study for the Unification in Konkuk University have articulated that the 
manipulated memory stored in the subconscious of the South Korean people against 
North Korea has led them to embrace anti-communism with a passion, and that they 
even “yearn for” the protection of authoritarian governments despite acknowledging 
that they were victimised by government violence.34 The authoritarian governments, 
from the end of the Korean War and through the 1970s, strongly propagated 
nationalist sentiment and anti-communism as a form of bondage in the South Korean 
identity against North Korean communists. However, as stated above, they 
emphasised minjok sentiment to secure their regime, arguing that the state and the 
nation are identical. For instance, in 1946, Rhee’s government disbanded the Special 
Committee for Investigation of Anti-national Crimes During the Japanese 
Occupation because the committee charged some cabinet members of Rhee’s 
government for their collaboration with the Japanese administration. The police then 
arrested the members of the committee, suggesting that they worked for the 
communist party. For Rhee Syng-Man’s government, activities relating to the 
communist party were more severe crimes than collaborating with the Japanese 
administration.  
In the nationalist discourse of the state, there was no place for North Korean 
communists and those who opposed the government were regarded as collaborators 
with the North Korean regime. The nationalism the South Korean governments 
pursued was a ‘one-nation state’, which emphasised, in order of priority, the state, 
the nation, and then individuals. The state was equivalent to the nation for South 
Koreans. Moreover, individuals’ rights and freedoms could be limited for the interest 
of the state, which would eventually bring about the nation’s prosperity. The North 
Korean regime also used nationalism to strengthen their statist ideology: Juche 
ideology, which replaced Marxism-Leninism from the end of 1980s. In 1985, they 
defined nationalism as “a concrete social community; at its core is independency, 
which has been integrated on the basis of one lineage, language, culture and regional 
                                               
34 Seong-Min Kim and Young-Gyun Park, “Introductory Reflections on the Trauma of Division of the 
Korean Peninsula,” Journal of the Korean Association For Studies of Philosophical Thought 21, no. 2 
(2010), p. 38.  
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specification through a long history.”35 Therefore, a nation should achieve its 
independence against foreign interventions and at the same time the ideology 
strengthened the leadership of Kim Il-Sung and his family. The same claims about 
nationalism in North and South Korea were thus being used to differentiate 
themselves from their enemies and to sustain their regimes. 
Against the statist nationalist sentiment and discourse of the authoritarian 
governments, social activists and scholars proposed a different nationalist discourse 
based on Korean ethnicity, highlighting the one ethnic identity of South and North 
Koreans. 36 After the liberation of Korea and in an era of democratic endeavour, there 
was a turning point in historical research which reinstated Korean nationalism at the 
centre of historical research to overcome the imperialistic historical narratives 
instilled by the Japanese administration. Nationalism in Korea has developed 
periodically in both the North and South, though an understanding of being a nation 
originated in the 13th century in response to the invasion of the country by the 
Mongol Empire. Historians such as Il-Yeon37 wrote that all Koreans were 
descendants of Dangun, the son of god named Whan-In. In the early 20th century, 
Korean patriots recapitulated this idea. Shin Chae-Ho wrote articles entitled “Joseon 
Sang-go sa (Early History of Joseon)”38 to Joseon Il-bo (a Korean newspaper 
company) in 1931 and insisted that the Joseon (the name of the dynasty before the 
Japanese occupation) people had a distinctive history over against that of foreign 
powers like China and Japan. This idea of Joseon as a single ethnic national identity 
became a common ground of independence movements after the annexation by Japan 
in 1910. 
                                               
35 Jong-Seok Lee, “The Sentiment of 'Nation' in the Divided Land and a Prospect of Unification,” 
Kidokgyo Sasang(Christian Thoughts) 34, no. 3 (1990), p. 57. 
36 Among the revisionist historians, Kang Man-Ghil tried to interpret the history of Korea from a 
perspective of ethnic centred nationalism which would be a ground for a historiography for unification 
of Korea. Kang, Historiography of the Age of Unification. 
37 Sung-Deuk Oak, “Shamanistic Tan'gun and Christian Hanănim: Protestant Missionaries' 
Interpretation of the Korean Founding Myth, 1895-1934,” Studies in World Christianity 7, no. 1 
(2001), p. 44. 
38 Chae-Ho Shin, Joseon Sang-Go Sa, trans. Jong-Seong Kim (Seoul: The Dawn of History, 2014). 
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Nationalist secular historians also emphasised the Gabshin Coup in 1884 and 
the Dong-Hak (later known as ‘Cheondogyo’) Peasant Revolt in 189439 which 
sparked people’s conscientisation to a modern nationalism for the establishment of 
an independent nation.40 This historical understanding of modern nationalism which 
emphasised the ethnic homogeneity of Korean people became a ground for 
unification discourse among Jaeya activists. Therefore, they suggested, the 
nationalist discourse in South Korea should not exclude North Koreans hoping for 
North and South Korea to be unified in the future. They highlighted that the 
peninsula was mainly divided by foreign powers, the Soviet Union and the US in 
particular, and that the division had caused widespread pain among the Korean 
population. Therefore, Koreans, as one nation, should act in unity themselves for the 
resolution of ‘Han’ and national flourishing, which would secure the well-being of 
all the individuals in the peninsula.  
Applying the thoughts of Ricœur regarding the ideology of the state and 
manipulation of people’s memory to the development of the South Korean identity 
and ideology against North Korean communism, we can suggest that anti-
communism, which was developed around the time of the establishment of the South 
Korean government, is still influencing the memory of South Korean people and is 
still influential in South Korean society even though anti-communist education and 
government propaganda has officially ended. Anti-communism was first intensified 
by the government as a measure by which the state militantly segregated “pure 
kukmin” and “impure kukmin” and it evolved into a social norm among the South 
Korean population; some of the South Korean population voluntarily collaborated 
with the authoritarian government to prove their national identity. Finally, this 
transformed into hostile sentiment toward North Koreans, especially among the 
younger generations in 21st-century South Korea and made people suspect the ethnic 
                                               
39 For the early historiography considering the Dong-Hak Peasant Revolt of 1894-5 as a primitive 
mass movement for modern nation-building, see Chong-Shik Lee, The Politics of Korean Nationalism 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967). 
40 For instance, Lee Ki-Baek argued that Dong Hak was a leading nationalist group which sought 
national independence and transformation. They fought against Japanese troops and led the March First 
Movement in 1919. Ki-Baek Lee, Nation and History, 2nd edition, (Seoul: Iljogak, 1994), p. 229.	
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homogeneity of North and South Koreans even though the social activists and 
scholars developed unification discourse based on ethnic-centred nationalism.  
 
1. 4. Protestant Churches’ Industrial Mission and Democratic Movement 
Based on Minjung Theology 
 
The minjung sentiment was widely shared by liberal politicians, social 
activists, historians and scholars, and even students participated in the 
democratisation movement in South Korea circa 1970s and 1980s. The minjung 
sentiment was used to emphasise minjung’s autonomy and subjectivity as grounds 
for the democratisation and unification of Korea. The minjung sentiment in South 
Korean society was begun by a number of artists, poets and writers who tried to 
rediscover minjung subjectivity against the ruling population, which had long been a 
major theme of Korean traditional folk music such as Pansori (a form of folk music 
performance consisting of one singer and a drummer chanting traditional epic stories, 
which was popular among Joseon commoners), literature, and even dance (Talchum: 
mask dance drama with a satirical theme focusing on the upper class ruling 
population), which had almost disappeared due to the harsh oppression of the 
Japanese administration, especially in the 1940s when the administration tried to 
annihilate Korean culture. With the emergence of minjung sentiment among cultural 
society, scholars, social activists and even religious leaders began engaging in 
productive discussions about minjung in various realms. Henceforth, some 
theologians tried to interpret minjung from Christian perspectives and their thoughts 
were developed into minjung theology. Even though minjung theology was a 
theological product of minjung discourse in South Korea in the 1970s, the theology 
also provided inspiration to minjung artists before and after the Kwangju 
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Democratisation Uprising highlighted minjung’s han and hope for unification of 
Korea, who suffered harsh oppression from unjust rulers.41  
Lee Man-Yeol, a leading church historian, a professor emeritus of 
Sookmyung Women’s University and a former president of the National Institute of 
Korean History, has argued that the unification movement of Korean Protestant 
Churches is largely the product of Minjung theologians and nationalist church 
historians. He insists that Korean churches formed the nationalist movement(s) in 
response to the Japanese occupation in political, educational and social realms and 
therefore, Korean churches should engage in social and political movements to fulfil 
their responsibilities as national churches.  At the same time he has criticised the 
majority of evangelical Protestant churches who collaborated with military dictators 
while liberal churches struggled for the promotion of democracy and unification in 
Korea.42 Likewise, Choo Jae-Yong, a former professor of church history and 
president of Hanshin University from 1988 through 1996 and a leading Minjung 
church historian, argued that the true identity of Korean churches was to be found 
according to the measure of their support for the Korean people in their time of 
suffering. Therefore, he maintained, Korean Christianity was formed and developed 
by minjung and became minjung’s religion in Korea.43 According to Minjung 
theology, the duty of the Church is to relieve the sufferings of people. Hence, the 
churches should be involved in a social and political movement for the well-being of 
the minjung. Democratic development and the unification of Korea are both seen as 
requisites for their well-being, and the two agendas are intertwined, to be 
simultaneously achieved in Korea. Therefore, the emergence of Minjung theology 
became a starting point for a theological approach to the unification of Korea.  
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Facing governmental oppression and manipulation of South Koreans, these 
Christians identified the laypeople with ochlos in the New Testament, especially in 
the Gospel of Mark, referring to the masses who were discriminated against by the 
ruling population of Israel and whom Jesus called his “mothers and siblings”.44 
Ochlos are laypeople, but they are also the members of a new community for Jesus. 
They are minjung, oppressed and manipulated politically, economically and 
culturally, and thus this group began to portray unification as an achievement of the 
health of minjung in both Koreas.  
The turning point at which South Koreans began to acknowledge their 
consciousness of minjung subjectivity was the suicide of Jeon Tae-Il who immolated 
himself in protest of working conditions in clothing factories on November 13, 1970. 
His death triggered people’s consciousness of human and labourers’ rights and drove 
liberal activists to believe that it was the duty of civil movement leaders and 
intellectuals to organise people and protect their rights.45 Likewise, Protestant 
churches made their voice heard after the death of Jeon Tae-Il and they tried to find 
ways to participate in the civil rights movement with a relevant theological reflection 
on the context of South Korea.46 As a result, they developed a theology to explain the 
context of South Korea and to contribute to the development of human rights. These 
theological reflections began to be called Minjung theology in the second half of the 
1970s. 
 Even before theologians entitled the contextual theology of South Korea 
concerning the oppressed people as Minjung theology, the liberal theologians had 
become deeply concerned about the unjust socio-political and economic system of 
                                               
44 Byung-Moo Ahn, “Jesus and Oculos: Focusing on the Gospel of Mark,” in Minjung and Korean 
Theology, ed. KNCC Committee of Theological Study (Seoul: Korea Theological Study Institute, 
1982), p. 90. 
45 Park, “Resistance of Jaeya under the Park Chung-hee Regime: Focusing on the Rise and Expansion 
of Issues.”, p. 41. 
46 At a conference held at Yonsei University titled “Politics and Theology” the South Korean 
Protestant churches regretted that they could not make changes to the working conditions of labourers 
even though they had launched and continued urban industrial missions in the 1960s. They concluded 
that they lacked theological reflections on those issues and were not equipped with professional 
analysis of working conditions of labourers. Hence, their urban industrial missions were not 
successful outside of churches. Byung-Seo Park, “Christians' Participation in Social Issues,” Dong-Ah 
Newspaper 1970. 11. 30. 
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South Korea. Economic development and rapid urbanisation shadowed the human 
rights of labourers from the 1960s. For the development of the state, it was 
considered understandable to limit the rights of people. However, some Christians 
and theologians tried to represent the oppressed labourers and some young pastors 
organised The Committee for Urban Special Missions. One of the founding members 
of the committee and the first generation of Minjung theology, Hyun Young-Hak, 
outlined an episode that he experienced when he worked for the committee:  
When I was passing a narrow pathway along Cheong-gae-cheon (Cheong-
gae stream), I saw some people standing looking two little girls fighting. 
They fought so fiercely that their clothes were almost ragged. They yelled 
and mocked each other. It was not difficult to guess a reason for their 
fighting. They were prostitutes. One girl took a customer from another girl 
and it caused them to fight. It was one of the most disgusting, mean, and 
horrible scenes I have seen in my life. Who should be blamed for the 
horrible lives of these little girls? Aren’t the social system and governmental 
policies responsible for their situation?47 
Witnessing people’s suffering under the oppression of the authoritarian government 
and rapid urbanisation, early Minjung theologians attempted theological reflection on 
the context of South Korea and gave hope through gospel messages.  
 At first, some churches led by ministers and theologians who later became 
Minjung theologians, tried to represent the marginalised people impacted by the 
rapid growth of the economy and urbanisation in the 1960s. Young people from rural 
areas rushed into urban areas to find jobs, but what waited for them were low-income 
and inhumane working conditions. Due to the strong policies of economic growth 
driven by Park’s government, young labourers could not organise labourers’ unions 
and they could not acquire their rights. Churches tried to find a way to work for these 
labourers and they launched urban industrial evangelisation campaigns, which 
became ‘urban industrial missions’ in 1970. In addition to their concerns about the 
improvement of the working conditions of labourers in urban areas, churches worked 
on human rights issues.48 They started the Friday Prayer Meeting for Human Rights 
                                               
47 Young-Hak Hyun, “Minjung, Servant of Passion, and Hope,” in A Progress of Korean Minjung 
Theology in 1980s, ed. Byung-Moo Ahn, Source Book of Minjung Theology (Seoul: Korean Institute 
of Theological Studies, 1990), pp. 16-17. 
48 Jin-Kwan Kwon, “Is the Minjung Church No Longer a Church of Minjung?: The Future of the 
Minjung Church,” Critical Review of History, no. 89 (2009), p. 213.  
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and Thursday Prayer Meeting, and organised the NCCK Commission for Human 
Rights. 
 Minjung theologians and activists of minjung churches passionately engaged 
in the political issues of South Korea. Ahn Byung-Moo argued that Korean churches 
should confess the sins that had caused injustice in South Korea. He asked: 
Where were the churches when minjung rose to fight against a dictator’s 
oppression? Churches did not make any voice heard against the dictator and 
kept silent when students and intellectuals protested against the authoritarian 
government. Even under Park’s regime only a few churches and a minority 
of Christians participated in democratic movements. Such cowardly 
attitudes by Protestant churches were a betrayal of Christian teachings and 
behaviours. 49  
He further explained that Jesus died “as a friend of minjung, for minjung and because 
he was present with minjung”.50 So, who are minjung? Ahn used a term from the 
Greek expression in the New Testament – ochlos – which he believed to symbolise 
minjung. Ochlos, or minjung, are marginalised people who followed Jesus. They are 
weary and burdened, lost lambs. They are poor, handicapped, blind, crippled, 
oppressed, slaves, hungry, persecuted and sorrowful.51 The Korean churches, it was 
suggested, should share their sorrow and pain and work to relieve them. In particular, 
churches should work for the democracy and human rights of South Korea through 
organising social non-violent movements.52  
 The liberal churches gathered momentum for a democratic movement when 
Park proposed an amendment that enabled him to continue his presidency for three 
terms. NGO leaders and social activists organised a people’s league to protest against 
the government and selected pastor Kim Jae-Joon as chairperson of the league. Kim 
encouraged Christians’ participation in democratic movements, arguing, “our 
churches are called to be prophets in this unjust society. We have to organise 
minjung’s movements and act and proclaim messages of God to the world.”53 
                                               
49 In-Cheol Kang, "Park, Chung-hee's Regime and the Protestant Churches," Studies in Religion and 
Culture 9 (2007), p. 84. 
50 Ahn, “Nation, Minjung, and Church,” p. 24. 
51 Ibid., p. 24. 
52 Ibid., pp. 25-26. 
53 Sasang-gae, October, 1969, pp. 108-111, cited from Park, “Resistance of Jaeya under the Park 
Chung-hee Regime: Focusing on the Rise and Expansion of Issues.”, p. 38.  
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Christian leaders such as Chung Il-Hyung, Ham Seok-Heon, Kim Sang-Don, Yoon 
Bo-Seon, Park Hyung-Gyu, Moon Ok-Tae, Moon Jang-Shik and Min Seung 
organised the Yeomkwanghoi (Salt and Light Christian Fellowship) and joined in 
various campaigns to secure democracy in South Korea. The NCCK made an official 
statement criticising the constitutional amendment proposed by Park Chung-hee and 
his party. After the constitutional amendment of Yushin was enacted in December 
1972, several Protestant pastors who led the democratisation movement were 
arrested and some missionaries who supported the movements were deported by 
Park’s government.54 Nonetheless, the churches who participated in democratisation 
continued their protests against Park’s regime and officially criticised Park Chung-
hee at the Easter Service on April 22, 1973. Against the democratisation movements, 
Park’s government issued the First National Emergency Measure with which the 
government could punish people who denounced the Yushin constitution, arguing 
that the new constitution was to ensure “Korean democracy and protection from the 
North Korean communist regime”. Henceforth, the Jaeya55  people and Minjung 
church leaders and theologians came to believe that democracy in Korea could not be 
separated from its unification. The following chapter provides an assessment of the 
history and theological grounds for the unification movement as understood by the 




                                               
54 Kang, “Park, Chung-hee's Regime and the Protestant Churches.”, p. 91. 
55 It literally means “people staying in wilderness” and indicates non-government organisations and 
social activists especially against authoritarian governments after the Korean War. Jaeya came to 
include “religious leaders, intellectuals, students, labour leaders, and workers,” under Park Chung-hee 
regime. Ho-Ki Kim, “The State and Civil Society in South Korea, 1987-1999: Civil Movements and 




South Korean Liberal Churches’ Involvement in the Unification 
Movement and ‘The Declaration of the Churches of Korea on 
National Unification and Peace’1 
 
 From the early 1970s, the Kim Il-Sung regime politically stabilised after the 
North Korean government enacted a revised constitution that allowed for Kim’s life-
long presidency.2 With the stability of North Korean politics, the religious bodies of 
the North were allowed religious activities and they began to contact international 
organisations.3 Among the religious bodies of North Korea, the Korean Christian 
Federation (Joseon Kidokyodo Yeonmaeng, KCF) was most actively engaged in 
various dialogues with the WCC and South Korean immigrant Christians abroad.  
As the North Korean Christian leaders started to appear on the global stage, 
South Koreans who resided abroad began to pay attention to Christianity in North 
Korea. In 1978, 34 South Korean Christians who had foreign citizenship (8 
Canadians, 18 Americans and 8 West Germans) sent a letter through the Christian 
Peace Conference entitled “A Letter to Christians in Democratic Peoples’ Republic 
of Korea” to express their wish to communicate with North Korean Christians. South 
                                               
1 The Declaration of the Churches of Korea on National Unification and Peace will be abbreviated to 
‘88 Declaration’ in some parts of the dissertation.  
2 See dissertation by Dr Keum Joo-Seop for a detailed history of the churches in North Korea and the 
involvement of the WCC in the unification dialogue between North and South Korean Christians. Joo-
Seop Keum, “Remnants and Renewal: A History of Protestant Christianity in North Korea, with 
Special Reference to Issues of Church and State, 1945-1994” (Thesis, PhD, University of Edinburgh, 
2003), p. 232. 
3 The North Korean Government encouraged their religious bodies to interact with other religious 
bodies in the world, seeing religion as a tool by which to win over South Korea in international 
relations and isolate South Korea as a global state. Heung-Soo Kim and Dae-Young Ryu, Religion in 
North Korea: A New Understanding (Seoul: Dasan Publications, 2002), p. 233; also, Noh Seong-Lim 
has argued that KCF was founded and encouraged to interact with international NGO groups for 
political necessity by the North Korean regime. See Seong-Lim Noh, “Religion and Cultural Policy in 
North Korea: The Significance of Protestantism in Politics, Culture and International Relations from 
the 1970s to the Early 1990s” (Thesis, PhD, University of Warwick, 2017). 
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Korean immigrant Christians also organised the Association of Foreign-residing 
South Korean Christians for the Unification of Korea in 1980.4  
 The appearance of North Korean Christians attracted the attention of South 
Koreans, especially those who had lived abroad, because they had the freedom to 
travel to North Korea and were able to legally meet North Koreans.5 At first, South 
Korean Christians criticised the meetings between North Koreans and South Korean 
Christians who had lived abroad because they had believed those meetings to be 
politically abused by the North Korean communist regime. However, these dialogues 
between North Koreans and South Korean Christians living abroad sparked and 
strengthened the unification sentiment among South Korean Christians, especially 
the more liberal Christian churches represented by the NCCK. Thereafter, through 
the mediation of the WCC, the NCCK began to meet KCF leaders at various 
consultations and exchanged various ideas on the issue of the unification and peace 
in the Korean peninsula.  
However, when WCC and NCCK leaders met North Korean Christians, the 
conservative Christians in South Korea believed that the Christians they met were 
nominal Christians who had been forced to go by the North Korean communists; 
they suggested that the WCC was keen to appease North Korean communists.6 The 
statements from the consultations between South Korean immigrant Christians and 
KCF members, as well as those between NCCK and KCF members, were also 
criticised by the majority of South Korean Christian leaders as being preferential to 
the North Korean communist regime because most of the published statements 
contained harsh criticism of the United States and South Korean authoritarian 
governments. Their anti-governmental statements made conservative Christians 
uncomfortable as they believed that churches should not be involved in political 
                                               
4 Kim and Ryu, Religion in North Korea: A New Understanding, pp. 246-247.  
5 According to the National Security Law of South Korea, it is prohibited to meet North Koreans 
without the permission of the South Korean Government.  
6 The communist controversy over the WCC in South Korea began in the mid-1950s when the ICCC 
(International Council of Christian Churches) criticised the WCC as a communist church organisation. 
The Presbyterian newspaper Kidokgongbo reported that the ICCC’s criticism of WCC also fuelled a 
controversy among Korean Christians. “The Strategy to Spread the Gospel into Communist 
Countries”, Kidokgongbo 1955.10.24. 
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issues. Thus, the unification movements of the liberal churches of South Korea 
generated internal conflict and exposed strong anti-communism among South Korean 
churches. Hence, with the increasing nuclear threat from North Korea and 
concomitant military confrontations between the two Koreas, the unification 
movements of liberal churches represented by the NCCK began to lose influence.  
This chapter presents a historical trajectory of the ecumenical movements of 
the liberal South Korean Protestant churches for the unification of Korea; it includes 
an account of the first meeting of South Korean Christians and North Korean 
Christians represented by the KCF. Second, this chapter examines the 88 Declaration 
of the NCCK, discussing how Minjung theology underpinned the declaration and 
what its weaknesses were. This part considers the reactions of conservative mainline 
South Korean churches who shared a strong anti-communist reaction to the 
ecumenical movement for unification. Third, the chapter examines how the 
ecumenical movement for unification weakened and changed to give greater 
emphasis to preserving the peace of the Korean peninsula, as well as Northeast Asia 
as a whole, in view of the military confrontations between the two Koreas, and 
especially the nuclear threat posed by North Korea.  
  
2.1. Foreign-residing South Korean Immigrant Christians’ Influence on 
the Christian Dialogue for Unification with North Korean Christians 
 
Direct dialogue between South and North Korean Christians began in 
Europe where South Korean immigrant Christians sought out meetings with North 
Korean Christians who, with governmental support, had appeared on the global stage 
for the purpose of isolating South Korea from international relations. As stated 
above, the South Korean immigrant group, led by Lee Young-Bin and Lee Hwa-
Seon, sent a message to the KCF through the Christian Peace Conference and this 
initiated a series of publications entitled, “Unification and Christianity”. They also 
organised a South Korean Immigrant Christian Fellowship and sent their leadership 
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to North Korea from the 8th to the 30th of June 1981.7 They met leaders of the KCF 
and agreed to a meeting between North Korean Christians and South Korean 
immigrant Christians in October of the same year. As agreed, they met in Vienna 
from the 3rd to the 6th of November and published a joint statement from the first 
conference of North Korean Christians and South Korean immigrant Christians for 
the Unification of Korea.8  
The South Korean immigrant Christians and KCF members met for a second 
conference from the 3rd to the 5th of December 1982, in Helsinki. As part of the 
conference, the participants made various statements concerning South Korean 
politics, such as a request for the withdrawal of the US army from South Korea, the 
dissolution of the military regime of South Korea, a halt to the large-scale joint 
military training of the US and South Korea, and the adoption of a confederate 
governmental system as a unification policy of Korea.9 Such statements from the 
participants at the conference clearly reflected an anti-American sentiment; they 
argued: 
The unification of Korea is a long desire of all Korean people but we have 
not accomplished the unification even though 37 years have passed since the 
division. It was not because our passion was not enough for the unification 
movement but the United States prevented the unification and has been 
ruling South Korea for their national profit, which was acquired through the 
sacrifice of Korean people. Hence, anti-American and independent 
movements should be pursued for the unification of Korea.10 
Even though the official statements from the three conferences between South 
Korean immigrant Christians and North Korean Christians represented by the KCF 
were widely regarded as a disguise of the political position of the North Korean 
                                               
7 Kim and Ryu, Religion in North Korea: A New Understanding, p. 247. 
8 Ibid., p. 248. 45 North Korean Christians and South Korean immigrant Christians participated in the 
conference and 30 people joined the conference as observers. In the statement, they reiterated various 
discussions from the conference. Dr Kang Wi-Jo from the United States criticised that South Korean 
churches had been collaborating with US imperialism in Asia and contributing to harsh confrontations 
between the two Koreas. He insisted that the Juche ideology of North Korea was not vastly different 
in the sense that it emphasised love and service for human beings. Elder Lim Guk-Heon, the vice 
president of KCF, emphasised that the United States should not interfere in unification dialogues of 
Koreans. They also attached five articles of resolutions of the conference in search of the independent 
and peaceful unification to one nation state based on mutual respect. Ik-Hwan Moon et al., The 
Unification and a Theology for National Church of Korea (Seoul: Hanul, 1990), pp. 299-301.  
9 The Unification and a Theology for National Church of Korea, pp. 304-307. 
10 Ibid., p. 308. 
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communist regime, the conferences of the early 1980s triggered a direct dialogue 
between North and South Korean Christians. Consequently, the NCCK began to 
search for a way to meet North Korean Christians who it was assumed had 
disappeared behind the strong leadership of the communist regime in North Korea.  
Along with the dialogue between foreign-residing South Korean immigrant 
Christians and KCF members abroad, some theologians also organised an association 
to construct a theology for the unification of Korea. The name of the association was 
the Association of Foreign-residing South Korean Immigrant Theologians for the 
Unification of Korea. Dr Kang Wi-Jo and Rev. Hong Dong-Geun organised the 
association in the late summer of 1986 in Los Angeles, USA. Later, Rev. Lee 
Young-Bin, who had lived in West Germany, joined the fellowship and they 
continued to meet North Korean Christians to discuss how they could contribute 
theologically to the realisation of the unification of Korea.11 However, the South 
Korean government and some religious leaders regarded these conferences between 
North Korean and South Korean immigrant Christians as little more than an 
advertisement for North Korean Juche ideology and its unification policies.12  
As stated in the resolution of the Vienna conference, the members of the 
Association of Foreign-residing South Korean Immigrant Theologians for the 
Unification of Korea expressed harsh criticism of American imperialism. Rev. Hong 
Dong-Geun, one of the founding members of the association, asserted that the USA 
and the USSR were responsible for the division of Korea and its aftermath. He 
particularly criticised the United States for monopolising the South Korean economy, 
culture and politics. Hong argued that “South Korea has become a military colony of 
the United States.”13 He continued to argue that anti-communism and American 
imperialism were rife among the majority of South Korean Protestant churches, who 
portrayed social activists who worked for the democratisation and unification of 
                                               
11 Ibid., p. vi.  
12 Kim and Ryu, Religion in North Korea: A New Understanding, p. 249. Rev. Lee Young-Bin, who 
led the conferences, was refused entry by the South Korean Government in 1991 and 1994 because 
the government regarded him as an anti-state communist activist.  
13 Dong-Geun Hong, “Reconciliation and Peaceful Unification of Korean People”, in The Unification 
of Korea and a Theology for National Church of Korea (Seoul: Hanul, 1990), p. 42. 
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Korea as communists. He wrote that the main purpose of the association was to build 
an ideological and theological bridge between the two Koreas, with a view to 
achieving the reconciliation and unification of the two Koreas.14  
The dialogue between South Korean Christian immigrants and North Korean 
Christians represented by the KCF surprised South Korean Christians. They thought 
that it was too soon to meet North Korean Christians directly because they were still 
unsure about the existence of Christianity in North Korea, which they believed had 
vanished after the division of Korea due to the communist regime. Although the 
meeting between South Korean immigrant Christians and North Korean Christians 
reflected possibilities for direct interaction between Christians of the North and 
South, in the opinion of most South Korean Christians, there was not enough 
consideration and explanation of how Juche ideology could be compatible with 
Christianity, which would be the first and most important step toward overcoming 
anti-communism among South Korean Christians. 
 
2.2. Dialogues between North and South Korean Christians and 
Involvement of the World Council of Churches in the Unification 
Discussions of Korean Christians 
 
 From the first moments of the KCF reaching out towards the global stage, the 
WCC played a crucial role in introducing KCF members to the NCCK. Several 
conferences and meetings between North and South Korean Christians and 
Christians in America followed, as shown in the table below: 
 
Year Meeting of North and South 
Korean Christians 
Engagement of American 
Churches in Korean Issues  
                                               
14 Ibid., p. 47. 
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1984 CCIA “Conference on Peace and 
Justice of North-East Asia” in 
Tozanso (29 October–3 November) 
 
1985 34th General Assembly of NCCK 
“Peace to the World” (27–28 
February) 
 
1986 Foundation of the Association of 
Foreign-residing South Korean 
Immigrant Theologians for the 
Unification of Korea (Tongil sinhak 
dongjihoi) 
Meeting of South-North Korean 
Christians at Glion Conference (2–
5 September) 
NCCCUSA representatives’ 
visit to North Korea (18 April) 
NCCCUSA’s statement on the 
Peace and Unification of Korea 
(6 November) 
1987  Second visit of NCCCUSA 
representatives  
UMC’s resolution entitled 
“Peace, Justice and Unification 
of Korea” (21 October) 
1988 2nd Glion Conference of North and 
South Korean Christians (23–25 
November) 
Publication of the ’88 Declaration 
 
1989  NCCCUSA hosts a “Conference 
for the Peace and Unification of 
South and North Korea” and 
North and South Korean 
Christians participate as 
observers (23–26 April) 
KCF leaders participate in 
WCC’s Central Committee 
Meeting in Moscow (16–26 
July) 
1990 3rd Glion Conference (2 December)  
<Table 2-1. Chronological Summary of the Ecumenical Unification Movement> 
 
When North Korean officials visited Geneva to deliver a letter from the KCF to the 
WCC headquarters, the WCC was unsure about the reality of Christianity in North 
Korea, which they had believed had been eliminated before and after the Korean 
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War. Therefore, they officially invited the KCF to the Tozanso Conference in Japan 
in 1984 and the executive secretaries of the Commission of the Churches on 
International Affairs of WCC (CCIA) visited North Korea to work out if Christian 
churches really existed in North Korea. The WCC delegates met the leaders of the 
KCF and advised them to meet South Korean Christians directly to discuss how 
Christian churches could contribute to the unification of Korea.15 Further, during the 
era of resurgent democratisation movements in South Korea after the Kwangju 
Democratisation Uprising in 1980, and after the Tozanso Conference in 1984, the 
NCCK urged the WCC to mediate meetings with North Korean Christians with a 
view to undertaking unification discussions. In a situation where South Korean 
churches faced difficulties contacting the North Korean Christian organisations 
represented by the KCF, the WCC facilitated and mediated various dialogues 
between the KCF and the NCCK.  
The WCC first invited KCF members to the CCIA “Conference on Peace 
and Justice of North-East Asia” in Tozanso, Japan, which ran from the 29th of 
October through to the 3rd of November 1984 as a follow-on program of the 
resolution of the general assembly of the WCC at Vancouver in 1983 which 
indicated that seeking justice and peace should be central responsibility of Christian 
communities. Rather than participating in the conference, the KCF sent a telegram to 
congratulate the conference as follows: 
The Central Committee of the Korean Christian Federation extends warm 
congratulations to the International Conference for Peace and Justice in 
North East Asia and through the conference, to the representatives. We 
believe that the conference will make every effort to realise peace and justice 
in this region, particularly [the] peaceful unification of Korea, focusing 
attention upon the urgent situation of North East Asia, which is covered by 
the dark cloud of nuclear war…16 
                                               
15 Keum, “Remnants and Renewal: A History of Protestant Christianity in North Korea, with Special 
Reference to Issues of Church and State, 1945-1994”, p. 267. 
16 The telegram was inserted into a letter from Erich Weingartner, the executive secretary of the 
CCIA, to Kim Hyong-Uh, the North Korean Ambassador in Geneva, on 12 December 1984. In the 
letter, Weingartner expressed an appreciation for the message of the KCF and the desire to maintain 
communications with the KCF. Heung-Soo Kim, Documents of the WCC Library: Korean Christian 
Federation, ed. Man-Yeol Lee, vol. 31, Source Book of Korean Church History (Seoul: Institute for 
Korean Church History, 2003), p. 83.  
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Regarding the congratulatory telegram, there were strong debates about whether the 
conference should accept the telegram and insert it into the official report. Some 
representatives of the South Korean churches suspected that North Korean Christians 
were ‘genuine’ Christians because the telegram was delivered by a communist 
organisation in Japan and they insisted that the KCF was simply a decoy religious 
organisation directed by the North Korean communist government.17 Following the 
debates, the South Korean representatives agreed to insert the telegram with a request 
that the WCC should mediate dialogues between North and South Korean Christians. 
Moreover, the conference generated an official resolution of the WCC advocating 
peace and unification dialogues between North and South Korean Christians, as well 
as encouraging global Christian communities to take part.18  
 Following the Tozanso Conference, the NCCK held its 34th General 
Assembly under the title, “Peace to the World” from the 27th to the 28th of February 
1985, publishing the statement, “South Korean Churches’ Declaration for Peace”. In 
the statement, the member denominations of the NCCK insist that the division of 
Korea has contributed to violations of human rights and distributive injustice and that 
this has also been strengthened by the Cold War system and the South Korean 
military governments. Therefore, they argue that South Korean churches have been 
called to work for the peaceful unification of Korea.19 The Presbyterian Church of 
Korea (Tonghap), the Presbyterian Church in Korea (Hapdong), the Presbyterian 
Church in Republic of Korea (Kijang), the Lutheran Church in Korea, the Korean 
Methodist Church, the Korea Evangelical Church and the Korea Baptist Convention 
                                               
17 Kim and Ryu, Religion in North Korea: A New Understanding, pp. 252-253. 
18 The conference involved a Tozanso Process regarding the peace and unification issues of Korea; it 
reads, “8.2.1. The WCC is asked to explore, in collaboration with the CCA, the possibility of 
developing relationships with churches, Christians and others in North Korea, through visits and 
forms of contacts. 8.2.2. The WCC, in collaboration with the CCA, should facilitate opportunities 
where it would be possible for Christians from both North and South Korea to meet in dialogue. 8.2.3. 
The churches are encouraged to share with the WCC and the CCA plans for contacts with and results 
of a visit to North Korea.” “Findings and Recommendations”, CCIA/WCC Consultation on Peace and 
Justice in North East Asia, 29th October – 2nd November, 1984, Tozanso, Japan. Cited from Keum, 
“Remnants and Renewal: A History of Protestant Christianity in North Korea, with Special Reference 
to Issues of Church and State, 1945-1994”, pp. 267-268. 
19 In the statement, the NCCK noted that minjung should be a subject of the unification of Korea and 
the South Korean churches should promote education in peace rather than confrontational anti-
communism. Seong-Hwan Jeong, A History of Unification Movements in Korean Churches, p. 270. 
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also organised the Korean Christian Council for South-North Relations to address 
various issues regarding relations between North and South Korea and to consult 
with other global religious bodies on peace and unification dialogues with North and 
South Korean Christians.20  
As argued above, the WCC, the leading church organisation to facilitate 
dialogue between North and South Korean Christians, officially sent a message 
through the North Korean Embassy in Geneva inquiring whether they could visit 
North Korea for the purpose of researching North Korean churches and meeting 
North Korean leaders to work out how the ecumenical organisations could improve 
peace and unification dialogues in Korea.21 As a response, the Committee for the 
Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland of the North Korean Government and the 
Central Committee of the KCF sent an invitation to CCIA on the 30th of May 1985.22 
On the 10th of November in the same year, Nian Koshy and Erich Weingartner 
officially visited North Korea and suggested that the KCF should meet South Korean 
Christians directly and that the WCC could facilitate the meetings between Christians 
from the North and the South. Thus, the church leaders from South Korea and the 
KCF met at the conference of the Biblical and Theological Foundation of Christian 
Concern for Peace, in Glion, Switzerland from the 2nd through to the 5th of 
September 1986. The first Glion conference was the first stage on which North and 
South Korean Christians directly met to discuss the issues of unification and peace in 
the Korean peninsula. Even though there was no official statement from the 
Christians from the two Koreas, this created an important opening for a future 
dialogue and cooperation between Korean Christians of the two countries with a 
view to achieving peace and unification in the two Koreas.  
                                               
20 The Lutheran Church in Korea, “Letter to the Rev. Dr Paul A. Wee, General Secretary of Lutheran 
World Ministries, 23 March, 1985,” Kim, Documents of the WCC Library: Korean Christian 
Federation, 31, p. 84. The council had its first meeting on 24th of May, 1985 and met four times more 
until January, 1988. The council laid the foundation of the 88 Declaration. You-Na Lee, “The 
Unification Movement of the National Council of Churches in Korea and the Unification Activities of 
Several Groups' 88 Declaration”, Christianity and History in Korea 32 (2010). 
21 Erich Weingartner, “The Tozanso Process: An Ecumenical Contribution to the Struggle for Peace 
and Justice in North-East Asia” in Kim, Documents of the WCC Library: Korean Christian 
Federation, 31, p. 89. 
22 Kim and Ryu, Religion in North Korea: A New Understanding, p. 255.  
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 Following the Tozanso Conference, various church organisations and 
denominations sought out dialogue with the KCF.23 The National Council of 
Churches of Christ in the United States (NCCCUSA) launched an immediate 
dialogue with the KCF. Representatives from the council visited North Korea on the 
18th of April 1986, and they issued an official policy statement in November of the 
same year: “Peace and the Unification of Korea: A Policy Statement of the National 
Council of the Churches of Christ in the USA”, in which the member churches 
acknowledged that they had been responsible for the division of the Korean 
peninsula and its aftermath and they confessed that they had ignored North Korean 
Christianity after the Korean War. The statement concluded that the NCCCUSA 
would interact with the KCF as the representative Christian organisation of North 
Korea and work together for the peace and unification of Korea.24 The NCCCUSA 
further stated that the US government should negotiate with the USSR to withdraw 
nuclear weapons targeted at Korea and promote peace in the Korean peninsula.25 The 
NCCCUSA sent their representatives to North Korea in 1987 and contributed to the 
development of the relationship between the United States and North Korea.26 In 
1989, the NCCCUSA hosted a “Conference for the Peace and Unification of South 
and North Korea” from the 23rd through to the 26th of April. Various church 
organisations in Asia, Europe and North America participated in the conference as 
observers, as well as the NCCK and the KCF. The conference was a stage where 
North and South Korean Christians met and discussed how Christianity could 
promote the peace and unification of Korea. The NCCK sent Park Bong-Bae, Park 
                                               
23 The list of church organisations and denominations that sought communication with the KCF are as 
follows: Lutheran World Federation, World Alliance of Reformed Churches, Christian Conference of 
Asia, National Council of Churches in Korea, National Council of Churches in Japan, National 
Council of Churches of Christ in the USA, and Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland. Keum, 
“Remnants and Renewal: A History of Protestant Christianity in North Korea, with Special Reference 
to Issues of Church and State, 1945-1994”, p. 268. 
24 The statement quoted, “The churches too have much to confess. Korea has suffered from uncritical 
acceptance by many in our churches and nation of the virulent anti-communism which gripped our 
society hard in the 1950s and has kept it in its grasp to varying degrees ever since… Nor have we 
sought sufficiently to comprehend the witness to the Gospel of the South Korean churches in their 
society, or to respond adequately to their call to us to be more responsible as U.S. Christians in 
relation to Korea…”. NCCUSA, “Peace and the Reunification of Korea: A Policy Statement of 
National Council of the Churches in the U.S.A.”, pp. 8-10, cited from ibid., pp. 324-325. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Kim and Ryu, Religion in North Korea: A New Understanding, p. 254. 
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Jong-Hwa, Jeon Kwang-Hoon and Song Mi-Hyun, and the KCF sent four delegates: 
Ko Ki-Joon, Kim Woon-Bong, Kim Nam-Hyuk and Kim Hye-Sook.27 The Korean 
participants emphasised that they needed to build mutual trust and use the WCC as 
an institutional mediator between the North and South Korean churches. They also 
acknowledged the danger of North Korean missions initiated by South Korean 
conservative churches and argued that North Korean missions should not be used as 
a means of South Korean churches infiltrating the North, but should instead respect 
the independence and faith of the North Korean Christians.28 The KCF participants in 
the meantime insisted that they wanted to support the ecumenical movement of the 
WCC on the issue of the unification of Korea and they respected the NCCK as their 
partner in the unification dialogues of Korean churches.29 The NCCCUSA’s dialogue 
with the KCF and their statement influenced the publication of the NCCK’s 
“Declaration of Korean Churches on the Peace and Unification of Korea” in 1988.  
 The KCF and the NCCK held a bilateral conference in Glion from the 23rd to 
the 25th of November 1988, mediated by the WCC. Seven KCF and 11 NCCK 
representatives, along with 14 observers from the United States, the Soviet Union 
and eight other countries, gathered for the conference. Based on the conference, the 
participants from the KCF and the NCCK published a joint statement: “The Glion 
Statement of the WCC for the Peace and Unification of Korea”.30 After the 
conference, the WCC and the NCCK were eager to prepare the way for further 
dialogues between North and South Korean Christians. The WCC sent a letter to the 
                                               
27 Ho-Kyung Kwon, “North and South Korean Christians in Washington D.C.”, Kidokgyo Sasang 
(Christian Thoughts) 33, no. 6 (1989), p. 165. 
28 Ibid., p. 169. 
29 Ibid., p. 170. 
30 In the statement, they expressed strong support for the Statement Regarding the Peace and 
Unification of Korea published by NCCUSA in 1986 and the 88 Declaration of the NCCK. They 
argued that the division of Korea was caused by the Cold War powers: the United States and the 
Soviet Union in particular. They stated that Koreans had a right to decide to unify and live as a single 
nation-state and Korean Christians were called to work together towards the peace and unification of 
Korea. They also agreed to declare the year of 1995 as a jubilee year for the unification of Korea and 
observe every Sunday after Independence Day of Korea, 15th of August, as the common prayer day in 
which Korean churches hold common prayer for the unification of Korea. Also, Korean churches 
should encourage other churches in the world to join in this common prayer Lord’s day. The 
participants reiterated that the minjung should be subjects of the unification of Korea and the 
unification should be led by Koreans independently refraining from submitting to the influence of 
foreign countries. Hence, the minjung of Korea were invited to join in unification movements. Ki-
Cheon Jang, “Glion Reports”, ibid., no. 1, pp. 253-254. 
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KCF in which they invited them to the WCC conference on “Justice, Peace and 
Integrity of Creation”, which was held in Seoul from the 5th to the 13th of March 
1990. The NCCK also invited KCF representatives to attend the general assembly of 
the NCCK held in February 1990 while they were staying in Seoul for the WCC 
meeting.31 To ensure the security of the KCF delegates to Seoul, the NCCK acquired 
governmental permission and prepared to welcome North Korean Christians to 
Seoul.32 However, the KCF ultimately sent a letter outlining their final decision that 
they could not participate in the WCC meeting and general assembly of the NCCK 
because of the militarism of the South Korean and US governments who continued 
their Team Spirit Joint Military Exercise and had intensified tension between the two 
Koreas.33  
On the 2nd of December 1990, the KCF and the NCCK held the third 
Conference for the Peace and Unification of Korea at Glion. The main subject of the 
conference was similar to that of the first conference in 1986: “Biblical Foundation 
for Peacemaking with a Focus on Korea”. 14 South Koreans, six North Koreans, 10 
foreign-residing South Koreans and 18 members from various church organisations 
in other countries participated in the conference.34 At this third Conference for the 
Peace and Unification of Korea, participants were aware of the changing mood in 
Northeast Asia, with the ending of the Cold War Era and the 7.7. Declaration of the 
South Korean government in 1990, which included various policies intended to 
encourage progress in relationships with communist countries. In this hopeful 
context, they reiterated that the year of 1995 was a jubilee year in which they would 
accomplish the peace, justice, and unification of Korea and that Korean churches 
should give an impetus to the unification movement.35 Based on the agreement at the 
                                               
31 Emilio Castro, “Letter to KCF” (Geneva, 13 November, 1989), Kim, Documents of the WCC 
Library: Korean Christian Federation, 31, p. 190.  
32 Ho-Kyung Kwon, “Letter to WCC” (Seoul, 23 January, 1990), ibid., p. 193. 
33 Gi-Jun Ko, “Letter to WCC” (Pyeongyang, 28 February, 1990), ibid., p. 199. 
34 So-Young Kim, “Conference Reports of the 3rd Glion Conference for the Peace and Unification of 
Korea”, Kidokgyo Sasang (Christian Thoughts) 35, no. 1 (1991), p. 134. 
35 The jubilee year phrase was stated in the 88 Declaration of the NCCK in 1988, which recruited a 
biblical term for the unification discourse of Korea. In the resolution of the conference, the 
participants suggested strengthening church education regarding the peace and unification of Korea in 
order to build a cooperative relationship with NGOs, religious organisations and political parties for 
the unification, and to ensure continuing dialogue between North and South Korean churches, as well 
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third conference at Glion, the NCCK and the KCF continued to meet and exchange 
their ideas on the peace and unification of Korea. They planned to hold the next 
Glion conference in the Korean peninsula, one in Pyeongyang and one in Seoul. In 
fact, the fourth Glion conference was held in Kyoto, Japan, in March 1995, where 
they agreed on a joint jubilee worship service at Panmunjeom36 on the 15th of August 
1995. However, this did not happen because the South Korean government did not 
give permission for a service in Panmunjeom.37   
 The WCC and the KCF continued their close relationship on the issues 
related to the Korean peninsula. The WCC invited KCF leaders to the WCC Central 
Committee meeting in Moscow from the 16th to the 26th of July 1989. The KCF 
leaders participated in the meeting as guests and the meeting approved “The Policy 
Statement for the Peace and Unification of Korea”, which was revised and signed by 
the delegates of the first Glion conference.38 Then, in February 1991, KCF leaders 
participated as observers in the seventh General Assembly of the WCC in Canberra, 
Australia.39 The active dialogue between the KCF and the NCCK mediated by the 
WCC achieved broad participation of member churches of the WCC and encouraged 
the South Korean government to publicise the unification discourse so that NGOs 
could join in developing the unification policies of South Korea. However, the active 
involvement of the WCC in the dialogue between North Korean Christians and South 
Korean liberal Christians represented by the NCCK caused harsh criticism of the 
                                               
as with international Christian organisations and denominations. Moreover, they suggested the 
reduced armament of the North and South Korean armies, as well as a ceasing of large-scale military 
exercises in both Koreas, such as the Team Spirit military exercise of the South Korean and US army. 
They agreed to encourage interactions of civil organisations between the two Koreas, such as the Red 
Cross, and to urge each government to act for the reunion of separated families. Ibid., pp. 140-142 
36 Panmunjeom is the building where the Armistice Agreement of the Korean War was signed by the 
United Nations Command and the North Korean Army on 27th of July, 1953 to suspend the Korean 
War. Now this place is in the Joint Security Area and secured by the UNC and the North Korean 
army. Therefore, to access the Panmunjeom, all civilians require permission from the government of 
South Korea and the UNC.  
37 Kim and Ryu, Religion in North Korea: A New Understanding, p. 266. 
38 Ninan Koshy proposed the “Policy Statement on Peace and the Reunification of Korea” to the 
Central Committee and suggested that the committee invite Rev. Ko Gi-Jun, the General Secretary of 
the KCF, to the meeting in Moscow. Rev. Ko went to the meeting with his interpreter. Ninan Koshy, 
“Letter to Emilio Castro, on 5th of August, 1989”, Kim, Documents of the WCC Library: Korean 
Christian Federation, 31, p. 175. 
39 Kim and Ryu, Religion in North Korea: A New Understanding, pp. 258-259. 
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allegedly communist characteristics of the WCC among South Korean conservative 
churches.40  
 
2.3. NCCK’s ‘the Declaration of Korean Churches on the National 
Unification and Peace’ and Its Influence 
 
 Along with the conferences of South Korean immigrant Christians and North 
Korean Christians abroad, the NCCK hosted the 4th Conference of South Korean and 
West-German Christians (EKD, Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland) at Academy 
House in Seoul, on 8th of June through 10th, 1981. In the conference, the participants 
suggested that the NCCK should facilitate a committee dedicated to dealing with the 
unification issues of Korea. Following the resolution of the conference, the NCCK 
organised the Executive Committee for the Unification of Korea in February, 1982 
and started to research unification issues. However, it was enormously difficult for 
the committee to facilitate meetings because of interventions by the South Korean 
government and it could not continue the project for four years.41 A number of 
preparatory meetings and discussions followed and members of the committee 
engaged in harsh debates on several issues such as the withdrawal of the US army 
from Korea.42 
                                               
40 In Korean the debate is called Yonggong-nonjaeng. The conservative South Korean churches 
fiercely criticised the WCC, suggesting it was an advocate of communism and North Korean 
communists. Hence, they argued that the WCC was neither a biblical nor a Christian organisation. The 
suspicions of the conservative South Korean Christians on the WCC were historically backed up by 
substantial historical evidence that the KGB of the Soviet Union used some bishops of the Russian 
Orthodox Church as their agents for advancing Soviet interests. C. Andrew and V. Mitrokhin, The 
Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB (Basic Books, 2000), 
pp. 486-507; W.R.  Ward, “Peace, Peace and Rumours of War”, The Journal of Ecclesiastical History 
51, no. 4 (2000) 
41 Man-Yeol Lee, “Marking the Tenth Anniversary of the Declaration of the Churches of Korea on 
National Unification and Peace”, Bulletin of the Institute for Korean Church History 31 (1998), p. 12. 
42 Dr Noh Jong-Sun, a member of the executive committee organised in 1986 for discussing and 
making an official statement regarding the peace and unification of Korea, insisted that it was difficult 
to compromise between members of the committee on the issue of the US army in Korea. Moreover, it 
was debated how the declaration assessed Marxism and a socialist ideology for unification discourse. 
Seo Kwang-Seon argued that the declaration should exclude any ideas that could be related to 
Marxism, while Oh Jae-Sik insisted that the declaration should propose a socialist ideology as a 
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 In 1985, the NCCK held its 34th General Assembly in Onyang City on 27th of 
March, just after the Tozanso Conference. NCCK issued an official statement 
entitled, “The Declaration of South Korean Churches for the Peaceful Unification of 
Korea,” which reads,  
South Korean churches have the freedom and responsibility to participate in 
overcoming the aftermath of the division of Korea and accomplishment of the 
unification of Korea according to our belief in the peace of the kingdom of 
God.43  
Through the statement, liberal South Korean Protestant churches proclaimed that 
they would actively engage in the unification dialogue and that the unification of 
Korea should be peaceful and be led by Korean people. With the publication of the 
statement, NCCK held the 1st Consultation of the Committee for the Unification of 
Korea of NCCK on the subject, “Justice, Peace and Church,” and four consultations 
followed until January 1988 leading up to the ‘88 Declaration. While the NCCK 
continued their discussions aimed at making a unified and official statement of South 
Korean churches on the peace and unification of Korea, the NCCCUSA published 
their own policy statement on the peace and unification of Korea on 6th of 
November, 1986 which acknowledged the responsibility of the US for the division of 
Korea and intensifying militarism of the Korean peninsula. The United Methodist 
Church of USA also published a resolution entitled “Peace, Justice, and Unification 
of Korea” on 21 October, 1987. In the statement, the UMC urged the US government 
to withdraw the US army from Korea when the military threats between the two 
Koreas eased. The prior statements of the NCCCUSA and UMC encouraged the 
NCCK to advance their arguments of reducing militarism in the Korean peninsula 
including the withdrawal of the US army.44  
                                               
methodology of unification discourse. Jong-Sun Noh, interview by Hoon Song, 23 September, 2016, 
Handwrite Dictation, Yonsei University. 
43 Gyoung-Ho Jeong, “Understanding of Tongil by Korean Christian Communities in 1980s”, 
Theology and Ministry 38 (2012), p. 24.  
44 Lee, “The Unification Movement of the National Council of Churches in Korea and the Unification 
Activities of Several Groups' 88 Declaration”, p. 272. In South Korea, insisting on the withdrawal of 
the US army was regarded as a reason to be suspected of supporting the North Korean communist 
regime and, therefore, the withdrawal of the US army from Korea is a still sensitive issue in South 
Korea in debates on the peace and unification of Korea.  
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The 88 Declaration is a distinguished statement which officially represented 
the theological reflections of NCCK on the unification of Korea. There had been 
harsh debates prior to the publication of the statement because it was still risky to 
talk officially about the peace and unification of Korea. The authors of the statement 
explained how difficult it was to prepare dialogues with various scholars and church 
leaders:  
From 1985, we had five conferences to prepare the statement. Totally 350 
people participated in dialogues for the statement. Making the statement, we 
sympathised pains and tears of Korean people. We prayed with tear for the 
people in Korea and passionately discussed critical issues of Korean people. 
We also confessed our sins for our ignorance of God’s providence in the 
world and the universe. We poured all pour energy for research and 
discussions to make a pathway to a new stage of the history of Korean 
people through the unification of Korea. All discussions and documents have 
been officially publicised. Moreover, NCCK tried to contact non-member 
denominations to collect their opinions and even we asked advice from the 
experts of political parties and even scholars of sociological and biblical 
studies. We also tried to include opinions of the youth and women.45 
As they recommended, the NCCK organised an executive committee for the 
unification which consisted of nine members46 in 1986. The ‘88 Declaration shared 
common ground with the various statements47 prior to the ‘88 Declaration on topics 
such as the responsibility of the US for the division of Korea, a halt to militarism in 
the Korean peninsula and the proposal of a peace agreement between North and 
South Korea, and even the withdrawal of the US military.  
 In the statement, first, they insisted that South Korean Protestant churches 
were called to be apostles of peace to bring peace and unification of Korea. They 
believed that this was a missiological calling for Korean Christians since Christianity 
was brought to the Korean peninsula in the late 19th century. They argued that the 
early Korean Christians were not obedient to Japanese authority and neither ignorant 
                                               
45 Moon et al., The Unification and a Theology for National Church of Korea, p. 324. 
46 The nine members of the committee were: Kim Young-Tae, Seo Kwang-Seon, Kim Yong-Bok, 
Kim Chang-Rak, Min Young-Jin, Noh Jong-Sun, Park Jong-Hwa, Lee Sam-Yeol, Oh Jae-Sik and 
Kang Moon-Gyu. Lee, “The Unification Movement of the National Council of Churches in Korea and 
the Unification Activities of Several Groups’ 88 Declaration”, p. 271. 
47 The statements include, Tozanso Statement of the CCIA, “Peace and the Reunification of Korea” of 
the PCUSA adopted in 1986, “Peace, Justice and Reunification of Korea” approved by the GBGM 
(General Board of Global Ministries) of the United Methodist Church of the US. Ibid., pp. 272-273. 
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of the pain of the oppressed under Japanese colonisation. Rather, they insisted, early 
Christians in Korea proclaimed good news to the people in desperation and worked 
for the liberation and independence of the Korean people. Moreover, under the 
dictators’ regimes after the Korean war, South Korean Christians passionately took 
part in the democratisation movement. In the statement, NCCK identified the 
independence movements and democratisation movement of Korean churches as 
peace movements for achieving God’s justice in the Korean peninsula.48 Therefore, 
South Korean churches’ involvement in the unification movement should be seen as 
a part of the history of peace movements of Korean churches and it was South 
Korean churches’ responsibility to break down the wall between the two Koreas and 
bring peace to the Korean peninsula. 
 Secondly, they confessed that they had sinned in that Korean Christians had 
uncritically accepted anti-communism and hatred against North Koreans. Moreover, 
they also recognised that the division of Korea and its aftermath were caused by the 
Cold War system and that they had not resisted the system. Hence, Korea had lost its 
independence and become subordinated to the Cold War system economically and 
politically. It stated: 
We confess our sins of deep hatred against North Koreans in front of Korean 
people and God at the moment of publication of a declaration of peace and 
reconciliation…We hated, cheated, and killed our Koreans and tried to 
justify our sins by arguing that it was inevitable in the era of ideological and 
political conflicts. The division caused the Korean war and we have agreed a 
high technology militarism to prevent a new war in the Korean 
peninsula…We, Christians, have ignored our responsibility to bring peace to 
this land rather we have afforded the Cold War system. Moreover, we, 
Christians in the North and the South have idolised our ideologies sustained 
our governmental systems. It is a violence of the covenant with God which 
affirms God’s sovereign authority. It is a sin of Korean churches to stand 
preferential for governments more than God’s will. We confess that the 
Christians of the South especially have sinned by making a virtual religious 
idol out of anti-Communist ideology and have thus not been content merely 
to treat the Communists regime in the North as the enemy, but have gone 
further and damned our northern compatriots and others whose ideology 
differs from our own.49 
                                               
48 Moon et al., The Unification and a Theology for National Church of Korea, p. 311. 
49 NCCK, “88 Declaration”, ibid., p. 313.  
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In the statement, NCCK criticised anti-communism as a tool of authoritarian 
governments and by which South Koreans expressed their hatred and hostility toward 
North Koreans.  Even Christians had thought that anti-communism had been 
advisable to protect South Koreans from the threats of North Korean communists. It 
is clear in the statement that anti-communism is regarded as not compatible with 
Christian teachings which encourage Christians to promote peace and the justice of 
God.  
Based on historical reflection on the Christian movements during the 
Japanese occupation and under military governments after the Korean War, and on 
Christian teaching on the promotion of peace and the justice of God, they proposed 
practical suggestions to South Korean churches. First, they argued that the 
unification movement of Korea should be based on the three principles of the 7.4 
Joint Communiqué in 1972 between North and South Korean governments: namely, 
independence, peace, and one nation state overcoming different ideologies and 
governmental systems. Then they proposed:  
First the unification is not only for the prosperity of nation and state but also 
securing human freedom and dignity because nation and state exist to secure 
human freedom and dignity of the people and also ideology and government 
are for flourishing of human beings. Hence, humanitarian policies should be 
considered and enacted immediately. Second, the participation of common 
people should be guaranteed for making unification policies. In particular, 
government should invite minjung to all unification discourses because they 
have been oppressed and marginalised under the governments of divided 
nations even though they are majority of Korean people.50  
The statement reflected NCCK’s theologians’ preference for the minjung in the sense 
that they believed that the minjung had been desperate victims of the division of the 
Korean peninsula. However, the statement caused a debate how minjung could be 
identified separately from common Korean people. 
 The NCCK also made five proposals to the North and South Korean 
governments. First, they argued that the governments should engage humanitarian 
policies for the families separated by the division of Korea. They insisted that it 
would be a step toward healing the wounds caused by the division of Korea. They 
                                               
50 NCCK, “88 Declaration”, ibid., p. 314. 
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urged both governments, to guarantee freedom to families to travel to meet their 
family members and to visit their hometown. They proposed, “the governments 
should allow those families to visit their separated family members at least during 
national holiday seasons such as New Years’ holidays or Chuseok (national autumn 
harvest season).”51 Second, they urged that both Korean governments should 
encourage people in both Koreas to partook in unification discourses and in making 
policies for the unification of Korea. Moreover, the governments should secure 
freedom of publication of people and allow their criticisms against governments 
according to the UN’s Declaration of Human Rights.52 Third, they urged the 
governments of North and South Korea to build up mutual trust to promote national 
identity regardless of ideologies and governmental systems. To build up mutual trust, 
both governments had to cease “mutual hostility and aggressive inclinations, and 
must eliminate the exclusivism which leads to the slandering and vilification of one 
another.”53 Moreover, the governments should promote exchanges of personnel and 
culture in areas such as arts, sports and religion as well as cooperation for various 
academic projects in history, language, geography, biology and natural resources.54 
The fourth proposal was about the militarism of the Korean peninsula which 
provoked harsh debates among South Korean Protestant churches. The NCCK stated 
that both governments should sign a peace treaty which would end the military 
tensions of the Korean peninsula. Moreover, once a peace treaty was concluded, US 
troops should withdraw from the Korean peninsula with their nuclear weapons. 
Lastly, in the proposal, NCCK urged the two governments to avoid foreign 
interference in the unification dialogues of Koreans and to cooperate with each other 
in international relations for the prosperity of Korean people.55  
 The statement also included various practical policies by which both Korean 
church bodies could make progress toward peace and reconciliation of the two 
                                               
51 NCCK, “88 Declaration”, ibid., p. 315. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid., p. 316. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid., pp. 316-317. 
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Koreas. First of all, the NCCK proclaimed that they were launching a jubilee 
movement for peace and unification of Korea;  
The National Council of Churches in Korea proclaims the year 1995 to be 
the ‘Year of Jubilee for Peace and Unification.’ (Luke 4:18-19)… The 
‘jubilee year’ is the fiftieth year following the completion of cycle of seven 
sabbatical years totaling 49 years. (Leviticus 25:8-10) The year of jubilee is 
a “year of liberation.”… The Korean churches proclaim 1995, the fiftieth 
year after liberation, as a Jubilee Year, to express our belief in the historical 
presence of God, who has ruled over those fifty years of history- indeed over 
all of human history: to proclaim the restoration of the covenant community 
of peace: and to declare our resolution to achieve this restoration in the 
history of the Korean peninsula today.56    
To prepare for the Jubilee Year of the Korean peninsula, NCCK proposed four 
practices which the Korean churches would carry out together. First, they argued that 
the Korean churches should strive for a church renewal movement for peace and 
unification. Second, the Korean churches should “carry out a broad program of 
education for peace and reconciliation.”57 Third, the Korean churches should prepare 
a liturgy for the peace and unification of Korea such as “Sunday of Prayer for Peace 
and Unification.” Fourth, the Korean churches should continue to “develop a 
solidarity movement for peace and unification” which would embrace various 
religious and civil organisations as well as other international Christian 
communities.58 The statement was submitted to the 37th General Assembly of NCCK 
on 29th of February, 1988 and unanimously approved by the representatives.  
 Following the statement of NCCK, in the end of March, 1988, the 
Association of Korean Feminist Theologians led by Park Soon-Kyung59 published 
“The Declaration of Korean Feminist Theologians on the National Unification and 
Peace.” In the statement, they alleged that the division of the Korean peninsula was 
“a product of a patriarchal dominance through a Western imperialism and 
colonialism as well as Cold War system of the United States and USSR after the 
                                               
56 NCCK, “88 Declaration”, Wi-Jo Kang, Christ and Caesar in Modern Korea: A History of 
Christianity and Politics (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), p. 181. 
57 Ibid., p. 181.  
58 Ibid., pp. 181-182. 
59 Park Soon-Kyung is a distinguishing first generation South Korean feminist theologian who first 
developed a unification theology adopting nationalist and minjung sentiment, as well as a feminist 
theological approach to a history of Korea.  
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Second World War.” Feminist theologians argued that Korean women, the most 
vulnerable “minjung” in a Korean history, should be the subjects of unification 
movements and also work for transformation of the patriarchal social system in 
cooperation with other women in the third world.60 
 The impact of the NCCK statement was huge enough to bring various 
reactions from government, church organisations, and mass media. Conservative 
churches protested that the NCCK could not represent all Protestant churches of 
South Korea. Even some churches of the member denomination, especially the 
Presbyterian Church of Korea (Tonghap) objected to the statement. They criticised 
the statement first because NCCK could not represent all South Korean Protestant 
churches. Secondly, the arguments that US troops and nuclear weapons should be 
withdrawn was a premature opinion which did not reflect the situation of the Korean 
peninsula where the North Korean regime still looked for a chance to invade South 
Korea. Thirdly, the opponents of the statement argued that the KCF and North 
Korean churches were not true churches but just tools of propagation of North 
Korean communism.61 The Fellowship of Korean Protestant Churches, an inter-
denominational fellowship particularly consisted of conservative denominations such 
as Presbyterian Church in Korea (Hapdong), Full Gospel Church, and the Baptist 
churches of Korea, issued a statement against the NCCK’s 88 Declaration. 
Moreover, the conservative Christian groups argued that it was suspicious that the 
KCF publicised a supporting statement for the NCCK’s statement and that it might 
be evidence of NCCK’s political preference toward North Korean regime.62  
 Facing with harsh criticisms from conservative denominations and religious 
groups, NCCK published a document which explained that the criticisms had been 
raised by conservative Christians. In the document, the NCCK first welcomed both 
the appraisals and the criticisms for their statement in the sense that the reactions of 
                                               
60 The Association of Korean Feminist Theologians, “The Declaration of Korean Feminist 
Theologians on the National Unification and Peace”, Moon et al., The Unification and a Theology for 
National Church of Korea, pp. 321-322. 
61 Detailed lists of the Christian groups that opposed the statement can be found in the book by Seong-
Hwan Jeong. Jeong, A History of Unification Movements in Korean Churches, pp. 277-278. 
62 “Sketch: Conservative Protestant Denomination Publicised Opponent Statements against NCCK's 
Statement on Peace and Unification”, Dong-Ah Ilbo Mar. 26, 1988. 
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the South Korean churches to the statement revealed that South Korean churches 
were concerned the unification and peace of the Korean peninsula. Then they 
explained the process of publication of their statement and maintained that they had 
tried to embrace diverse opinions of member denominations as well as non-member 
denominations. However, the NCCK complained that the criticisms of the statement 
did not fully evaluate the main parts of the statement such as confession of sins of the 
Korean churches; rather the critics had only emphasised subsidiary agendas such as 
the withdrawal of US troops and their nuclear weapons. They reiterated that the 
withdrawal of US troops would not happen immediately but could be realised only 
when a peace between North and South Korea as well as US, China, USSR and 
Japan concretely realised. Moreover, they argued that the NCCK did not mean to 
advocate the unification policies of the North Korean regime by the statement but 
tried to present ancillary policies which could be implemented by the Korean 
churches for the unification of Korea. In addition, they insisted that they 
acknowledged the efforts of the South Korean government which triggered diverse 
interactions with communist countries of Eastern Europe.63  
 
2. 4. Minjung Theology and the 88 Declaration 
 
The preparatory committee members who drafted the declaration were 
theologians of liberal inclination and keen proponents of Minjung theology. They 
strongly suggested two principles should govern the unification discourse in order to 
ensure a preferential attitude to Korean minjung. First, the unification discourse 
should concern humanitarian issues such as the families separated between the North 
and the South. As the division of the Korean peninsula created ideological, 
economic, and cultural conflicts and turmoil among Korean people, the goal of 
unification should be a resolution of people’s suffering. Second, the Korean minjung, 
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who were excluded from the national policy making process even though they were 
the majority of Korean society, should lead the unification discourse. 
The declaration reflected Minjung theologians’ understanding of sin, 
salvation, liberation and the kingdom of God. In the declaration, the participant 
churches argued that the division of the Korean peninsula and concomitant 
aftermaths including the Korean war were caused by the structural sin of the Korean 
society. Ahn Byung-Moo, a Minjung theologian, insisted that the minjung of Korea 
were oppressed and exploited due to the structural sin of Korea, in which the ruling 
people privatised public resources64 and Noh Jong-Sun, a former professor of 
Christian Ethics of Yonsei University, argued that this sinful structure was supported 
by the imperial powers of the western world such as USSR and the United States.65 
The division of the Korean peninsula, as the participants of the declaration argued, 
was a result of the Cold War structure and brought harsh suffering to Koreans in the 
North as well as in the South. 
In addition to the division of Korea by foreign countries, the capitalistic 
economic system of Korea suppressed and exploited South Koreans. Hence, in 
Minjung theology structural sin was linked more to economic injustice. Moreover, 
they argued that the unjust social structure of Korea was caused by the greed of 
ruling people who pursued ‘privatisation of the public.’ The Declaration quoted 
passages of Jeremiah 6:13 through 14 in the Old Testament which reads, “From the 
least to the greatest, all are greedy for gain; prophets and priests alike, all practice 
deceit. They dress the wound of my people as though it were not serious. ‘Peace, 
peace,’ they say, when there is no peace”.66 Even though South Korea was famous 
for rapid economic development from the ashes of the Korean War of 1950-3, the 
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life of the Korean minjung was still desperate under military governments. As 
depicted in the first chapter, military governments suppressed the voice of laborers, 
farmers and even the intellectuals who tried to secure basic human rights of Korean 
people by deploying propaganda in the name of national security against the North 
Korean communist regime. The division of the Korea was a tragedy of the poor 
people of South Korea, but the rich people, especially those associated with the 
chaebol,67 benefitted from the division. In the NCCK statement presented to the 
conference “Justice, Peace and the Integration of Creation” held in Seoul in 1990, 
NCCK member churches declared that economic justice was not a charity work of 
the government or rich people but required a true confession of sins of the rich 
people and rich countries and their transformation.68 The statement in 1990 was a 
continuance of Minjung theologians’ critical assessment of capitalism. Minjung 
theologians such as Song69 and Ahn insisted that a structural sin was whatever 
oppressed and exploited minjung, and the participants of the declaration agreed that 
an obvious structural sin in modern Korea was the monopolisation of wealth and 
public power by the ruling class.  
Liberation was also a main theme of the NCCK’s declaration in 1988 as well 
as of the Minjung theology. Minjung theologians tried to apply biblical stories to the 
Korean context. They interpreted the stories of the Old Testament like the Exodus 
and the Israelites’ return to Jerusalem as the story of the liberation of the minjung. 
Ahn Byung-moo paralleled a minjung ideology and a monarchic ideology in the Old 
Testament. Monarchic ideology was represented by the Egyptian rulers who 
oppressed and exploited the Israelites as slaves and kings of Israel such as King 
David and Solomon who established kingship in Israel and ruled the land. In 
contrast, the minjung of Israel escaped from Egypt and organised their own 
community after 40 years’ life in the wilderness and continuously developed their 
own faith movement that generated apocalyptic literature dreaming of the kingdom 
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of God who shall fulfil justice and peace in the world.70 Later, the minjung 
movement which underwent the occupation of Israel by the Roman Empire was the 
cornerstone of Jesus’ minjung movement. Jesus and the minjung advanced to 
Jerusalem, where Jesus proclaimed that the temple, the centre for the monarchic 
ideology which had been exploiting Israelites from the reign of King Saul, would be 
destroyed without a stone being left on a stone. Even though Jesus’ minjung 
movement ended with his death on the cross, the minjung who followed Jesus spread 
all around the Roman empire and finally broke down the monarchy.71 The minjung 
movement from Exodus to the time of Early Christianity was a basic motif of 
Minjung theologians who sought for the liberation of Korean minjung who suffered 
under imperialistic capitalism instituted by military governments of South Korea and 
their political supporter, the United States. Therefore, in the Korean situation, the 
liberation of minjung meant a liberation from imperialistic capitalism which had 
benefited mostly the rich and ruling people. As stated in the previous chapter, during 
the rapid economic development of South Korea, laborers and farmers’ organisations 
pushed South Korean governments to improve their working conditions and initiated 
various human rights movements. However, the governments suppressed the human 
rights movements using the excuse of national security against North Korea and 
accused social activists of being collaborators with North Korean communists. 
Hence, Minjung theologians insisted that the unification of Korea should be a 
pathway toward the liberation of Korean minjung.  
However, the liberation of Korean minjung did not only mean economic 
egalitarianism. Economic injustice was just one aspect of the minjung’s turmoil in 
Korea. Rather, minjung also included the culturally estranged such as the 
handicapped and those who were sexually discriminated against in the cultural 
context of South Korea.72 Therefore, unification and liberation were related to the 
broad issues faced by the Korean minjung and not simply to the political unification 
of two Koreas. The unification of Korea was a groundbreaking process toward the 
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realisation of the full humanity of the Korean minjung. Hence, the declaration stated 
that the unification should not only be a way to improve the national interest but also 
a way to “realise full humanity such as human freedom and dignity”73 regardless of 
social and physical status. 
The liberation of the minjung from poverty caused by Western imperialistic 
capitalism and the social discrimination under patriarchal culture of Korea was 
viewed as the prerequisite for the fulfillment of true humanity. Since the fulfillment 
of true humanity for the minjung would guarantee “self-determination and an ability 
to fully contribute in political, economic, and religio-cultural liberation,” the 
liberation of the minjung would bring about the realisation of the kingdom of God74 
and the mission of God. Minjung theologians interpreted the history of the early 
Korean churches as a minjung’s peace movement and for realisation of the kingdom 
of God.75 The understanding of Minjung theologians of the history of early Korean 
churches as a mission of God was clearly reflected in the Declaration:  
The peace movement of the Korean churches during the Japanese imperialist 
rule over our land was necessarily a movement for national independence 
which shared the pain of our enslaved people-a national liberation movement 
which proclaimed the kingdom of God and strived to realise this faith within 
history. The Christians of Korea stood in the forefront of the March First 
Independence Movement of 1919, resisted the policy of national annihilation 
by the Japanese imperialists, and shed martyrs' blood for their defiance of 
the enforcement of Shinto worship, a deification of Japanese nationalism.76 
The participants and other Minjung theologians argued that the kingdom of God did 
not only mean an ethereal place but a kingdom realised on the earth as a goal of 
history. Minjung are becoming subjects of history rather than remaining as spectators 
and will finally obtain their ownership of the kingdom of God.77 Seo Nam-Dong 
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interpreted an idea of Christian utopia as a messianic kingdom78 different from the 
conventional idea of ethereal heaven which was popular among South Korean 
Christians. Seo insisted that a messianic kingdom meant a new world through social 
transformation in which the minjung would enjoy self-determination and recover 
their human dignity.79 Hence, the kingdom for minjung did not mean an imaginary, 
abstract and static place but a tangible and materialistic kingdom which would be 
realised by the minjung’s movement for liberation. Minjung theologians aimed not 
only to explain the kingdom of God but also to transform society so that “starving 
people can have enough foods, thirsty people can drink, sick people can be healed, 
imprisoned people freed.”80 As the division of Korea caused the minjung’s suffering, 
the unification of Korea, they argued, should be a cornerstone for the minjung’s 
liberation as well as the realisation of kingdom of God in this world.  
 The two major principles of the unification discourse proposed by the NCCK 
in the Declaration clearly reflected the theological understanding of Minjung 
theologians on the liberation of minjung and the realisation of the kingdom of God in 
this world through the unification of Korea. However, it was questionable how the 
vague concept of minjung could integrate Korean people in support for the 
movement of unification. Moreover, in the 21st century, Korean people have 
achieved a rapid growth of economy and improved human rights.  It is still 
disputable how minjung can be defined and how many Korean people can be 
categorised as minjung in accordance. Moreover, according to a recent survey, 
around 31.5% South Korean people answered that they do not agree that North and 
South Korea should be unified; and even the population who supported unification of 
the Koreas insisted that the current South Korean economic and political system 
should be the basis for a unified Korea. The result signified that young South Korean 
people suspect the necessity of unification and showed that anti-communism after the 
division of Korea and strengthened by military governments is still flourishing 
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among the older elements of the South Korean population.81 They could be the new 
minjung of the 21st century, then how Minjung theology would encourage South 
Koreans to partake in unification movements overcoming their hatred against North 
Koreans? Moreover, in 20th century, Minjung theologians have argued that 
unification is a prerequisite for South Korean democracy and economic justice but in 
the 21st century, it has been agreed that South Koreans could improve economic 
justice and democracy without unification with North Korea even though South 
Koreans still struggling for democracy and justice. Meanwhile, the nuclear threat 
from North Korea has intensified the hatred of older generation South Koreans 
against North Korea and provoked anti-communism even among the young Korean 
population. As a result, in South Korea, even many activists who partake in peace 
movements are criticised as Jongbuk82 by politicians and organisations which have 
inclinations to conservative government. Therefore, rather than focusing on a 
political unification as a prerequisite of social wellbeing of the minjung, an 
alternative approach toward unification is needed which puts unification as a goal of 
peace of Korea and proposes preparatory stages of healing memories and 
reconciliation of Koreans, especially those of an older generation.  
 
Conclusion 
The Declaration of the Churches of Korea on National Unification and Peace 
was the first official declaration on the unification of Korea published by an NGO 
after the Korean War.83 For fifty years after the division of Korea, it had been 
prohibited for NGOs to publish official statements on the unification and peace of 
Korea. Even more, the statement touched sensitive issues such as the withdrawal of 
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US troops and the proposal of a peace treaty between surrounding countries of the 
Korean peninsula. The issues of US troops and a peace treaty were also included in 
the following governmental policies. Moreover, the suggestions to the governments 
included in the declaration were later adopted by the 7.7 Declaration on National 
Independence, Unification, and Prosperity in July, 1988, issued by South Korean 
government, the Joint Agreement for the Reconciliation, Peace, Interaction and 
Cooperation between South and North Korea signed on 13th of December, 1991, and 
the South-North Joint Declaration of on the Denuclearisation of the Korean 
Peninsula on 31st of December.84  
 The declaration of the NCCK in 1988 was a result of the ecumenical 
movement promoted by the WCC and other church organisations such as NCCCUSA 
regarding peace and unification of Korea. After the publication of the statement, the 
NCCK held “The International Consultation on Peace on the Korean Peninsula” 
sponsored by CCIA and CCA (Christian Conference of Asia) on 25th to 29th of April, 
1988.  This affirmed the 88 Declaration of NCCK and proposed seven policies which 
global churches were encouraged to adopt.85 Moreover, at the central committee 
meeting at Moscow, the WCC issued a statement entitled, “Peace and the Unification 
of Korea: Policy Statement,” in which the WCC acknowledged the KCF as the 
representative Protestant organisation of North Korea and noted KCF’s contribution 
to the ecumenical movements for peace and unification of Korea. Moreover, the 
WCC reaffirmed the 88 Declaration of NCCK and indicated that they would monitor 
and support the ecumenical efforts of NCCK for the peace and unification of Korea 
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through CCIA.86 A number of consultations held or sponsored by the WCC 
continued and the participants stated that they supported the statement of the NCCK.  
 The NCCK statement seemed to throw a stone into the peaceful pond of 
conservative South Korean Protestant churches who simply believed that the 
unification discourse of Korea should be managed only by the government and that 
churches should confine themselves to the evangelisation of North Korean people. 
Therefore, they believed that the only thing South Korean churches could do was to 
pray that the North Korean regime would collapse and that South Korean churches 
would advance to the North. However, they were urged to work for the unification 
more progressively. Kidokgongbo, a newspaper published by the Presbyterian 
Church of Korea (Tonghap), strongly criticised NCCK’s statement in 1988, saying:  
40 years have passed since the division of Korea even before Koreans could 
taste sweetness of freedom from Japanese occupation. The unification of 
Korea is our dream and a missiological task of the South Korean 
churches…The South Korean churches are responsible for the evangelisation 
of South Korea as well as North Korea…Therefore, unification discourses 
should not be sorely dedicated to the Department of Unification of South 
Korean government but be a cooperative task of all Koreans. The South 
Korean churches should involve in the dialogue for the unification with a 
missiological purpose…Missiological approach toward the unification of 
Korea requires the South Korean churches be more sensitive toward social 
issue. It means that the South Korean churches should humbly confess their 
sins and be renewed for mission works for North Korea.87 
Even though the conservative churches did not agree with the statement of the 
NCCK, they felt that South Korean churches needed to approach the unification of 
Korea from different perspectives such as mission work including humanitarian 
involvement for North Koreans supported by governments of both Koreas. Hence the 
major figures of conservative churches insisted that the government should open the 
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debate to the public and invite NGOs and religious organisations to the table of 
unification dialogues.88  
 As examined above, the NCCK’s Declaration of the Churches of Korea on 
Peace and Unification influenced the governmental policies regarding the 
relationships with the North Korean regime and widened ecumenical involvement for 
the peace and unification of Korea. Moreover, it brought a limited change of mind 
among conservative churches toward the unification issues. However, even though 
NCCK succeeded in provoking people’s interest in the peace and unification of 
Korea, they had difficulty in securing the adoption of the ecumenical approach to the 
unification of Korea, for various reasons.  First, the statement could not achieve the 
broad support of South Korean Christians. Even the Presbyterian Church of Korea 
(Tonghap)89, a founding member of NCCK, failed to reach an agreement on the 
statement and NCCK’s ecumenical efforts for the unification. Second, as Lee Man-
Yeol argued, the declaration did not invoke meaningful discussions on how 
Christianity could make a productive and supplemental ideology for a unified Korea 
in dialogue with Juche ideology of North Korea, the capitalist and anti-communist 
ideology of South Korea.90 Third, the declaration also lacked a methodology by 
which to achieve the unification of Korea while other NGOs or religious bodies 
proposed their own methodologies for the unification such as a unification through 
absorption (the conservative solution) or via confederate governmental system of two 
Koreas (the liberal solution).  
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The reactions against the ecumenical efforts of the WCC and the NCCK 
revealed once again the strong anti-communism among the majority of South Korean 
conservative Christians and raised the pertinent question of how a direct unification 
dialogue would be possible without a deeper engagement with anti-communism 
among South Korean churches. Moreover, in response to the nuclear issues that 
surfaced in the early 1990s, the hostility among South Koreans against the North 
Korean regime deepened and many criticisms were raised against the unification 
movement as advocated by more liberal churches. Furthermore, the South Korean 
churches entered a transitional period in the early 1990s when North Korea faced a 
leadership change due to the death of Kim Il-Sung and a terrible food shortage. As a 
result, the unification discourse of South Korean churches increasingly focused on 
humanitarian projects for North Korean people. The conservative South Korean 
churches, particularly mega-churches such as Youngnak Presbyterian Church 
(Tonghap), Somang Church (Tonghap), Yoido Full Gospel Church (Pentecostal) and 
Namseoul Church (Hapdong), launched various humanitarian projects for North 
Korean people and passionately formulated their own theological approaches to the 
unification intertwined with humanitarian issues, evangelism and anti-communism. 
Along with the harsh reactions of conservative churches against the liberal 
churches on their unification movements, the liberal churches’ unification 
movements became weakened under the presidency of Kim Dae-Jung (Feb. 1998- 
Feb. 2003) and Roh Moo-Hyun (Feb. 2003- Feb. 2008).  This was because South 
Korean governments made progress in their own unification dialogue with the North 
Korean regime, through such means as the First Presidential Summit and June 15 
Joint Declaration in 2000, and the Second Presidential Summit in 2007 and the 
establishment of the Gyeseong Industrial Complex where South Korean companies 
built factories in a North Korean city and hired North Korean workers. With the 
progress of the relationship between the two Koreas at governmental level, the liberal 
churches somewhat withdrew from political engagement for the unification of Korea 
and started to join in humanitarian movements for North Korean people. However, 
under the presidencies of Lee Myeong-Bak and Park Geun-hye from 2008, the South 
Korean governments declared that there would be no more interactions with the 
North Korean government for as long as they tried to develop nuclear weapons. 
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Moreover, due to regional military confrontations between two Koreas such as the 
artillery attack of North Korea on Yeonpyeong Island and sinking of a warship 
named Cheon-an, the Lee Myeong-Bak government blocked all humanitarian 
supports and civil communications to North Korea from 24th of May in 2010. 
Recurring confrontations between the two Koreas refuelled anti-communism among 
South Korean people and weakened unification dialogue among liberal churches in 
South Korea, as Kim Heung-Soo, a church historian, has argued:  
The theologians who once studied Juche ideology and presented unification 
theologies are silent and it is hard to find new researchers of studies of the 
unification of Korea. It is even hard to find pastors among NCCK member 
churches who engage in unification movements. In a word, the unification 
movements of South Korean Protestant churches are in a state of 
dormancy.91 
In view of this situation, the leaders of liberal churches concluded that without 
establishing peace in the Korean peninsula, any unification dialogue would not 
possible. For instance, Yoo Kyung-Dong argued that the unification movements in 
South Korea had generated decisive conflicts among South Korean people on the 
issues of US military bases in Pyeongtaek and Jeju, and US’ Missile Defence system 
in South Korea. He pointed out that those issues were brought to the fore by Lee and 
Park’s governments which were collaborating with the United States which in 
building up a new Cold War system in the Korean peninsula. Because of the 
resurgence of the Cold War system in the Korean peninsula and the reality that the 
unification movements in South Korea are hugely influenced by the governmental 
power, liberals concluded that South Korean churches should bring a new phase of a 
peace movement to encourage South Koreans to elect a government which would 
develop policies for peace and unification of Korea.92  
The unification movements for the Korean peninsula thus became 
transformed into peace movements which adopted wider goals such as opposition to 
war and nuclear weapons rather than unification itself, while they had formerly 
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highlighted unification as a continuance of the peace movement of South Korean 
churches started from the era of Japanese occupation. The changing emphasis of the 
ecumenical movement for the unification of Korea by liberal churches represented by 
NCCK and WCC was clearly reflected in the statement of the 10th General Assembly 
of WCC in Busan in 2013. WCC emphasised that a sustainable peace must include a 
peace treaty which would replace the Armistice Agreement in 1953 and would end 
the state of war between two Koreas, and a nuclear-free agreement in the Korean 
peninsula between the two Koreas, China, the United States, Japan and Russia.93 In 
the changing political and social landscape of South Korea in the 21st century the 
liberal churches’ unification movement partly merged into the movements 
concerning humanitarian issues faced by North Koreans initiated by conservative 
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Humanitarian Works and the Missions for the North Korean People 
Led by the Conservative Churches of South Korea 
 
 While the liberal churches generally saw the unification movement as a 
means of forwarding the missio Dei, the conservative churches tended to emphasise 
personal transformation and salvation,1 which led to evangelisation efforts directed at 
North Koreans and North Korean defectors in South Korea. From the early 1990s, 
when the economy and the military power of South Korea began to surpass that of 
North Korea and North Koreans suffered natural disasters and shortages of food, the 
conservative churches concentrated their energy and resources on humanitarian work 
for North Koreans as seeds for the evangelisation of North Korea. This chapter 
presents a historical trajectory of the development of the conservative churches’ 
approach to the unification of Korea, including an analysis of how their approach 
was formulated after the Korean War and under authoritarian governments. This 
chapter also sets out to analyse how the evangelical South Korean churches 
presented the Christian mission to North Korea as a method to bring about 
unification, while at the same time expanding their humanitarian projects in 
cooperation with South Korean liberal churches.  
  
3.1. Anti-Communism and the South Korean Conservative Churches 
 
The unification movement of the conservative South Korean churches has 
been deeply rooted in a dualistic anti-communism and the tendency to emphasise 
earthly blessings, which has characterised the spirituality of the majority of South 
Korean Christians since the Korean War. After the Korean War, the faith of many 
South Korean Protestant Christians was distanced from an emphasis on social 
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transformation and justice and focused more on national security and earthly 
blessings. Kim Heung-Soo argued that, “the Korean War brought a psychological 
disorder to South Koreans, such as a horrific trauma against the North Korean 
communists, so that the rapid social changes after the war made South Koreans feel 
insecure”.2 Many conservative Christians yearned for earthly blessings that would 
secure their life in a land that had been devastated by civil war and they believed that 
their faithfulness and sincerity in church activities, such as observance of the Lord’s 
Day and tithing, would be pathways through which God’s earthly blessing would be 
bestowed. Church planting and proselytisation were also regarded as blessed works 
that would expand the kingdom of God.3 This characteristic of faith was most 
strongly exhibited among Christians who had been evacuated from North Korea.  
The most prominent figures in the conservative South Korean churches were 
immigrants who escaped from Northern Korea between the time of the advance of 
Soviet armies into the North in August of 1945 and the end of the Korean War in the 
summer of 1953. Among these people were those who had their property confiscated 
by the North Korean communist government, and those who sought political and 
religious freedom to avoid persecution by the communists. The Christians who 
escaped from the North gathered and founded new churches in South Korea and 
invited other North Korean refugees to their churches. In the era of the division of 
the Korean peninsula in 1948 and the end of Korean War in 1953, the population of 
Protestants who migrated from North Korea reached 25% of the Protestant 
population in South Korea. In the case of Presbyterian churches, the North Korean 
immigrant pastors and elders organised the North Korean Christian Fellowship (Ibuk 
Shindo Daepyohoi) and supported North Korean immigrant Christian communities 
with the strong support of the Presbyterian Mission Board of the United States and 
the Christian World Service (CWS).4 The North Korean immigrant Presbyterians 
                                               
2 Heung-Soo Kim, A Study of the Korean War and This-Worldly Blessings in the Christian Churches 
(Seoul: The Institute for Korean Church History, 1999), p. 40. 
3 Kwang-Hee Lee, “Evaluation of Modern Pneumatology: Church Growth and the Work of the Holy 
Spirit from a Perspective of the Theology of Blessing”, The Bible and Theology 20 (1996), pp. 468-
469. 
4 Jeong-Ran Yoon, “The Fractions and Competitions of South Korean Denominations and the Aid of 
International Relief Organisations”, Bulletin of the Institute for Korean Church History 99 (2012). 
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organised a synod for North Korean immigrant Presbyterian churches, which soon 
became the biggest synod in South Korea. They also established a number of social 
welfare and education facilities. From thereon in, the North Korean immigrant 
church leaders became the leaders of Christian denominations in South Korea.5 As a 
result, the majority of South Korean churches were centres of anti-communism and 
the preachers proclaimed that South Korea should defeat the North, excommunicate, 
and finally eliminate the communists from the Korean peninsula. During the Korean 
War, the conservative Christians were involved in military combat with North 
Koreans, and church leaders such as Han Kyung-Chik6 encouraged young Christian 
men to join the South Korean armies to fight the “evil communists”. When the North 
Korean armies advanced on and captured Seoul in 1950 during the Korean War, the 
South Korean church leaders evacuated to Daejeon and organised the Christian 
Alliance to Save the Nation. They continued to work alongside the South Korean 
armies retreating to Daegu and Busan. They concentrated their efforts on relief work 
for war refugees, broadcasting and comforting the soldiers, but they also encouraged 
young Christians onto the battlefield.7 
South Korean church leaders saw the Korean War as a crusade against the 
expansion of communist forces into the Korean peninsula and hence they believed 
that the South Korean and UN armies were fighting for God’s cause. Therefore, they 
officially opposed the negotiations between the UN, China and North Korea to 
suspend the war and insisted that “the unification of Korea [could] never be 
accomplished by negotiation with communists but by defeating them”.8 They sent 
letters to the headquarters of the UN armies and the US government urging them to 
stop the negotiations and advance towards the North to defeat the North Korean 
communists and unify the Korean peninsula. The pastors of the conservative 
                                               
5 In-Cheol Kang, “(Speical Report) South Korean Society and North Korean Refugees - South Korean 
Churches and Anti-Communism under a Conservative Anti-Communist Government”, Critical 
Review of History 23 (1993), pp. 75-76. 
6 Han Kyung-Chik (1902-2000), a famous conservative Christian leader, was a North Korean pastor 
who escaped the North in 1945 and founded Youngnak Presbyterian Church in 1946.  
7 Kim, A Study of the Korean War and This-Worldly Blessings in the Christian Churches, p. 57. 
8 Ibid., p. 63. 
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churches also strongly embraced hostility towards North Koreans and all the 
communist nations in the world.  
Even in the early 1970s when the North and South Korean governments 
started to discuss the unification of Korea, anti-communism was still rife in the South 
Korean conservative churches. For instance, pastors of the conservative South 
Korean churches joined in the Christian Crusade for Saving Korea, a Christian 
organisation established by a multi-religious leader, Choi Tae-Min, and supported by 
Park’s government. The pastors joined in military training camps and designated 
themselves as a crusade army fighting against North Korean communists and the 
people who would ‘threaten’ South Korean society.9 For the South Korean churches 
facing the threat of North Korea, anti-communism was intertwined with opposition 
to the power of Satan, expectations of eschatological salvation and the belief that 
God had chosen South Koreans as his instruments to defeat communism. The leaders 
of new revival movements in Korea insisted that when the communists disappeared 
from the Korean peninsula, Jesus would come to the land to bring salvation to South 
Korean Christians. This eschatological belief spread widely among conservative 
Christians. Even after the leaders of the movement were criticised as pagans by 
South Korean Protestant churches, this belief continued to have a strong influence 
among conservative South Korean Christians.10  
The conservative churches were very concerned about the state security 
against the North Korean communist regime. Most of the church leaders who 
escaped from North Korea had experienced the Japanese occupation and its 
oppression. Hence, they believed that the existence of a nation-state in the South was 
vital and that Christians were responsible for serving the state, as Romans 13:1 
states, “Let everyone be subject to the governing authorities, for there is no authority 
except that which God has established. The authorities that exist have been 
established by God”.11 Therefore, conservative Christians tended to have a close 
                                               
9 “Park Geun-Hye, the Daughter of the President, Visited the Dismissing Service of Pastriotic Pastors' 
Military Camp”, Kyunghyang Newspaper 26 May, 1975. 
10 In-Cheol Kang, “[Special Issues: Protestantism in Korea] the Production and Reproduction of Anti-
Communism in the Korean Protestant Churches”, Critical Review of History 70, (2005), p. 49. 
11 New International Version.  
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relationship with the authoritarian governments after the division of the peninsula 
and they also enjoyed governmental support through such means as the inception of 
the army chaplaincy under Rhee Syng-Man’s government. The churches welcomed 
the inception of the chaplaincy, hoping that Christianity would strengthen the 
soldiers’ zeal for fighting against North Korean communists and that the chaplains 
would present the Christian message to the younger male population of South Korea 
who had to complete their national service in the army. They thought that the army 
camps and schools were “blue oceans” for evangelisation. The representative pastors 
of the conservative South Korean churches were invited to morning prayer meetings 
organised by the authoritarian governments, who used these religious meetings to 
justify their governments that had taken power through military coups.12 They were 
primarily interested in the evangelisation of the nation and the growth of South 
Korean churches. Therefore, while the liberal churches engaged in social justice and 
human rights movements under authoritarian governments, most South Korean 
Protestant churches emphasised national evangelisation and programmes of church 
planting. The South Korean churches, which had a tendency toward church planting 
and refraining from engaging in political issues, were thus inclined to talk about 
taking over North Korea and opening a door for evangelisation. 
 The approaches of the conservative churches toward the unification of Korea 
were closely aligned with the governmental positions. They believed that the 
unification was a political issue between the two Koreas and that churches were not 
responsible for promoting unification dialogues. The only thing churches could do, 
they believed, was to pray for the leaders of South Korean governments to develop 
wise unification policies, and for the North Korean people to embrace the gospel 
message and become Christians. In addition, they prayed that a just God would 
punish the North Korean communist leaders and their governments would collapse 
soon. Their hope for an imminent end to the North Korean communist regime 
resulted in the retarding of the unification movement and a campaign for the re-
                                               
12 Lee Man-Yeol has criticised conservative pastors for ‘complimenting’ and ‘blessing’ the military 
leaders who took over the government despite the fact that they claimed to be opposed to the political 
involvement of churches. Man-Yeol Lee, “70 Years' Division of the Korean Peninsula: Historical 
Assessment of the Christianity of Korea”, Christianity and History in Korea 44 (2016), p. 15. 
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establishment of Christian churches and communities in North Korea, which were 
supposed to have been destroyed under the communist regime. Thus, the 
conservative churches emphasised anti-communism more than the unification of 
Korea, and they believed that, “North Korea is an evil country where Christians are 
persecuted and killed by the anti-Christian communists and the North Koreans 
should be saved from persecution by communists.”13 
 However, in the early 1970s the political and diplomatic conditions in the 
Korean peninsula began to change rapidly. From 1970, the United States and China 
started to develop their relationship, and in July 1971, Henry A. Kissinger, the 
Secretary of State in the United States administration at that time, visited China to 
prepare for a presidential meeting between the US and China. As well as breaking 
down the wall between China and the US, this meeting led to the North Korean 
Government declaring that they were willing to talk with the South Korean 
Government.14 Consequently, the South Korean Government could not avoid some 
changes in its policies towards North Korea. First, President Park Chung-hee 
publicised a “Plan for Peaceful Unification” at the memorial ceremony on the 
National Independence Day (15 August) in 1970 and announced that the government 
would start a new stage of dialogue with the North Korean Government.15 Second, in 
1971 the South Korean Government proposed a dialogue with the North Korean 
Government on the issue of separated families through the Red Cross of South 
Korea. The changing mood toward global diplomacy and the changed attitude of the 
South Korean Government toward the North resulted in the 7.4 Joint Communiqué of 
1972. 
 
                                               
13 Lee, “Church and Nation: The National Unification of Korea from an Evangelical Perspective in the 
Korean Church”, p. 125. 
14 Ha-Na Lee, “Changes in the Logic of the Yusin Period’s Anti-Communism, and Cold War 
Sensitivities”, Critical Studies on Modern Korean History 32 (2014), p. 517. 
15 “Announcement of a Plan for Peaceful Unification by President Park Chung-hee”, Kyung Hyang 
Newspaper 15 August, 1970. 
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3.2. Seung-gong16 Discourse and the Churches’ Message of Earthly 
Blessings 
 
The 7.4 Joint Communiqué challenged the dominant anti-communism 
among South Koreans and their attitude toward unification. Under the Rhee and Park 
governments, conservative South Korean Christians had believed that the North 
would soon collapse and South Koreans could take over the North. Therefore, 
unification discourse between the two Koreas, they thought, was unnecessary. 
Moreover, unification dialogue with the North Korean communists would not be 
possible because the latter still had a plan to make the Korean peninsula into a single 
communist country and because the communism of North Korea could not coexist 
with Christianity in the Korean peninsula. Hence, conservative South Korean 
Christians had previously argued that they were responsible for “missionary work in 
the North and that they should rescue North Korean Christians and even rebuild 
churches in the North.”17 
 However, with the development of North-South Korean dialogue and the 7.4 
Joint Communiqué, the South Koreans now began to acknowledge North Korea as a 
rival state and thought that unification would only be possible when South Korea 
overtook North Korea economically, politically and militarily.18 The conservative 
South Korean Christian leaders now preached this kind of message from the pulpit.19 
Even liberal South Korean Christians, pushed by conservatives to prove their anti-
                                               
16 Seung-gong literally means ‘a victory over communism.’  
17 Eunsik Cho, “Dimensions of Christian Mission toward Reunification of Korea”, p. 69. 
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gong in Korean; South Korea had to show that the South Korean capitalist democracy was superior to 
the North Korean communist democracy. Lee, “Changes in the Logic of the Yusin Period's Anti-
Communism, and Cold War Sensitivities”, p. 524. 
19 Seong-gong sentiment already existed among some South Korean people before the 1970s. For 
instance, Bang Ji-Il, the senior pastor of the Youngdeongpo Presbyterian church in the 1960s, argued 
that the Christian family should be a centre for resisting communism by teaching children about 




communism, emphasised “the democratisation and securing the human rights to 
bring a victory over the North Korean communism.”20  
The Seung-gong discourse of the government based on the economic 
development of South Korea won the support of South Koreans. Having experienced 
harsh years under the Japanese occupation and horrific shortages of food after the 
Korean War, South Koreans agreed with the governmental campaign for economic 
modernisation, including a rural development movement (Saemaul Undong).21 Along 
with the national campaign of the government for economic development, church 
leaders also preached about earthly blessings and the goodness of God. Rather than a 
message about God’s justice and human rights, which would make the authorities 
uncomfortable, church leaders preached about earthly blessings and positive thinking 
about the world. The leaders of Protestant churches developed programs about 
spiritual experience and healing, and held revival meetings in churches, as well as 
mass prayer gatherings in prayer retreat centres.22 Thus, the Protestant churches in 
South Korea achieved rapid growth in membership and numbers of churches during 
this period. From the 1980s mega-churches emerged with more than 10,000 
members. South Korea now had more mega-churches than any other country in the 
world and “most of the mega-churches were conservative churches”.23 
 Emphasising earthly blessings, the pastors preached that the earthly blessing 
from heaven were God’s promise to Korea and South Koreans, God’s chosen people, 
who would win a spiritual battle against North Korea that would eventually enable 
                                               
20 Kang, “[Special Issues: Protestantism in Korea] the Production and Reproduction of Anti-
Communism in the Korean Protestant Churches”, p. 56. 
21 Saemaul Undong was planned by the South Korean government led by Park Chung-hee, which 
aimed at the development of the infrastructure of rural areas and the income of people who lived in 
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proclaimed a “race to overtake the North”, economically, the development of rural towns was 
essential for the continuance of Park’s regime, as Park Chung-hee argued, “Saemaul Undong is a 
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22 Kim, A Study of the Korean War and This-Worldly Blessings in the Christian Churches, p. 198. 
23 Kang, “[Special Issues: Protestantism in Korea] the Production and Reproduction of Anti-
Communism in the Korean Protestant Churches”, p. 57. 
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the unification of the two Koreas. After the Korean War, South Korean Christians 
yearned for material security as well as spiritual consolation and they believed that 
the development of the economy and political life would lead to victory over North 
Korean communism. Han Kyung-Chik, appearing in 1984 on a television discussion 
program with young college students, insisted:  
To achieve the unification, South Korea should surpass the North in every 
aspect. We should prove that our society is morally superior to the North 
Korean society... Finally, we should create economic progress, which would 
bring us a prosperous life that North Koreans cannot have…24 
In the same year, Cho Yong-Gi (David), the founding pastor of Yoido Full Gospel 
Church, wrote that the only way to protect South Korea from the North Korean 
communists was through the empowerment of the economy and the military force of 
South Korea. He insisted, “Let’s imagine a fence to protect sheep from the attack of 
wolves. If the sheep safe in the fence broke the fence and invited wolves to negotiate 
for peace. What would happen?” Cho portrayed North Korean communists as 
untrustworthy and constantly ready to occupy the Korean peninsula. Therefore, he 
concluded that South Koreans should be aware of the threat and keep praying for 
national security and prosperity.25 In addition to seeking to surpass North Korea 
economically and in terms of military power, the conservative Christians started to 
publish academic materials to explain theoretically how the communism of the North 
could not be compatible with Christianity and to educate young Christians about the 
dangers of communism, rather than simply ignoring the ideology of North Korea.26  
Following the 7.4. Joint Communiqué between the North and South Korean 
governments and the increasing number of appearances of the KCF at international 
conferences, conservative Christians started criticising the KCF as a governmental 
religious organisation controlled by communists, and hoped that there would be 
                                               
24 KBS (Korean Broadcasting System), “Rev Han Kyung-Chik and 100 College Students: A Free 
Discussion” (Seoul: KBS, 3 February, 1984). 
25 Yong-Gi Cho, “Let's Brighten up the Candle of the Unification of Korea by Prayer and Devotion”, 
Tongil Hankook (The Unified Korea) 4 (1984), p. 53. 
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underground ‘genuine’ Christians who were left behind before and during the Korean 
War. They believed that the North Koreans were still in need of the gospel message 
and ‘real’ church communities. It was the responsibility of South Korean churches to 
take the gospel message to the North and evangelise the people in the North who had 
been brainwashed by North Korean communism.27 South Korean churches were also 
called to restore the Christian communities in the North that had been destroyed by 
the North Korean communist regime after the division of the Korean peninsula.28 
Before the 88 Declaration of the NCCK, missions to North Korea were based on 
militant anti-communism that regarded the North Korean communist regime as an 
evil force that would be brought to an end by God’s providence. In that period, the 
conservative Christians believed that their mission to North Korea and the restoration 
of North Korean Christian communities would be fully realised. Thus, the 
conservative churches, motivated by a strong anti-communism, rejected interactions 
and dialogue with the North Korean Government and believed that the North Korean 
communist regime would collapse soon as South Korea was winning the ideological 
battle with the North. Hence, they strategically emphasised indirect evangelisation 
through broadcasting systems.29 They believed that in this way the gospel message 
would reach the people in the USSR and China and even those in North Korea. Then, 
they argued, it would bring about a transformation in North Korean society.  
The chairperson of the committee for North Korean missions of the 
Presbyterian Church of Korea (Tonghap) insisted that if the gospel message were 
spread throughout North Korea it would contribute to the peace and unification of 
Korea, but that North Korean missions should be limited to the “governmental 
guidelines for national security”. The committee would not accept dialogue between 
                                               
27 A number of organisations already existed from the 1970s to pursue North Korean missions, such as 
the committee for the North Korean mission in the Presbyterian Church of Korea (Tonghap, 
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the KCF and other WCC member churches.30 The conservative South Korean 
churches were cautious about interactions between North Korean churches 
represented by the KCF and the WCC member churches. They worried that the 
North Korean communists would expand their influence over South Korean 
Christians through meetings between Western and North Korean churches. Han 
Kyung-Chik, the chairperson of the preparatory committee for commemorating the 
centennial of South Korean Protestant churches, argued:  
We should be cautious about the expansion of the communism of North 
Korea, which threatens the freedom of faith, Christian communities and 
mission works in the Korean peninsula…we still believe that the unification 
of Korea will be realised only through a national evangelisation.31 
As it pursued the unification of Korea in cooperation with the KCF, the NCCK –  
although not with the support of all its member churches – increasingly departed 
from the anti-communism that was rife in South Korean society and even in 
Christian communities. Meanwhile, the conservative churches remained as wedded 
to anti-communism as ever. Therefore, from the end of the 1980s, anti-communism 
became a more clearly divisive line between the conservative and the liberal South 
Korean churches.32 
 
3.3. The 88 Declaration of the NCCK and the Response of the 
Conservative Churches 
 
 The year 1988 was a momentous one for South Korean society in terms of its 
relationship with North Korea. In spite of the terrorist acts of the North Korean 
communist regime, such as the Rangoon bombing, which targeted the president of 
South Korea in 1983, and the blowing up of a Korean Air aircraft in 1987 by North 
                                               
30 Jeong, A History of Unification Movements in Korean Churches, p. 247. 
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Korean intelligent agents, South Koreans were confident that South Korea had 
surpassed North Korea, both economically and in military power. South Korea 
hosted the 1988 Olympic Games and communist regimes in Eastern Europe were 
collapsing. Thus, there was a hope among South Koreans that there would soon be 
peace in the Korean peninsula and the North Korean communist regime would give 
up their national plan to make the Korean peninsula a communist land.  
 When the NCCK produced the 88 Declaration amidst changing circumstances 
around the Korean peninsula, the conservative churches strongly criticised the 
declaration, but at the same time they agreed that there should be a change in the 
attitude of South Korean churches toward North Korea and the unification of the two 
Koreas. Before the interactions of the South Korean and North Korean churches 
represented by the KCF, as well as those between South and North Korean 
governments, the conservative churches had ignored the existence of the churches in 
North Korea and had not acknowledged the North Korean communist regime as a 
legal government. However, they now became interested in the underground 
churches, as well as the Juche ideology of North Korea.  
 The governmental policies to promote interactions with North Korea in the 
fields of sports and arts, and the confidence of South Koreans that South Korea had 
already overtaken North Korea militarily and economically, encouraged conservative 
Christians to search for ways to take the gospel to the North. Kim Myung-Hyuk, a 
former professor of the Theological Institute of the Korean Presbyterian Church 
(Hapdong) and a former president of the CCK, argued that the South Korean 
churches should prepare workers and materials that could be used to rebuild church33 
buildings and Christian communities in the North, which had formerly been 
supposed to have disappeared after the Korean War, even though that seemed not 
foreseeable. He continued:  
First, the North Korean underground Christians will provide ways to rebuild 
churches and the Christian communities of North Korea… Second, Koreans 
living abroad and holding foreign citizenship, especially those of communist 
countries, could bring gospel messages into North Korea… Third, South 
                                               
33 The CCK was an inter-denominational organisation aiming to represent the voices of conservative 
churches in South Korea. The history of its foundation will be presented in section 3.4.  
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Korean Christians need to urge the South Korean government to broaden 
interactions with North Korea so that South Koreans easily travel to North 
Korea with the Bible… Fourth, the South Korean churches should prepare 
for the moment when the North Korean communist regime collapses…34 
The 88 Declaration of the NCCK led the South Korean conservative churches to 
regard North Korean churches as potential partners in the unification of Korea in 
spite of their suspicions about the “Christian authenticity” of the KCF. For instance, 
the Presbyterian Church of Korea (Tonghap) formed a committee for the 
evangelisation of North Korea after the 88 Declaration of the NCCK to placate the 
strong critics in conservative member churches, and they sent Lee Eui-Ho, the 
chairperson of the committee, to the Glion conference in 1989. Lee reported:  
It was miracle to see remnant churches in North Korea where Christians 
worshipped God. If South Koreans are stubborn about accepting the changes 
happening in the Korean peninsula and ignore the existence of Christian 
communities in the North regarding them as a propagation of North Korean 
communists, we are opposing God’s providence as he answers our prayer to 
open a small door for missions toward North Korea…35  
The declaration encouraged the conservative churches to become more involved in 
the unification discourses with other non-government organisations. The Lausanne 
Covenant of 1974 partly influenced the South Korean conservative churches to 
become more concerned with and involved in the unification issues of Korea in the 
late 1980s.36 The conservative churches had previously been characterised by their 
indifference to social and political issues. While liberal South Korean churches 
actively engaged in social and political issues under authoritarian governments, the 
conservative churches had previously insisted that churches were not responsible for 
social and political issues. However, after the Lausanne Congress, there were notable 
changes among the South Korean conservative churches regarding social issues. For 
instance, they established the Christian Ethics Movement of Korea in 1987 and 
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promoted the social responsibilities of the conservative churches of Korea.37 
Concomitantly, after the declaration, the conservative churches came to acknowledge 
their responsibility for the unification movements in the social realm. Therefore, the 
conservative churches saw the declaration and the interactions between the KCF, the 
WCC, and the NCCK as opportunities to make a connection with North Korean 
churches and North Korean Christians. For instance, Kwak Sun-Hee, the former 
pastor of Somang Presbyterian Church in Seoul (Tonghap), who was regarded as a 
representative pastor of the conservative churches of South Korea, visited 
Pyeongyang on the 24th of September 1991 to discuss the future projects of pastoral 
interactions between the churches of the two Koreas. Kwak was the first individual 
to visit North Korea with governmental permission and without representing any 
organisations in South Korea.38 However, conservatives still believed that the North 
Korean communist regime could not be trusted to pursue a dialogue for a peaceful 
unification.  
The South Korean conservative churches now criticised militant 
denominationalism. While the NCCK argued in the 88 Declaration that it was a sin 
for the Korean Christians not to resist the division of the Korean peninsula and the 
strong hatred established between the two Koreas, the conservative churches began 
to confess that they had sinned against God through divisive denominationalism and 
ignorance toward the suffering of North Koreans.39 They argued that South Korean 
churches should speak in one voice for the evangelisation of the entire nation, 
including North Korea. The majority of South Korean churches organised 
committees for national evangelisation and propagated their vision through various 
events, such as Saving Korea prayer gatherings. In terms of evangelising works for 
North Koreans, the conservative South Korean churches launched various 
organisations for mission works in communist countries such as China, the USSR 
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and Mongolia. For the missions to North Korea, and the countries bordering North 
Korea, they believed that decisive cooperation between denominations and even 
between individual churches was essential.  
The 88 Declaration thus stimulated the conservative South Korean churches, 
who had previously shown a tendency to consider unification issues as simply 
political and had argued that South Korean churches should not engage in unification 
movements, to take part in unification dialogues with the North and South Korean 
governments.  They also began dialogues with North Korean churches represented 
by the KCF, although only on limited humanitarian and religious issues. The 
declaration, coming as it did from the liberal wing of South Korean churches, also 
provoked the conservative churches to establish a new inter-denominational 
organisation that could reflect their own ideas regarding North Korea and the 
unification of Korea. 
 
3.4. Establishment of the CCK (Christian Council of Korea) and their 
Approach to Unification 
 
Recognising the need for cooperation between churches on the issues of 
unification and national evangelisation, the conservative churches established the 
CCK as a rival to the NCCK. They believed that the NCCK had a strong tendency 
toward embracing North Korean communism and they were too much involved in 
anti-state and political movements, which was regarded as ‘not evangelical’ by the 
conservative churches. Therefore, on the 28th of December 1989, following the visit 
of Rev. Moon Ik-Hwan to North Korea, the representatives of the conservative 
denominations, including the Presbyterian Church of Korea (Tonghap), a member 
denomination of the NCCK, gathered at Gangnam Holiness Church in Seoul to 
establish an inter-denominational organisation named the Hangichong (CCK).40 The 
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leaders of the conservative churches had begun to discuss the possibility of forming a 
new inter-denominational organisation in the early 1980s. However, the 88 
Declaration by the NCCK and the visit of Rev. Moon Ik-Hwan hastened the 
establishment of the CCK in 1989. The founding statement of the CCK clearly 
emphasised the unification of Korea as a purpose of the organisation. It stated:  
…the participants of the preparatory meeting for the establishment of an inter-
denominational organisation agreed that the South Korean churches should be 
unified to prepare for the new millennium and the unification of Korea as well 
as to make one voice on the political and social issues of South Korea…41 
After the foundation of the CCK, the member churches tried to avoid political 
involvement in movements for unification, but their projects and dialogues with the 
governmental offices of North and South Korea were influenced by the political 
landscape of the Korean peninsula.42 Nonetheless, they still believed that the 
unification movement of the South Korean churches was a form of spiritual warfare 
and their projects and dialogues with the two governments were limited to their 
object: unification through evangelising the two Koreas. The first project of the CCK 
relating to the unification of Korea was the Drive for Sharing Rice of Love, proposed 
by Han Kyung-Chik, the former pastor of Youngnak Presbyterian Church and an 
honorary chairperson of the CCK in 1990. The early 1990s in North Korea were 
marked by a devastating flood and food shortages. The CCK organised the Centre for 
the Drive for Sharing Rice of Love on the 17th of February 1990, which was first 
aimed at the poor people within South Korea, but on the 3rd of July in the same year 
they sent 800 tons of rice to North Korea. The centre reported that the rice was 
delivered to non-governmental organisations in North Korea and hence the project 
did not have any political purpose.43  
                                               
41 Ibid. 
42 The conservative churches used three methods to conduct missions toward North Korea: the 
movement for the restoration of North Korean churches, humanitarian works for North Koreans, and 
supporting North Korean defectors. Myung-Soo Park, “Anti-Communism, Unification, and Missions 
toward North Korea: Comparative Study on the NCCK and CCK”, The Holiness Church and 
Theology 21, no. Spring (2009), p. 134. 
43 “No Political Purpose in Sending the Rice of Love to North Korea”, Kidokgongbo 5 January 1991. 
recited from Jung, A History of Unification Movements in Korean Churches, p. 328. 
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 The early 1990s saw a number of acts of national reconciliation and peace in 
the world. North and South Yemen were unified on the 22nd of May 1990 and West 
and East Germany were unified on the 3rd of October in the same year. North and 
South Korea also both became members of the United Nations in September 1991, 
and the countries agreed to expand civilian interactions between the two countries in 
February 1992. Despite the nuclear issues of North Korea in 1994 when the North 
Korean Government refused the inspection of IAEA, and the death of Kim Il-Sung in 
the same year, South Korean Christians hoped that unification might be realised 
sooner than they had once expected, and they hastened projects relating to the 
unification of Korea.44 
Compared to the rapid diplomatic changes between the two Koreas and the 
development of the unification movement of the NCCK, the unification discourse of 
the CCK was not systematic until 1996. In 1996, the CCK published their first 
unification policy statement in which they argued that the unification of Korea was 
the responsibility of South Korean Christians, expressing a hope that a “graceful God 
would open a door to North Korea and enable missions toward North Korea”. They 
proposed 12 essential elements for the unification of Korea and nine of them are 
summarised:45 
First, the unified Korea should be a national commonwealth governed by 
God’s justice and love. 
Second, the unified Korea should be a country of freedom, equality and 
peace. 
Third, the unified Korea should be a country where everyone can enjoy 
human dignity. 
Fourth, the unified Korea should be a country that operates an economic 
system enabling everyone to live with full humanity. 
Fifth, the unified Korea should resolve the conflicts between generations, 
regions and economic classes. 
Sixth, the unified Korea should promote peace and reconciliation in Northern 
East Asia. 
                                               
44 Lee, “Church and Nation: The National Unification of Korea from an Evangelical Perspective in the 
Korean Church”, p. 145.  
45 Dong-Chun Lee, “A Study of Unification Methods of the Korean Church from the Perspectives of 
Public Theology” (PhD, Presbyterian College and Theological Seminary, 2010), pp. 69-70. 
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Seventh, unification is not a goal of Korean history but a process toward a 
fulfilment of God’s will in this country. Hence, we disagree that unification 
will resolve all the problems of the Korean peninsula. 
Eighth, the unification of Korea should be peaceful. 
Ninth, to promote the reconciliation and unification of Korea, the two 
governments should enhance humanitarian works, especially regarding the 
separated families. 
The CCK members therefore rejected the perspective of the NCCK that the 
unification would provide a pathway toward a single Korean democratic state and 
they argued that the unification was not only a political or economic matter, but also 
a spiritual and cultural matter, and churches should passionately engage in the latter. 
Therefore, they argued that before the unification, the South Korean churches should 
become involved in movements to restore people’s relationship with God and 
develop a vision for rebuilding the North Korean Christian communities after the 
unification. Thus, the CCK considered the unification as a means by which to restore 
North Korean Christianity and promote the evangelisation of the North Korean 
people. In 1996, the CCK organised a Special Committee for the Reconstruction of 
North Korean Churches and outlined three principles for North Korean missions: the 
first principle was to install a single office for the project; the second was to establish 
one denomination in North Korea; and the third was that the North Korean churches, 
which would be restored in the future, should eventually become independent and 
self-supporting.46  
After the death of Kim Il-Sung in 1994, and the series of natural disasters 
that followed, the CCK strengthened its humanitarian work for the North Korean 
people. The Sunshine Policy47 of the Kim Dae-Jung government (February 1998–
January 2003) also encouraged the South Korean churches to become more involved 
in humanitarian work for North Korea. However, discourses about missions to North 
Korea and the rebuilding of North Korean Christianity were rarely engaged when the 
                                               
46 Seong-Tae Kim, “A Missiological Proposal for the Unification of Korea with a Historical 
Assessment of the Development of the Missions toward North Korea Reflecting from the Current 
Situation of the Korean Peninsula (2)", Presbyterian Theological Quarterly 70, no. 3 (2003), p. 124.  
47 The Sunshine Policy was enacted by the Kim Dae-Jung government to enhance economic support 
for North Korea and promote civil exchange between the two Koreas with a view to resolving the 
nuclear weapon development plan.  
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South Korean churches were involved in humanitarian works for North Korea and 
the South Korean Government adopted the Sunshine Policy toward North Korea. 
Practically, North Korean missions and the rebuilding of North Korean Christianity 
were based on the expectation that South Korea would take over North Korea or that 
the North Korean communist regime would collapse. The conservative churches now 
became worried that their enthusiasm for the rebuilding of churches and Christian 
communities in North Korean territories would injure South-North relationships and 
lead to a blockage in the exchange of material and human resources.48 The 
conservative churches therefore increasingly refrained from using the discourse on 
rebuilding North Korean churches and Christian communities, which would provoke 
the KCF and the North Korean Government. Rather, they focused their projects on 
the relief of the North Korean people, as well as work among North Korean 
defectors.49  
Along with the project for North Korean human rights, the CCK also 
established a special committee for helping North Korean defectors. Through the 
committee, the CCK provided the North Korean defectors with basic materials to live 
in South Korea and legal and job-seeking advice so that the North Korean defectors 
could adjust to living in an unfamiliar capitalist society.50 The CCK also secretly 
cooperated with South Korean missionaries in China who helped the North Koreans 
escape from North Korea and supported Korean diaspora Christians in China to 
organise underground Christian communities.  
In 2006, the CCK issued a policy statement regarding North Korean 
missions. In the statement, they described North Koreans as objects of 
evangelisation, not subjects of the unification of Korea. Therefore, they insisted, “the 
                                               
48 Tae-Joon Jung, “The Unification Movements and the Missions toward North Korea of South 
Korean Protestant Churches”, Kidokgyo Sasang (Christian Thoughts) 44, no. 8 (2000), p. 156. 
49 Kim Myung-Hyuk argued that, “we would better not use discourse about North Korean missions or 
the restoration of North Korean churches. There is nothing more worthwhile for people who are 
robbed than foods and medical care… It is not appropriate to strongly put forward North Korean 
missions or the restoration of North Korean churches before the North Koreans…” Myung-Hyuk 
Kim, “Editorial Notes: What Can We Do for Unification?”, Shin-Hak Jung-Ron (Theological Studies) 
15, no. 1 (1997), p. 6. 
50 Do-Hong Joo, “The Evangelical Approach toward the Unification of Korea”, Christianity and the 
Unification 3 (2009), p. 2002.  
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evangelisation of Korea is prior to the unification of Korea…and the unification shall 
be realised by God’s providence as a free gift of God.”51 Thus, they held that the 
South Korean Christians should prepare for the eventual unification of Korea, but 
they insisted on the spiritual transformation of South Korean Christians as a 
prerequisite for the unification. Their approach to North Korea also distinguished the 
North Korean communist regime from North Koreans in general: while they could 
help the North Koreans, they could not embrace the North Korean communists. Their 
unification policy with its approach separating the North Korean communists from 
the North Koreans and the belief that God would realise the unification stimulated 
some groups of conservative Christians to seek a practical and active methodology 
for the unification of Korea. 
By the start of the 21st century, the CCK had become the biggest inter-
denominational organisation in Korea. Park Myung-Soo, a professor at Seoul 
Theological Seminary, has argued that the CCK became a “big tent” enabling 
conservative churches and Christian organisations gather together to face the 
challenge of the governments of Kim Dae-Jung and Rho Moo-Hyun, which had a 
tendency to embrace more politically liberal agendas and sought an equal 
relationship with the United States and a closer relationship with the North Korean 
communist regime, because the majority of South Korean churches were originally 
evangelical and gave preferential support to the governments that adopted a more 
conservative line toward North Korea. Obtaining a degree of political power, the 
CCK started to represent the political voices of the conservative churches in relation 
to North Korean issues.52 The CCK criticised South Korean liberal churches, as well 
as the South Korean governments that implemented the Sunshine Policy to North 
Korea, for their alleged lack of concern about the human rights issues in North 
Korea, even though the liberals had continuously worked to secure human rights in 
South Korea. While the liberals explained that agitation about the human rights of 
North Koreans would provoke the North Korean Government and cause a 
                                               
51 Ibid., p. 201.  
52 Park, “Anti-Communism, Unification, and Missions toward North Korea: Comparative Study on 
the NCCK and the CCK”, p. 142.  
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discontinuance of North-South interactions, the CCK encouraged South Korean 
conservative churches to push the members of the South Korean Parliament to pass 
the North Korean Human Rights Act in 2016, which corresponded to the Resolution 
on the Situation of Human Rights in the DPRK adopted by the UN Commission on 
Human Rights in 2003.53 The South Korean conservative churches’ push for the 
legislation of the North Korean Human Rights Act was primarily aimed at criticising 
the North Korean communists and the South Korean governments of Kim Dae-Jung 
and Roh Moo-Hyun, which launched and continued the Sunshine Policy 
respectively. They also sought to secure the religious freedom of North Koreans so 
that they could expand their mission work for North Koreans.54  
  Even though the conservative churches pursued an apolitical and evangelical 
approach to the unification movement of Korea, the prayer gatherings of the 
conservative churches had a strong tendency toward embracing political agendas 
such as the Iraq War and the issues of the nuclear weapon development programme 
of North Korea. From 1998, the CCK announced that they would not remain silent 
on social issues such as anti-American sentiment55 among the South Korean younger 
generation and the debate about homosexuality. Their campaigns became more 
frequent under the governments56 that were inclined to adopt more liberal policies 
such the Sunshine Policy for North-South Korean relations. The political engagement 
of the conservative churches became evident in the early 2000s in opposition to the 
government, which had applied more liberal policies regarding issues of social 
welfare and a new taxation system for rich and mega-companies. They argued that 
                                               
53 Yonhap News, “The South Korean Assembly Passed the First North Korean Human Rights Act”,  
http://www.huffingtonpost.kr/2016/03/03/story_n_9365886.html.  
54 For details of North Korean human rights issues and the approaches of South Korean conservative 
churches toward these issues, see Sung-Up Huh, “Looking at the Strategic Policies of Missions to 
North Koreans in the Lens of Unification: Focusing on North Korean Human Rights and Problems 
Concerning Defectors”, The Korean Society of Mission Studies 42. 
55 The CCK hosted the “Prayer Vigil for Peace and Security of Korea” on 11, January, 2003, and the 
catchphrases of the prayer gathering were “No Nuclear Weapon of North Korea, No Retreat of US 
Army, and No Anti-Americanism”. CCK Publicity Department, “Timetable for the Prayer Vigil for 
Peace and Security of Korea”,  
http://www.cck.or.kr/chnet2/board/viewPrint.php?id=8&code=intro05c&cate=. 
56 The governments led by president Kim Dae-Jung, and then by president Roh Moo-Hyun.  
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free democratic capitalism was the national ideology of South Korea and in this they 
strongly emphasised anti-communism.  
The ‘New Right’ camp was the leading Christian fellowship for the Christian 
involvement in South Korean politics. The ‘New Right’ movement was organised 
around the early 2000s before the presidential election in 2007 and the people 
involved in the movement supported Lee Myung-Bak, the candidate for the largest 
opposition party, the Hannara Party. Conservative Christian leaders took part in the 
movement; such figures included the pastor Kim Jin-Hong, a former president of 
Durae Commonwealth, a Christian NGO founded for rural development. Kim 
worked as the chair of the board of the National New Right Alliance and officially 
announced that he supported Lee Myung-Bak. Jeon has noted that this New Right 
movement could be characterised by three points. The people involved in the 
movement unanimously emphasised the freedom of the market, rather than political 
freedom. They tended to criticise egalitarianism and the nationalist approaches 
toward the unification of Korea widely shared among the revisionist historians and 
some liberal politicians of South Korea. Finally, they used general ideas about 
human rights and democracy to attack the North Korean communist regime.57 Partly 
influenced by and involved in the New Right camp, some church historians and 
theologians have argued that South Korean Christians should be proud of their anti-
communism and the history of Christian collaboration with the authoritarian 
governments of Rhee Syng-Man for the foundation of a strong anti-communist 
government in 1948. Therefore, while liberal theologians and historians have argued 
that the unification movement of conservative churches was encumbered by their 
anti-communism,58 conservative theologians and church historians have evaluated 
                                               
57 Jae-Ho Jeon, “A Study on the Ideological Character of Korean Conservativism in the 2000s: With a 
Focus on the New Right”, Journal of Contemporary Politics 7, no. 1 (2014) p. 165. 
58 Lee Man-Yeol argued that the unification movement of the conservative churches revealed the 
limitations of anti-communism among the conservative Christians and the conservative churches 
contributed to confrontations between the two Koreas after the Korean War. Man-Yeol Lee, “A 
History of the Unification Movement of South Korean Churches”, Journal of Reformed Theology 26 
(1996), p. 73; Noh Jong-Sun argued that the South Korean Churches have to overcome 
confrontational antagonism and move toward prosperous co-existence. Jong-Sun Noh, “A New 
Paradigm for the North-South Sharing Movement in the Age of Unification Sentiment”, Kidokgyo 
Sasang (Christian Thoughts) 44, no. 8 (2000), p. 135. 
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anti-communism as an essential feature of the Christian movement of the 
conservative churches. Park Myung-Soo has insisted that:  
Anti-communism and pro-Americanism were the piths of the conservative 
ideology in South Korea. Practically, anti-communism and pro-Americanism 
cannot be separated and they are the essence of societies that ensure human 
freedom. Anti-communism was a tool to protect South Korean society from 
the attack of North Korean communism and anti-communism is possible 
only with pro-Americanism.59  
Thus, entering into the 21st century, anti-communism among the conservative 
churches represented by the CCK was still influential even though their humanitarian 
projects continued in North Korea; the ideology even became a pole to sustain their 
Christian identity.  
 
3.5. Conservative-Liberal Churches’ Alliance for the Unification 
Movement 
 
During the 1990s, based on a common concern about supporting North 
Koreans, the liberal churches and some conservative churches began to cooperate in 
various humanitarian and research projects for the unification of Korea. Even though 
the participants came from both the conservative and liberal churches of Korea, most 
of the funds and personnel came from the conservative mega-churches. For instance, 
Hong Jung-Ghil, the former pastor of Namseoul (Southern Seoul) Presbyterian 
Church of Korea (Hapdong), led the foundation of The South-North Sharing 
Campaign and raised funds for this. The current chair members are also from 
conservative denominations. Thus, the NCCK provided the connections with the 
North Korean churches represented by the KCF, while the conservative churches 
provided funds and personnel, especially people who had influence with the South 
Korean Government. The South Korean assembly passed and the South Korean 
Government enacted the Act on the Exchange between South-North Korea in June 
1989 in response to the 7.7 Declaration of the South Korean Government in 1988. 
                                               
59 Park, “Anti-Communism, Unification, and Missions toward North Korea: Comparative Study on 
the NCCK and the CCK”, p. 141. 
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The act enabled NGOs to legally launch a variety of humanitarian projects for the 
North Koreans.60 The first and the most famous cooperative NGO of the South 
Korean churches that aimed to contribute to humanitarian work with North Koreans 
and the unification of Korea was The South-North Sharing Campaign, begun in 
1993. In its founding statement, the authors argued that they had launched the 
campaign in “prophetic calling” and “priestly sacrifice” to “remind the South Korean 
churches of the consciousness of the unification of Korea and to realise 
reconciliation between the two Koreas”. They further insisted that they “seek to share 
love with people in both Koreas which shall be grounds for national peace, 
reconciliation and unification”.61  
To a greater extent than the churches in the liberal camp, the conservative 
churches had enough funds and resources to support Christian NGOs in humanitarian 
work in North Korea. The North Korean Government also welcomed the 
conservative churches’ involvement in humanitarian work for North Korea. The 
pastors of leading mega-churches like Youngnak Presbyterian Church, Somang 
Presbyterian Church and Yoido Full Gospel Church, mostly CCK member churches, 
frequently visited North Korea and supported the humanitarian projects to establish 
food factories, educational and medical facilities and infrastructure. The president of 
the KCF officially appreciated the South Korean churches’ involvement in 
humanitarian works and gave an address suggesting that the North Korean churches 
would be transformed into a commonwealth of social service.62 The Protestant 
churches passionately engaged in humanitarian work for North Koreans more than 
any other religious organisation. According to the statistics outlining the number of 
NGOs engaged in humanitarian work for North Koreans with the permission of the 
Department of the Unification of Korea of the South Korean Government, in 2007 
                                               
60 Byung-Ro Kim, “An Analysis of the Changing Shape and Democraphy of Christian NGOs Running 
Programs of Humanitarian Works for the North Koreans”, Christianity and the Unification 2 (2008), 
pp. 68-69.  
61 The main projects of the campaign were targeted at the children of North Korea who were most 
vulnerable to the natural disasters that struck North Korea in the early 1990s. The Center for the 
South-North Sharing Campaign, http://sharing.net/content/page.php?seq=21, [accessed 11 January 
2017]. 
62 Heung-Soo Kim, “The Historical Analysis of the Works of Christian NGOs”, Christianity and the 
Unification 2 (2008), pp. 65-66. 
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the Protestant churches were operating 21 organisations (29% of 79 NGOs), while 
Catholics and Buddhists had only four organisations each.63 However, in addressing 
humanitarian work to North Korea and seeking the support of church members, 
many South Korean pastors exaggerated the situation of North Korea and even 
tended to mock the North Korean communists. Moreover, even though the CCK 
officially acknowledged the KCF as the representative organisation of the North 
Korean churches, some pastors of the conservative churches who visited North 
Korea did not change their view that the KCF was a governmental and communist 
organisation rather than a real Christian organisation.64 Hence, the conservative 
churches need to reconsider their views of the KCF and how they relate their 
humanitarian works and missions to North Korea to the unification of Korea. 
In addition to humanitarian projects for the North Korean people, various 
church organisations founded research centres to study the unification from a 
Christian perspective. The South-North Sharing Campaign launched a research 
centre in 1993 that was developed into the Korea Peace Institute in 2007, an 
independent research institute. The institute is now a leading NGO research centre 
for unification studies in South Korea. The people who are currently involved in the 
institute come from various denominations, organisations and academic institutes. 
The advisor of the institute is Lee Man-Yeol, a famous church historian, and the 
chairperson is Kim Ji-Cheol, the senior pastor of Somang Presbyterian Church 
(Tonghap). The board members also come from various backgrounds; they include: 
Oh Jeong-Hyun (senior pastor, Sarang Community Church, PCK Hapdong), Kim 
Dong-Ho (pastor and director, God’s Will Mission, PCK Tonghap), Son Dal-Ik 
(senior pastor, Seomun Church, PCK Tonghap), Lee Jae-Hoon (senior pastor, Onnuri 
Church, PCK Hapdong), Yoon Young-Gwan (professor, Seoul National University), 
Lee Jang-Ro (professor, Korea University), Jeon Woo-Taek (professor, Yonsei 
University) and Kim Chang-Soo (professor, Korea Institute for Defence Analysis).65 
                                               
63 Soo-Jeong Kim, “A Research of Humanitarian Works for the North Koreans by South Korean 
Protestant Churches” (PhD, Ewha Womans University, 2008), p. 9. 
64 Young-Han Kim, interview by Hoon Song, 14 October, 2016. 
65 Korea Peace Institute, “Structure and Personnel”,  http://www.koreapeace.or.kr/, [accessed 11 
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The Christian Fellowship for North Korean Missions was founded in 1998 to 
research the unification and North Korean missions and to help churches to prepare 
for the unification of Korea from a Christian perspective, emphasising national 
evangelisation as a means to integrate North and South Koreans.66 In 2008, with the 
support of Sarang Community Church, the Jubilee United Prayer Campaign67 was 
launched to organise prayer meetings and to provide information on the unification 
movement to South Korean churches. The Korean Christian Prayer Fellowship for 
the Peaceful Unification began vast prayer gatherings every Monday from January 
2015 with the support of Myeong-Seong Presbyterian Church (Tonghap). Speakers 
invited to these prayer gatherings were from both the liberal and conservative wings 
of the church, as well as those from governmental offices and NGOs.68 The 
conservative churches also supported colleges and seminaries to inaugurate 
specialised programs on unification, such as the Christian Training Centre for 
Leadership for the Unification at Soongsil University, and most seminaries installed 
specialised programs to teach the students Christian approaches to the unification of 
Korea. 
Through the Christian NGOs led by the CCK member churches in 
cooperation with the liberal camp of the South Korean churches, conservative 
churches were able to continue their humanitarian and mission work for the North 
Korean people despite the turbulent situation between the two Koreas, such as the 
naval battles near Yeonpyeong Island in 1999 and 2002 and the tensions caused by 
the nuclear tests undertaken by North Korea. The relief work of the conservative 
churches brought them into direct contact with the North Korean Government, which 
seemed incompatible with their position, which had hitherto ruled out political 
negotiation with the North Korean communist regime. Significant differences also 
                                               
educate and spread them to Korean churches and society to contribute to peace in the world.” Woo-
Taek Jeon, “Introduction of the Korean Peace Institute”, in The Unification of Korea and the Role of 
Christianity, ed. Woo-Taek Jeon (Seoul: The Korean Peace Institute, 2014), p. 78. 
66 Byung-Ro Kim, “The Unification of Korea and the Role of Christian Think Tanks”, ibid. (The 
Korea Peace Institute), p. 69. 
67 The Jubilee United Prayer Campaign consists of 50 organisations considering North Korean 
missions and holding prayer meetings every Thursday.  
68 Seong-Won Kim, “The Recent Unification Movements of South Korean Churches and Some 
Suggestions”, Kidokgyo Sasang (Christian Thoughts), no. 679 (2015), p. 53. 
 
 102 
emerged between the conservative pastors and conservative lay people in their 
perspectives on missions for North Korea. Many leaders of the conservative churches 
have, in recent years, tended to acknowledge the existence of North Korean 
Christians and even the KCF member Christians and have tried to forge and maintain 
relationships with North Korean Christians. They now believe in the peaceful 
unification of the two Koreas rather than taking over North Korea. However, 
research conducted in 200069 showed that the laity of the churches, especially the 
older generations, were still suspicious of the KCF’s purpose and the existence of 
North Korean churches. They still thought that the most important project for the 
South Korean churches for the unification of Korea was the evangelisation of North 




 The unification movements of the conservative churches, co-ordinated by the 
CCK, have been based on apolitical and evangelical approaches. Conservative South 
Korean Christians have argued that the purpose of unification would be realised by 
national evangelisation. Park Young-Hwan, a professor of Seoul Theological 
Seminary, has argued that South Koreans, as God’s chosen people, have a 
responsibility to expand the Christian message to North Korea, even though the 
North Korean regime has continuously provoked military conflict. Moreover, the 
South Korean churches should yearn for the evangelisation of the Korean peninsula 
through reconciliation and forgiveness between the two Koreas.70 However, the view 
of the conservative churches led to a ‘dualistic’ approach toward unification when 
they continued to express a strong anti-communism. How could they explain their 
                                               
69 In the research of Hong, the laity of South Korean Christians were poorly informed on the 
unification movements and theological approaches of their denominations toward the unification. 
Moreover, the South Korean Christians are still suspicious about the North Korean churches and 
North Korean government. Seong-Joo Hong, “A Study of the South Korean Christians’ Sense of the 
Unification of Korea” (PhD, Methodist Theological University, 2000)  
70 Young-Hwan Park, “Genesis Perspectives on North Korean Mission”, Korean Journal of Christian 
Studies 90, no. 1 (2013), pp. 284-286. 
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activities in North Korea, greeting North Korean communist officials with a smile in 
front of the humanitarian facilities in Pyeongyang, while condemning Kim Jong-Un 
and his colleagues in North Korea in political anti-communist demonstrations in 
Seoul?71  
 In contrast to the variety of humanitarian and mission activities for the North 
Korean people they have undertaken, the conservative churches have hardly 
developed any theological approaches toward peace, reconciliation and the 
unification of Korea. For instance, they have not engaged in theological reflection on 
such subjects as how the conservative churches could be brought to a meeting table 
discussing North Korean Juche ideology for a unified Korea, or indeed why it is 
necessary for the two Koreas to unify. If religious freedom and freedom of travel and 
publication in North Korea were secured so that the South Korean churches could 
evangelise the North Korean people, would the unification of Korea then be 








                                               
71 Park Young-Hwan, a conservative theologian of Christian ethics, criticised that, “the political 
activities of South Korean conservative churches were regarded as a part of the unification movement 
or of the North Korean missions and caused tensions between the two Koreas. Hence, the South 
Korean churches have to metamorphose the structure of political agendas toward those of 
humanitarian teachings of the bible.” “Unification, North and South Korea, and the Role of 





From Nationalism and Minjung Theology to Unification Theology in 
South Korea: The Contributions of Moon Ik-Hwan and  
Park Soon-Kyung 
 
 As previous chapters have emphasised, after the Korean War (1950–1953), 
anti-communism was rife in South Korea and the authoritarian governments used 
anti-communism as a tool to strengthen their regime. For those living in South 
Korea, even speaking about unification with North Korea meant risk to their life. 
Anti-communism also facilitated a harsh oppression of democratisation movements 
as authoritarian governments persecuted liberal politicians and social activists in the 
name of national security and anti-communist laws. Thus, anti-communism was a 
powerful tool for the authoritarian leaders of South Korea to use to suppress 
democracy. In this context, social activists against the authoritarian governments – 
the so-called Jaeya – came to believe that democratisation could not be separated 
from the unification of Korea. Liberal Protestant churches engaged in social issues 
like labourers’ rights in urban industries and they later spoke out in favour of the 
democratisation of South Korea. They developed Minjung theology,1 a contextual 
theology for South Korea that believes the minjung, a term meaning the ‘common 
people, especially those who are oppressed’, should be the subjects of an authentic 
Korean theology.  
                                               
1 The first theologian to apply the minjung sentiment to theological reflection was Ahn Byung-Moo, 
who delivered a lecture on the meaning of minjung entitled, “A Nation, the Minjung, and the Church” 
at the conference to welcome the professors who had been released from imprisonment by the South 
Korean government on 1 March, 1975 at the Saemoonan Church in Seoul. Chang-Rak Kim, 
“Minjung's Liberation Movement and Minjung Theology: Focusing on the Minjung Movement in 
1970s and the Theology of Ahn Byung-Moo”, Theological Studies 28 (1987), p. 93. 
Later, the term, ‘Minjung theology’ was officially used from 1979 at the Conference of Asian 
Theology hosted by the NCCK. The members of the preparatory committee continuously discussed a 
term for a theology originating in the Korean context. Among terms like ‘theology for the minjung’, 
‘theology of the minjung’, ‘theology by minjung’, they agreed to term the theology ‘Minjung 
theology’. Hyun, "Minjung, Servant of Passion, and Hope”, p. 11. 
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In addition to Minjung theologians and activists, Moon Ik-Hwan and Park 
Soon-Kyung developed their own perspectives on the democratisation and 
unification of Korea. Moon Ik-Hwan was a Protestant pastor who led civil 
democratisation and unification movements from the middle of the 1970s, as well as 
visiting North Korea to meet Kim Il-Sung in 1989. He continuously fought against 
the authoritarian governments and tried to find a way for the Korean people to 
achieve both democratisation and the unification of Korea. Park Soon-Kyung is 
particularly notable for her contributions to the formation of theological reflection on 
the unification and feminist theology of Korea. She developed her own unification 
theology based on nationalist and feminist agendas of South Korea, as well as the 
minjung sentiment widely shared among the Jaeya people. Park spoke fiercely 
against Western theologies and the mainline Korean evangelical churches for their 
collaboration with the imperialistic Western capitalism that had devastated the lives 
of people in Korea. It is worth noting that both Park and Moon worked to facilitate 
progress in the dialogue between Christianity and communism, as well as between 
the ideologies of the two Koreas (South Korean free democracy and North Korean 
Juche ideology), and to oppose anti-communism in South Korea, a task that had not 
been undertaken by theologians and church leaders in South Korea before.  
This chapter aims to describe the historical trajectory of the development of 
liberal Protestant churches’ theologies for the unification of Korea after the Korean 
War, and then to introduce and analyse Moon Ik-Hwan’s involvement in the 
unification movement and discourse and the unification theology of Park Soon-
Kyung. 
 
4.1. Development of Minjung Theology and Minjung Theologians’ 
Various Reflections on the Unification of Korea 
 
 Following the intensive involvement of liberal Christians in the 
democratisation movements of the 1970s and the early 1980s, as described in the 
first chapter, liberal Christians, Minjung theologians in particular, increasingly turned 
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their attention to the unification of Korea. They believed that the wellbeing of the 
minjung and social justice could not be realised without the unification of Korea and 
thus they developed their own theological reflections on the unification. For instance, 
Choo Jae-Yong articulated a theology for the unification suggesting a few 
theological principles for the unification of Korea: Shalom, integrity and meeting. He 
argued that shalom does not simply mean peace and refraining from military 
confrontation, but it includes peace, joy, co-existence, mutual reliance and social 
justice. Shalom is a kind of power that enables people to overcome desperate 
conditions and seek a hope for a new generation. Shalom would be given through the 
grace of God. The second principle, integrity, according to Choo Jae-Yong, does not 
refer to a simple uniformity between the two states, but mutual integration with 
which the two seek a common goal through dialogue and negotiation. The third 
principle, meeting, is a fundamental interaction of the two Koreas without any 
consideration of ideology; they should meet each other with respect and search for a 
way of relieving the pains of the minjung who are suffering as a result of the division 
of the Korean peninsula.2  
Later, as the South Korean Government tried to build a new relationship 
with North Korea and other communist countries, alongside the termination of 
military rule in 1988, South Korean Protestant churches developed a theological 
approach to the unification of Korea based on the idea of the ‘jubilee’ in the Old 
Testament. The idea of the jubilee was also noted in the “88 Declaration of Korean 
Churches for the Promotion of the Peace and Unification of Korea” in 1988. They 
argued that the North and South should be unified in 1995, a year that marked the 
fiftieth anniversary of the division of Korea. 1995 would be a jubilee year for people 
who had suffered from the division of the Korean peninsula, which would bring 
freedom and peace, especially to the poor and the marginalised. From the early 1980s 
Min Young-Jin developed the jubilee idea as a basis for a theology of unification. He 
argued that the jubilee year is a year of God’s grace proffered toward the poor, the 
heart-broken, the captives and the desperate. Therefore, the proclamation of a jubilee 
                                               
2 Jae-Yong Choo, “A Unification Discourse of Korean Churches”, Kidokgyo Sasang (Christian 
Thoughts) 25, no. 6 (1981), pp. 35-38. 
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for these people includes good news, healing, liberation, release and consolation. 
Min insisted that the proclamation of the jubilee was not violating the socio-political 
system of Korea, even though Western capitalism controlled the social and judicial 
system and in spite of a suspicion that the proclamation would appease communists. 
God has already proclaimed and achieved jubilee by his grace through the coming of 
Jesus. Henceforth, Min has continuously argued that our actions in comforting those 
who are hurt, releasing those who are captive, and resolving pain are not illegal 
either.3 In 1989, Min asserted that the jubilee law in the Old Testament requires the 
peace and restoration of people who are laid off from companies, as well as those 
who are manipulated and deported from their living places and who have lost their 
freedom of consciousness because of the ideological conflicts in the divided land.4 
Noh Jong-Sun claimed that the division of the Korean peninsula is against the 
integrity of the creation of God and the unification of Korea proffers a way to restore 
God’s creation.5 Park Jong-Hwa has argued that the Korean Protestant churches 
should confess their sins of collaborating in the division of Korea. Moreover, the 
Korean churches’ theology for the unification should seek a just peace and then the 
Korean Protestant churches could be truly national, representing the minjung of 
Korea.6 In addition to biblical scholars and theologians in South Korea, Korean 
theologians abroad organised the Fellowship of Korean Theologians Abroad to 
discuss issues of democracy and unification of Korea. Communicating with these 
theologians, Moon Ik-Hwan and Park Soon-Kyung developed their own 
understanding of the unification of Korea and worked fiercely in both academy and 
society to achieve their visions of the unified one nation.  
 
4.2. Moon Ik-Hwan's Minjung-Driven Unification Movement and his Visit 
to North Korea 
                                               
3 Young-Jin Min, “The Meaning of the Jubilee”, ibid. 26, no. 1 (1982), pp. 23-25. 
4 “The Jubilee and a Proclamation of Liberation”, Kidokgyo Sasang (Christian Thoughts) 33, no. 8 
(1989), p. 30. 
5 Jong-Sun Noh, “The Division of the Korean Peninsula and a Preservance of God's Creation”, 
Korean Journal of Christian Studies 4, no. 1 (1988), p. 131. 





 Moon Ik-Hwan (1918–1994) was a pastor of the Presbyterian Church in the 
Republic of Korea, a liberal Old Testament scholar, a passionate social activist and a 
poet. This section focuses on his life trajectory: how an anti-communist youth 
became a passionate unification activist and what was the reason for and result of his 
visit to North Korea and his meeting with Kim Il-Sung, the founding leader of the 
North Korean Government. 
Moon was born in Manchuria in June 1918, the son of Moon Jae-Rin, who 
was arrested by the Japanese police for his pro-independence activities. Moon Jae-
Rin (? – 1985) was also a nationalist who took part in the democratisation movement 
against the authoritarian government, dreaming of a democratised and unified Korea. 
Moon Ik-Hwan reported that his unification activities were strongly influenced by 
the life of his father.7 Moon studied at Eunjin Junior High School with Ahn Byung-
Moo and Kang Won-Ryong, a Christian social activist, and at Tokyo Union 
Theological Seminary from 1938, but he returned to Korea in 1941 without finishing 
his program. After he returned to Korea, he continued his theological studies at 
Bongcheon Theological Seminary and served a church in Manchuria. When Korea 
was liberated from Japanese occupation, he and his family remained in Manchuria 
for a year and then they travelled through North Korea en route to Seoul in 1946. 
Upon arriving in Seoul, Moon studied at Joseon Theological Seminary where Kim 
Jae-Joon and Han Kyung-Chik taught. After his graduation from Hanshin University, 
he was ordained in 1947. In 1949, he travelled to the United States and started a 
master’s program at Princeton Theological Seminary. When the Korean War broke 
out, he joined the UN Army as an interpreter, and after the war he returned to 
America and graduated with an Th.M. degree in 1954. From 1956, he taught at 
Joseon Theological Seminary and he was also elected as a directing member of a 
biblical translation project with the Korean Catholic Church in 1968.8 He served the 
                                               
7 Court Secretary of the Republic of Korea, “Record of the Trial of Moon Ik-Hwan”, (Seoul 
1986.10.7). cited from You-Na Lee, “The Formation and Character of the Unification Theory of 
Moon Ik-Hwan”, Christianity and History in Korea, no. 27 (2007), p. 175.  




Hanbit Church as a senior pastor, but resigned in 1970 to focus on the translation of 
the Bible.  
Moon claimed that he was heavily influenced by St Augustine and Dietrich 
Bonhöffer. Moon wrote that he was impressed by Augustine’s Confessions in which 
a man agonises deeply over his fallen nature and sins. In undergraduate school, living 
under the Japanese occupation and troubled about his calling for his nation, Moon 
began to compare his own agony with that of Augustine. When he became a senior in 
the seminary, he carefully read the works of Bonhöffer who, Moon believed, had 
broken down the barriers between the world and the church and taught him that the 
church should be salt for the world, rather than the light of the world: Christians are 
obliged to sacrifice themselves for God’s justice and God’s kingdom.9 Like 
Bonhöffer, Moon searched for a pathway through which Christianity could transform 
Korean society into a free egalitarian commonwealth as described in the Bible. 
However, from his viewpoint, Korean churches had not made any progress toward a 
better society where God’s justice could be realised. For instance, after the 4.19 
Revolution, Moon criticised Korean churches for being more interested in their 
disciplines and institutions than humanity. They had given up operating as a true 
religion that works for the liberation and transformation of human beings. Moreover, 
the Korean churches had split into hundreds of denominations and become shameless 
about their sins of collaborating with authoritarian governments. They had resorted 
to pietist language about forgiveness and grace, but refused to recognise their social 
sins. They had lost the true power to resist unjust authorities. To ensure a better 
society, Moon insisted that churches had to establish a messianic voice against social 
injustice, even if this put them at risk of losing their lives.10 
Moon Ik-Hwan frequently emphasised God’s justice, especially for those 
who were suppressed and marginalised, and he argued that leaders and Korean 
churches should concern themselves with what God might hope for. Moon was 
                                               
9 Ik-Hwan Moon, “Theologians Who Influenced My Life and Their Writings”, Kidokgyo Sasang 
(Christian Thoughts) 7, no. 11 (1963), pp. 24-25. 




probably quoting Isaiah 11:3b-511 when he insisted that a good leader should work 
and speak for the people, especially widows and orphans, who are oppressed and 
encouraged to remain silent, even though they have to live with severe difficulties. 
Thus, a good leader should be a good servant who regards the pains of the masses as 
his or her own.12 The Korean churches should also seek God’s justice and peace,13 
fighting against the injustice and corruption of Korean society.14 
 Deep concern for the needy and the marginalised drove Moon to partake in 
the democratisation and unification movements of Korea. When he was in jail from 
1976,15 he exchanged correspondence with Kang Won-Ryong and Ahn Byung-Moo, 
by which means he was able to develop his ideas of unification. According to the 
correspondence sent to Ahn Byung-Moo, his theology on unification reflected ideas 
of Minjung theology. He wrote:  
I believe that our Minjung theology should develop to a theology for peace 
if we want our theology to be a theology for unification. Minjung are the 
underprivileged people who are most vulnerable to a war and should be 
protected. Therefore, minjung are always yearning for peace.16 
Moon’s theology developed from Minjung theology to a unification theology and 
later to a theology emphasising peace.17 Moon’s ideas about unification can be 
                                               
11 Isaiah 11:3b-5 quotes, “He will not judge by what he sees with his eyes, or decide by what he hears 
with his ears; but with righteousness he will judge the needy, with justice he will give decisions for 
the poor of the earth. He will strike the earth with the rod of his mouth; with the breath of his lips he 
will slay the wicked. Righteousness will be his belt and faithfulness the sash around his waist.” (NIV) 
12 Ik-Hwan Moon, “Essential Characteristics of Good Leaders”, Kidokgyo Sasang (Christian 
Thoughts) 13, no. 10 (1969), pp. 52-54. 
13 Moon emphasised human flourishing as a condition of peace in the bible. He argued, “Peace in the 
Bible does not simply mean a state without wars. Rather, it signifies a wholeness which means a 
healthy, strong, flourishing status of all human beings. There are no distortions and suppressions.” 
“Yearning for the Kingdom of Messiah”, Kidokgyo Sasang (Christian Thoughts) 14, no. 2 (1970), p. 
54. 
14 “A Vision for the Korean Churches”, Kidokgyo Sasang (Christian Thoughts) 16, no. 2 (1972), p. 39. 
15 Moon was imprisoned six times for violating the emergency measures of Park’s regime and national 
security law and he spent 12 years in jail. 
16 Ik-Hwan Moon, 1989.8.5, Lee, “The Formation and Character of the Unification Theory of Moon 
Ik-Hwan”, p. 176. 
17 According to a letter to Paik Nak-Cheong, a professor of Seoul National University, which was 
written during Moon’s second imprisonment from 1980-1982, Moon developed his idea of the 
unification of Korea for the establishment of peace in Northeast Asia and the world. He argued that 
the collapse of North Korea and unstable status of the Korean peninsula would lead to a confrontation 
between China and Japan, as well as between the Soviet Union and the United States of America. 
Therefore, a peaceful unification is essential for peace in Asia and the world. Ik-Hwan Moon, “Letter 
from the Jail: An Idea for the Future of Northeastern Asia and the Relationship between Korea, China 
and Japan”, Creation and Criticism 21, no. 2 (1993), pp. 309-311. 
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characterised as founded on three principles. First, unification should be 
accomplished by the minjung. While the unification movements after the division 
were mostly led by politicians and governments, Moon believed that the minjung 
should play a central role in unification movements. Second, a unification movement 
should have a politically neutral attitude. The early unification movements were part 
of the democratisation movements and therefore opposed to South Korean 
authoritarian governments and they tended to be sympathetic to North Korean 
unification policies. However, Moon urged that unification movements should be 
continued from a neutral attitude toward both North and South Korean society and 
they should search for a way to bring changes to both North and South Koreans. The 
third principle was legitimacy. The early unification movements were criticised for 
the illegal activities of social activists and they could not gain people’s support. 
Therefore, unification movements should operate within legal boundaries and 
maintain cooperation with the government. In this way, the unification movements 
would be able to develop social publicity, which could put pressure on politicians 
and governments to engage more in unification dialogues with North Korean 
governments.  
 Considering Moon Ik-Hwan’s efforts for the unification of Korea, it may 
appear strange that he was in fact a North Korean anti-communist immigrant. When 
he was in North Korea, he joined an anti-communist underground group named the 
Emmanuel Group. Furthermore, during the Korean War, he worked for the United 
Nations Forces as an interpreter.18 When anti-communism was rife in South Korea 
and the 4.19 Democratic Revolution overthrew the dictatorship of Rhee Syng-Man, 
South Korean society was unstable and Park Chung-hee seized power through a 
military coup. Moon Ik-Hwan commented that the military coup was “for a recovery 
of human rights rather than political greediness”.19 From this, we may deduce that 
Moon was theologically liberal, but by instinct, politically conservative. However, 
experiencing Park Chung-hee’s authoritarianism, he became deeply concerned about 
                                               
18 Seong-Hwan Lee, “A Prophet Who Has Broken a Cold Wall: Moon Ik-Hwan's Unification 
Principles and Heritage”, The Radical Review 64 (2015), p. 91. 
19 Moon-Hwan Chio et al., “The Korean War and a Self-Reflection of South Korean Churches”, The 
Christian Thought 4, no. 6 (1960), p. 52. 
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democracy and the unification of Korea. In 1968, he wrote in an article that only 
independent individuals can create an independent nation, and the independence of 
Korea would be achieved with the unification of Korea. Therefore, South Korean 
churches should search for love, forgiveness and reconciliation rather than 
factionalism and hostility toward communism.20 
Emphasising forgiveness and reconciliation with North Korean communists, 
Moon welcomed the 1972 Joint Communiqué between the North and South 
governments because it opened a way to overcome the ideological differences 
between the two countries. Moon argued that in order to promote unification, South 
Koreans did not need to adhere to the political ideology of South Korea; instead they 
should look for a better ideology for Korean people through dialogue with North 
Koreans. He believed that communism and Christianity were engaged in a healthy 
competition to work out which was better suited to advocate the rights of minjung 
and to accomplish an egalitarian and just society.21 Hence, South Korean churches 
needed a theology that South Korean Christians could use to create a dialogue with 
North Korean communism and thus demonstrate Christianity’s ideological 
superiority. This theology would eventually heal the pains of a divided land, as well 
as contributing to realising equality and peace in the land.22 
 Even though Moon had been developing his own ideas on the unification and 
democratisation of Korea, he had not thus far fully engaged in the democratisation 
and unification movements. However, the suspicious death of his closest friend, Jang 
Joon-Ha, in 1975, fuelled Moon Ik-Hwan’s passion for the democratisation of South 
Korea and he now became strongly involved in these movements. Lee You-Na 
argues that the death of Jang changed Moon’s ideas of unification towards a 
nationalist style of unification that emphasised a unification of the people of the two 
Koreas more than territorial unification.23 In 1971, he wrote a draft of the “3.1 
Declaration for a Salvation of Democracy and South Korea”, which criticised the 
dictatorship of Park Chung-hee and appealed for the abolition of the National 
                                               
20 Ik-Hwan Moon, “Self-Reliant People”, New Family Mar. 1968, no. 158 (1968), p. 22. 
21 “Korean Churches and Unification of Korea”, The Christian Thought 16, no. 10 (1972), pp. 54-55. 
22 Ibid., pp. 55-56. 
23 Lee, “The Formation and Character of the Unification Theory of Moon Ik-Hwan”, p. 70. 
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Emergency Measures and the release of political prisoners. The declaration also 
emphasised the need for a restoration of democracy based on a separation of three 
powers: the legislation, administration and judicature. Due to his involvement in the 
“3.1 Declaration for a Salvation of Democracy and South Korea”, Moon was 
sentenced to eight years in jail. 
 After the “3.1 Declaration for a Salvation of Democracy and South Korea”, 
Moon came to think that the two goals of achieving democracy and the unification of 
Korea could not be separated. He argued that “the unification of Korea is a 
completion of democracy” and that a democracy of South Korea should be “a 
democracy which can finish this status of division and bring the unification of 
Korea”.24 He believed that the unification movement should be a national goal for 
three reasons. First, the division of the Korean peninsula was a humiliating historical 
episode for the Korean people that caused harsh confrontations between people in the 
North and the South, in which North Korea had developed relationships with the 
Soviet Union and China who fought against South Korea during the Korean War. 
Second, the unification movement was a humanitarian movement to resolve the pains 
of the Korean people, especially the families who had been forced to live separately 
in the North and the South. Moreover, the division had caused inhumane incidents 
such as the 4.3 Massacre in Jeju and the Yeosu-Suncheon Rebellion in 1948. Due to 
militant anti-communism, a number of people had been accused and persecuted as 
supposed communists. Third, the unification movement was a liberation movement 
for the minjung, particularly labourers and farmers who lived in poor conditions and 
were forced to work with inhumane working conditions. The division of Korea had 
thus contributed to a distributive injustice.25 
As a methodology of the unification of Korea, Moon strongly emphasised a 
unification in which the minjung took the lead. He also insisted that a unified Korea 
would gain a neutral nation status so it would not disturb the four powerful states 
                                               
24 Ik-Hwan Moon, “Democracy and Unification Are Identical!”, The Voice of People, June (1985), p. 
58. 
25 Min-Hwa Choi, Why I Visited Pyeongyang - Interview with Moon Ik-Hwan (Seoul: Nanum 
Publications, 1989), pp. 37-42. 
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around the Korean peninsula: China, the Soviet Union, Japan and the United States.26 
In 1984, he wrote an article – “The Current Stage of the Conscientisation of 
Unification Issues” – which presented a new methodology of unification, balancing 
the two different social ideologies and systems of the two Koreas. The North should 
develop an element of freedom, while the South needed to move toward a more 
egalitarian society.27 Thus, Moon’s methodology for the unification of Korea 
envisaged a process of mutual transformation of the two Koreas. His idea was 
distinctive in the sense that the majority of South Korean people supported a form of 
unification that aimed at the absorption of North Korea, whereas the North aimed at a 
confederation of governmental systems, which South Koreans believed to be a 
strategy by the North Korean communists to take over South Korea and subject the 
South to a North Korean communist regime.  
 In 1990, Moon wrote a poem entitled “I Shall Go Even by My Foot”. The 
poem was about a vision that he had dreamt in 1988:  
… living a history in this land means to 
denounce the division with all of my body  
screaming that there is no 38 line  
and go to train stations in Seoul, Busan and Kwangju and ask staff at ticket 
booths  
to give tickets to Pyeongyang. 
… 
I shall go there even by my foot 
or swim the Imjin River. 
I do not care even though I might be shot to death. 
I will live in spirit like clouds in the sky…28 
Whereas South Korean society was full of confrontations between anti-communism 
on the one hand, and anti-Americanism and anti-imperialism on the other, with 
apparently little progress being made by the pro-unification sentiment in the South 
Korean Government, Moon believed that there could be sufficient momentum to take 
                                               
26 Ik-Hwan Moon, “Democratisation and Unification of Korea”, Voice of the People, March (1978). 
27 Lee, “The Formation and Character of the Unification Theory of Moon Ik-Hwan”, p. 71. 
28 Ik-Hwan Moon, I Shall Go There Even on Foot (Seoul: Silcheon Munhwasa, 1990), pp. 18-19. 
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a big step toward the unification of Korea as the fiftieth year of the division 
approached. Moreover, following the June Democratisation Protest in 1987, a new 
president was elected by the South Korean people. Moon thought that 
democratisation was almost accomplished and it was time to accelerate the 
unification movements by engaging the power of the minjung. Therefore, Moon Ik-
Hwan, the chairperson of the People’s League for Democratisation and Unification 
of Korea, travelled to local cities giving speeches and attending conferences, to listen 
to various ideas about unification and expound principles of compromise that could 
be widely shared with other NGOs.29 At a conference at Yonsei University on the 
16th of April 1988, he suggested a peace treaty between the North and South 
governments and a unification methodology of confederate governments that would 
allow each government its own military forces and diplomacy. Moon also presented 
his methodology for a neutral nation status.30 He thought that civil society, rather 
than the South Korean Government, could make more progress towards unification 
and that dialogue between South Korean NGOs and North Korean civil organisations 
would enable politicians to make realistic progress towards unification.  
The experience that made Moon decide to travel to the North was the suicide 
of Lee Dong-Su, a student of Seoul National University, on the 20th of May 1986. 
While Moon was delivering a lecture at Seoul National University, Lee set himself 
on fire and jumped out of the building where Moon was lecturing. Moon was 
shocked and determined to stop the suicides of college and university students who 
were involved in student democratisation movements; he thus came to believe that 
the only way to stop these suicides was through the unification of Korea.31 He also 
believed that through his visit to North Korea, he would be able to present the 
possibility of breaking down the wall built by the Cold War imperialists between the 
two countries, as well as to discover what Kim Il-Sung and his governmental 
officials thought exactly of the unification of Korea. He hoped that his visit would 
                                               
29 Lee, “The Formation and Character of the Unification Theory of Moon Ik-Hwan”, p. 72. 
30 Ibid., p. 73. 
31 Choi, Why I Visited Pyeongyang - Interview with Moon Ik-Hwan, pp. 43-45. 
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pave the way for dialogue between politicians of the two Koreas. This visit to North 
Korea was not a spontaneous event; it had been on his mind for years.32 
On the 25th of March 1989, responding to the invitation of Hur Dam, a 
chairperson of the Committee of a Peaceful Unification of Korea in North Korea, 
Moon flew to Pyeongyang via Beijing.33 His 1988 vision of dialogue at the level of 
civil society therefore came true. Following his arrival in Pyeongyang, he joined an 
Easter service at Bongsudae Church in Pyeongyang and said that the “the 
resurrection of Korean People is the unification of Korea”.34 He had two meetings 
with Kim Il-Sung and signed a 4.235 Joint Statement with Hur Dam.36 The South 
Korean Government later evaluated the joint statement and concluded that it 
contained practical and meaningful direction for future dialogue between the two 
Korean governments. The minister of the Department of Unification of the South 
Korean Government, Lee Hong-Gu, commented that the statement showed that 
“North Korea is willing to continue exchange programs as well as military and 
political dialogues with the South Korean Government. Hence, it brightened the 
possibility of South-North higher officers’ meeting.”37 However, the South Korean 
                                               
32 Ibid., pp. 51-52. 
33 “Arrival of Pastor Moon Ik-Hwan to Pyeongyang”, Hankyerae Newspaper 1989.3.26. 
34 The Ministry of Unification of South Korea announced that Moon said that he had visited North 
Korea to meet Kim Il-Sung. Moon explained that he talked frankly with Kim about the future of 
Korea. “Moon Ik-Hwan's Visit to North Korea Shocked South Korean Political Society”, Dong Ah 
Newspaper 1989.3.27. 
35 The number 4.2 refers to the 2nd of April, the date when the statement was signed. This numeric title 
is generally used to name specific historical incidents in Korea such as the 6.15 Joint Statement of 
Presidential Meeting of North and South Korea and the 7.4. Joint Communiqué of North and South 
Korean governments.  
36 The statement reconfirmed the three principles of the 7.4 Joint Communique, which quotes, “the 
unification of Korea should be independent, peaceful and involve the restoration of one nation-state.” 
Article three states that both governments will continue military dialogues to soothe military 
confrontations and launch various exchange programs, such as family reunions. The fourth article 
emphasises that both countries shall not aim to absorb another country, rather searching for a phased 
confederate methodology of unification that guarantees each other’s existence. The joint statement 
showed that there was a change in the unification policy of the North Korean government from 
Korean Confederate Governments to a phased confederate system that ensures each other’s 
independence from military and diplomatic action. The last article of the statement proposes that the 
statement would a base for future dialogues of the two governments. Lee, “The Formation and 
Character of the Unification Theory of Moon Ik-Hwan”, p. 77, Lee, “A Prophet Who Has Broken a 
Cold Wall: Moon Ik-Hwan's Unification Principles and Heritage”, p. 106. 
37 Secretary of the National Assembly, Minutes Sessions of Commission of Foreign and Unification 
Affairs, 23 May, 1989. “A Prophet Who Has Broken a Cold Wall: Moon Ik-Hwan's Unification 
Principles and Heritage”, p. 101. 
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Government also criticised Moon Ik-Hwan for his illegal visit to North Korea, which 
had caused confusion about the unification policies of the South Korean 
Government.38 
 Even though Moon had visited North Korea as a leader of an NGO, South 
Korean churches could not help speaking out on this question because Moon was a 
Protestant pastor and an Old Testament scholar. In particular, the opinions of liberal 
and conservative churches were divided based on their political attitudes. The liberal 
churches commented that his visit to North Korea was a brave action that opened the 
door for civil society to promote dialogue between the South and North Korean 
governments. Moreover, the contents of the joint statement corresponded to the 
opinions of liberal churches on the unification of Korea. In contrast, the conservative 
churches criticised Moon because he had violated a civil law and he appeared to 
completely agree with the unification policies of the North Korean Government.39 
On the 28th of April 1989, representative pastors and church members of 20 
conservative Protestant denominations also founded the Christian Council of Korea 
(CCK), which aimed to represent the voices of conservative South Korean Protestant 
churches and launched an alternative unification movement with an emphasis on 
evangelisation and humanitarian work, as described in the previous chapter.  
 Moon Ik-Hwan was a Protestant pastor, as well as a democratisation and 
unification activist. He proposed the neutral unification of the two Koreas driven by 
the minjung, rather than anti-communist or communist unification ideas. However, 
his activities, including his visit to North Korea, revealed a clear division between 
the unification ideas of the liberal and conservative churches and, ironically, it 
weakened the unification movement of the liberal churches which were drawn into 
controversy over the allegedly ‘communist’ attitudes of the NCCK and WCC.  
 
                                               
38 “‘South and North Korean Governments Should Meet’: The Government Criticised the Meeting of 
Moon Ik-Hwan and Kim Il-Sung”, Hankyorae 1989.3.30, p. 1. 
39 Jeong, A History of Unification Movements in Korean Churches, p. 292. 
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4.3. Park Soon-Kyung and the Reworking of Korean Nationalism, 
Christian Socialism, and Feminist Theology into Unification Theology  
 
Park Soon-Kyung was born in Yeoju, a town of Kyoung-gi Province, in 
1923 and entered Severance Nursing School, Seoul, in 1942. In 1948, she started her 
theological education in the Methodist Theological University and entered the 
Department of Philosophy of Seoul National University in 1951. In 1955, she 
travelled to the United States to study at Emory University where she earned M.Div. 
and concomitantly earned a Ph.D. at Drew University in 1966. She wrote a thesis on 
Karl Barth, “Man in Karl Barth’s Doctrine of Election” supervised by John D. 
Godsey (1922-2010). Having earned her doctoral degree, she came back to Seoul and 
taught at Ewha Woman’s University for 22 years. During her academic career, the 
Joint Communiqué of the North and South Korean governments was signed in 1972 
and this historical event made her aware that she was called to develop a theology for 
Korean people, which had the unification of Korea and liberation of Korean people 
at its core.40 Park had a chance to study in West Germany in 1974 for her sabbatical 
year and researched particularly historical philosophy and Marxism. The main theme 
of her study was how to break down the anti-communism widely shared by South 
Korean Protestant churches as a prerequisite for the unification of Korea. From 1976, 
she studied the history of independence movements of Koreans during the Japanese 
occupation and the history of the division of the Korean peninsula. She discussed 
how Korean churches could formulate a nationalist theology for unification in 
various seminars of the graduate school of Ewha and continued to publish articles  
which argued that the anti-communism of the majority of South Korean churches 
was anti-biblical and anti-national.41 Then Park became involved in the Scholars’ 
Committee for the Research of 6.15 Agreement of North and South Korea in 2000.  
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 Ahn Kyo-Sung has studied two contributions of Park Soon-Kyung to the 
formation of unification theology in South Korea. First, she was the first theologian 
to articulate a theological reflection on the issues of nation and unification from the 
middle of the 1980s. Second, she was the first theologian to be arrested and put in 
jail specifically for presenting a unification theology while some other theologians 
were accused because they partook in urban industrial missions and democratic 
movements.42 In particular, she tried to bridge the huge gap between the North 
Korean Juche Ideology and South Korean Christianity, an attempt which had not 
been previously made in South Korea. Park believed that the Juche ideology should 
not be entirely repudiated in South Korea since the ideology embraced the 
consciousness of Korean nationalism of the anti-Japanese independence movement.43 
 The basic themes of her theology were ‘nation,’ ‘unification,’ and ‘women’. 
She defined a nation as a social group who share life conditions which have been 
formulated by thousands of years’ history of religion, culture and family and regional 
relations. However, in the South Korean context there needed to be a new 
perspective on what made a nation. She claims that a nation means minjung, the 
oppressed, and the poor who have been marginalised.44 Moreover, the prime 
principle of the unification would be an embracing of the respective ideologies and 
governmental systems of the two Koreas within one nation-state and society.45 She 
published her first book on unification theology in 1986 entitled National Unification 
and Christianity.46 As the title of the book indicates, she tried to develop a Christian 
theology on the unification of Korea from various ideas and methodologies of 
unification in South Korean society. She defined her theology as ‘Hanminjok 
Theology (a theology for Korean people)’. Park has argued that her theology for the 
Korean people was grounded on the Bible. First, the prophetic faith of salvation in 
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the Old Testament is also a relevant issue for Korean people. A history from the 
Exodus through to the exile of Israel, and eschatological prophecies during the exile 
would reveal the accomplishment of the justice of God which would be also achieved 
in the Korean peninsula which had similarly been manipulated by foreign imperial 
powers. Second, Jesus Christ was proclaimed as the true subject of the history and 
‘God’s revolution’ through his passion, death, and resurrection. He had called 
minjung to join in the revolution47 aiming at the establishment of an equal and just 
human commonwealth and the fullness of humanity.48 Therefore, she argued that the 
urgent theological issues in South Korea were to address the division of Korea and 
seek unification which would realise the wellbeing of minjung and God’s justice in 
Korea, as well as in the world. Christians needed a more progressive and realistic 
theology for those issues rather than being idealistic or theoretical.  
Park Soon-Kyung proposed that the situation of division of the Korean 
peninsula was anti-national and anti-Christian. Due to the division of Korea and the 
Korean War that followed it, millions of people had lost their lives and the United 
States, which many believed to be a protector of democracy in South Korea, was in 
fact responsible for the division and the country’s authoritarian governments, as 
revealed by the Kwangju Democratisation Uprising in 1980. Therefore, the burden 
for unification and democratisation rested solely on the shoulders of Korean people 
and theological reflection on those issues was the most important role for Korean 
theologians.49 Furthermore, the theological tasks they should undertake should 
include a dialogue between politics and theology as well as with communism and the 
Juche ideology of North Korea. With this sentiment, she criticised Minjung theology 
because she believed that Minjung theology did not adequately bridge the gap 
between Christianity and communism for a new unification theology. As she 
indicated, the first generation of Minjung theologians were critical of communism.50  
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Moreover, Park Soon-Kyung argued that Minjung theology differentiated 
between the nation and the minjung, and the minjung in Minjung theology is not 
clearly defined. For instance, Ahn Byung-Moo insisted that the proletariat is different 
from minjung and they have abused minjung for many years. Therefore, Park argued 
that Ahn’s understanding of minjung was partly based on anti-communism, 
excluding the North Korean proletariat, and that therefore it could not be a theology 
for the unification of Korea which must embrace all people in the Korean peninsula 
as citizens.51 Taking a stance that differed from that of Minjung theologians and the 
NCCK, Park Soon-Kyung doubted the beneficial effect of the jubilee theology which 
was developed among NCCK member denominations in the second half of the 
1980s. She alleged that the jubilee theology and movement among the Korean 
Protestant churches had not succeeded because the main denominations of NCCK 
had not joined in and the movement itself became fruitless. She argued that the 
jubilee theology should consider more deeply how it could apply biblical jubilee 
sentiments to the socio-political system of the unified Korea as well as to its 
ideological basis.52 
Park Soon-Kyung wrote that Christianity and communism had been destined 
to talk with each other since the division of Korea in 1945. In her view, minjung is a 
term for describing a nation, which should include communists in North Korea. 
Therefore, Minjung theology for the oppressed and manipulated should be reoriented 
for the age of Korean unification in order to include all Koreans.53 Furthermore, 
communists in North Korea are also victims of the division of Korea and the Korean 
War and at the same time they are the subjects for the transformation and unification 
of Korea. Park tried to point out the danger of different approaches of South Koreans 
toward North Korean people. Park asserted that South Koreans should not 
differentiate North Korean commoners from those who are in governance. It was 
dangerous that many South Koreans hoped that North Korea would collapse from the 
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inside. Once North Korea collapsed, it would bring further tension between foreign 
powers, the United States and China in particular.54 
 Park argued that the first cause of the division was Japanese imperialism and 
the colonisation of Western powers such as the expansion of the Soviet Union and 
the United States of America. If the imperialistic cold war was an international cause 
of the division, Korean Protestant churches’ preference toward the American 
influence was a domestic cause of the division.55 Park insisted, “the 50 years of the 
division was a history of colonisation of Korea and Korean people by America and 
international powers.” In addition to the political and military expansion of powerful 
countries, Park criticised Western capitalism as a cause of the division.56 
Furthermore, anti-communism in South Korea aggravated hostility and the aftermath 
of the division. An aggressive and violent anti-communism blocked all kinds of 
dialogue between Christianity and communism even though there are some virtues 
they share with each other. At first, Marxism was concerned with a basic principle of 
Christianity, namely human equality. Marxists criticised capitalism as mammonism 
and Christians are also believed to oppose this material mammonism. However, in 
South Korea, it seems that churches had warped Christian values to advocate 
capitalism and attack Marxism. She continuously attacked Western churches and the 
majority of Korean churches which she claimed supported capitalism and benefited 
from the division of Korea.57 Moreover, the vision of a free democratic South Korea, 
which was believed to be a national ideology, had in fact capitulated to imperialism, 
colonialism, and mammonism, and could not provide a vision and methodology of 
unification of Korea.58 She wrote that God’s just punishment would force the Korean 
churches to talk with Marxists and communists to realise a true commonwealth of all 
human beings and also the kingdom of God.59 
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 As stated above, Park Soon-Kyung harshly criticised mammonistic capitalism 
and looked for its overthrow by Christianity. The death of Jeon Tae-Il was a crucial 
example of an unjust social system and economy. His death was a salvific death 
yearning for an egalitarian society.60 The achievement of an economically egalitarian 
society would be a measure of an independent nation that would be opposed to ‘the 
survival of the fittest,’ of Western capitalism. Therefore, Christianity should accept 
socialist principles which denounce selfish mammonism of capitalism and seek to 
achieve the liberty, love, justice, peace and equality of Christian teaching.61 Park 
presented a terminology of “Inmin of God (people of God)” for peace and freedom of 
human beings. This term is not ideological but practical language. All ideologies and 
religions should be on placed on the table for a discussion for human freedom and 
equality. She argued,  
[The] revolutionary ideologies such as socialism and Juche ideology of 
North Korea would have limitations. However, they could be theoretical 
catalysts for achievement of jubilee law of the Old Testament which would 
resolve the issues of land ownership of a capitalistic system.62  
Korea is the best place where various ideologies can dialogue with each other and 
also the reconciliation of Korea can lead to a wider global reconciliation.63 She 
argued that a dialogue between ideologies for human freedom had a prototype: the 
independence movements of Koreans against Japanese imperialism. A history of the 
independence movement that comprised left and right nationalists was a good 
historical example which Koreans could follow in order to become one national 
commonwealth in the future.  
 She believed that the governmental system and national ideology of the 
unified Korea in the future would be neither South Korean’s capitalist democracy nor 
the communist Juche ideology of North Korea. She strongly opposed any idea of 
absorption of North Korea by the South. She has articulated,  
The first task of South Korean churches should be a confession of their sins 
of supporting the idea of absorption and should continuously speak for the 
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unification of two Korean at an equal status of two Koreas…For an equal 
unification of two Koreas, the South and the North Korean governments 
have to drive for a reconciliation of two Koreas and open a door for a 
vigorous interaction of people in the South and the North. Also, there needs 
to be a confederate governmental system of two Koreas which would enable 
local governments have autonomy.64 
There should be a third way which could compensate for the weakness of both 
ideologies and social systems for the unified Korean commonwealth and in so doing 
achieve a new kingdom of God on earth. There would be no discrimination between 
genders and between the rich and the poor in this Korean commonwealth which 
would be realised through a reconciliation of North and South Korea. Park 
specifically presented a methodology for a new Korean commonwealth:  
An issue of national independence closely related to a transformation of 
national societies into equal nations and society. [Christians] should face the 
urgent issues of Korean people in the context of division and proclaim the 
coming of a kingdom of God. Also Korean people should make a step from 
the free Global trade capitalism in South Korea to a kind of socialist 
economic system.65 
 
According to Park, the result of the unification of Korea would be a 
realisation of peace in Korea and egalitarian society. This is a goal of Koreans as 
well as of all the people in the world. She suggested the way of socialism as a middle 
way between communism and capitalism. In her article entitled, “The kingdom of 
God and Its Transformative Power for Social History,”66 she wrote an outline history 
of Christian socialist movements in Europe and in South America. As she studied in 
West Germany, she emphasised the works of German-speaking scholars who were 
related to Christian socialist movements such as Johann Christoph Blumhardt (1805-
1880) and his son, Christoph Friedrich Blumhardt (1942-1919), Leonhard Ragaz 
(1868-1945), Hermann Kutter (1863-1931), and Karl Barth (1868-1968). She 
asserted that the history of Christian socialist movements is very valuable for South 
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Korea where anti-communism is still rife. The anti-communist and anti-North 
Korean sentiment in South Korea were deeply rooted in an imperialistic Western 
capitalism which South Korean churches have deemed as originated from the 
Christian gospel. However, an imperialistic Western capitalism gave birth to a 
distributive injustice, war, and terrorisms. If South Koreans do not refrain from anti-
communism and anti-North Korean sentiment, they cannot achieve a new one-
Korean nation-state for neither will move forward toward God’s kingdom.67 Hence, 
she has argued that South Korean churches should open their ears to the voice of 
Christian socialists in South America and Europe who would give a clue to South 
Koreans of how to overcome confrontations between communism and Christianity. 
This mutual dialogue between Marxism and Christianity would make a further step 
toward the kingdom of God:  
The kingdom of God shall be incarnated in a human history through a just 
punishment over ‘principles and powers’ of the world and through a hope of 
the poor and the burdened for a new future. It also gives a chance to people 
to transform the world toward a definite future of the kingdom of God on the 
earth.68 
For a transformation of the world toward a new future history, the unification of 
Korea would be a first step. Hence, the unification of Korea is not a matter of the 
divided Korean peninsula alone - it is also a question for a world dominated by 
unjust mammonism.  
 ‘Women’ is another core subject of Park’s unification theology. In particular, 
she represents the first generation of feminist theology in South Korea. She 
developed her feminist theology intertwined with a nationalist and unification 
theology. Women symbolised the pains of minjung who were suppressed and 
marginalised. In the Korean peninsula, women were the worst victims of the war in 
patriarchic Korean society, and they have not enjoyed complete freedom and 
equality. If minjung of Korea are oppressed and manipulated and at the same time 
have an ability to transform Korea, women in both Koreas have been the most 
oppressed and manipulated minjung, and yet can be subjects who can make a 
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pathway to a new future of Korea. Park argues “theologically, women’s claim to 
freedom and their rights should be a starting-point to overcome the patriarchic 
dominance and social structure and to create a new humanity of men and women, 
nation and minjung, and people in the world.”69 Hence, women’s participation in 
democratisation and unification movements could create a new paradigm for 
movements which had previously been distorted by male dominance of the social 
and political structure.  
For Park, women’s role in the unification movements was rooted in the 
biblical understanding of spirituality. She appealed to the feminine image of God in 
the Old Testament as all nature and materials were originated by God. God, the 
creator and bearer of the world and Jesus Christ who was crucified and resurrected to 
save the world are reflecting an image of ‘motherness’ which is different from a 
traditional patriarchic images of man.70 Moreover, the Holy Spirit is the fountain and 
the mother of human communities and the Church is a harbinger of a new kind of 
human beings and hence of a new world. The Church, as a visible and invisible 
fellowship of Christians, should have a spirituality of life and love for unifying all 
kinds of people as well as a power to transform the world.71 However, South Korean 
churches and Western churches have lost their feminine spirituality. The spirituality 
of South Korean churches has become an illusory, selfish, and fortune-seeking 
spirituality rather than realistic, communal and concerning the issues of the Korean 
people. In a word, South Korean churches have lost their true spirituality and ability 
to transform the world and became a proponent for an unjust mammonism.72 She has 
asserted, “A feminine spirituality transforms the unjust social and economic structure 
and the male dominating system of the world toward an eschatological salvation.”73 
 Park also argued that a Korean feminine spirituality could restore the national 
identity of Korea. Shin Chae-Ho, a prominent historian who lived under the Japanese 
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occupation, insisted that there are two realms of a national identity: physical and 
spiritual. He also defined the nation in spiritual terms as an entity which survives 
among people even though they have lost their home land and government.74 Park 
Soon-Kyung thought that the independence movements of the Korean people against 
Japanese imperialism emanated from the spirituality of Korean people. Moreover, 
this spirituality was deeply rooted in the consciousness of Korean people who were 
yearning for the unification and restoration of one Korean nation.75 However, the 
division of Korea had distorted the identity of one Korean nation. The divided status 
of two Koreas had been sustained by anti-communists of South Korea and the 
imperialists of Japan and the United States. Hence, it was urgent to restore one 
Korean nation through a revived Korean spirituality which would unify the land, 
people, and economic resources of Korea.76 
 Park also insisted that the spirituality that Koreans should seek is not 
illusionary but practical and material. It is different from a Marxist materialism but 
reinterpreted from biblical teachings. The spirituality should seek for real 
transformation of the world not just for fortune seeking or for entering an ethereal 
heaven. In a Korean context, the spirituality should concern the life of minjung who 
are manipulated, oppressed, and poor. Moreover, it will realise not only the 
unification of Korea but also overcome the dualistic perspective of the rival 
ideologies of Korea and pave a third way for Koreans. Hence, it is necessary to have 
dialogue between religions and ideologies.77 
Unification cannot be realised by theological statements or political 
propaganda alone, but by practical participation of the churches. Park argued that 
even though Minjung theologians agreed with unification sentiments, they do not 
make alternative methodologies for unification. For instance, when the NCCK did 
not present an appropriate methodology for unification, she supported it by means of 
confederate governments which was widely shared by opposition NGOs rather than 
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the governmental unification methodology of the Pan-Korean Commonwealth.78 
Moreover, she specifically suggested a mail exchange of separated families between 
North or South, and meetings between those families. To the Korean churches, she 
suggested a new interpretation of the Christian gospel with which Christians could 
challenge a culture of Western capitalism and the issues of the division of Korea. 
Furthermore, she strongly argued that unification movements should be led by the 
common people rather than being driven solely by the governments of North and 
South Korea.79 
 The unification theology of Park Soon-Kyung laid a foundation of unification 
theologies in South Korea which crucially assessed the contextual theologies such as 
Minjung theology and feminist theology from a viewpoint of unification. Park 
insisted that theologians should embrace communism and Juche ideology in order to 
achieve the freedom and economic equality of all Koreans. Her argument was highly 




 As stated above, the first part of this chapter reviewed the development of 
various theological reflections on the unification of Korea based on the Minjung 
theology. As the Cold War era approached its end in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
liberal theologians thought that the barrier between two Koreas should be broken 
down before the fiftieth year of the division of Korea. They proclaimed the year of 
1995 as a jubilee year when God’s justice would be realised in the Korean peninsula 
through the unification of Korea. Therefore, their theological reflections on the 
unification recalled the jubilee teachings of the Old Testament and also permeated 
the 88 Declaration of Korean Churches for the Promotion of the Peace and 
Unification of Korea. Moreover, observing the harsh confrontations between North 
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Korea and the United States on the issue of nuclear weapons in 1993 when North 
Korea withdrew from the NPT (Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty), liberal 
theologians began to raise their voice in favour of a concrete peace in the Korean 
peninsula. However, these various theological reflections on the unification of Korea 
by liberal Christian scholars were not shared by the majority of South Korean 
Protestant churches. As stated above, the major denominations did not join in the 
ideas of liberal theologians neither partook in the unification movement of NCCK. 
Rather they founded another church organisation named CCK in 1989. CCK’s initial 
idea of unification was to aim at an evangelisation of North Korea in an imagined 
situation in which the North Korean communist regime would collapse and South 
Korea would concomitantly absorb it.  
This chapter has also described how the minjung sentiment after the Korean 
War triggered Christian involvement in unification movements particularly with 
Moon Ik-Hwan’s activities. While Park Soon-Kyung developed her own unification 
theology, Moon worked with NGOs for the democratisation and unification of Korea 
as a social activist. The momentum which prompted him to leave his scholarly career 
as an Old Testament scholar was the death of Jang Joon-Ha, his dearest friend who 
protested against Park Chung-hee’s authoritarian regime. He thought that the 
democratisation of Korea could not be realised without the unification of Korea, and 
the unification of Korea should be achieved by minjung. For the unification of Korea, 
therefore, he tried to draw people’s interest to the unification issues and launched the 
“Seventy Million People’s Campaign for the Unification” just before his death. In 
short, he made unification issues of Korea popular among South Koreans.80 For 
instance, following his visit to North Korea, Im Soo-Kyung, a student of Hankuk 
University of Foreign Studies, visited the North through East Germany on the 30th of 
June, 1989 to participate in the 13th World Festival of Youth and Students in North 
Korea as a representative of National Association of College and University Students 
of South Korea. Even though their visits violated the National Security law of South 
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Korea, they brought progress in dialogue between the governments of the two Koreas 
and made South Koreans concerned about unification issues of Korea.  
As shown in part 3 of the chapter, Park Soon-Kyung’s unification theology 
developed from nationalist and feminist agendas in South Korea. She defined her 
theology as ‘A Theology of Korean Nation’, a tool to fight for unification and well-
being of the Korean nation and against capitalist imperialism. Even though, there 
have been criticisms that Korean nationalism would not be relevant for unification 
discourse, she tried to highlight nationalism in the Korean context from a Christian 
perspective.  Her efforts are valuable as a foundation that could be developed into a 
new nationalist understanding which would aim for the common good of society in 
both Koreas, much as Doug Gay has argued from his Scottish perspective:  
[Nationalism would contribute to promoting the Common Good] which 
affirms the dignity and value of each and all within society and finds in the 
doctrine of the imago Dei a radical presumption in favour of the equality of 
all people, regardless of their gender, ethnicity, health, ability to learn, wealth 
or status.81 
Park also emphasised the motherness of Korean churches intertwined with her 
nationalist understanding for the unification and her theological enterprises for the 
unification of Korea were inherited by other feminist theologians such as Kim Ae-
Young, a professor of Hanshin University. As a founding member of the Association 
of Korean Feminist Theology, Park made the unification of Korea into a primary 
agenda of Korean feminist theology, arguing that the liberation of women of Korea 
could not be achieved without the unification of Korea. Moreover, Park’s Christian 
socialist ideas for an alternative ideology for the unified Korea were re-examined by 
Lee Deok-Joo, a professor of church history at the Methodist Theological University 
in Seoul, who introduced Son Jeong-Do’s82 socialist agendas for the unified Korea. 
Also, Yeon Gyu-Hong, a professor of church history at Hanshin University, has tried 
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to rediscover the Christian socialism of Yeo Un-Hyoung83 in order to mediate 
between the communism of North Korea and the capitalism of South Korea. Through 
historical studies on Christian socialists under Japanese occupation, Lee and Yeon 
have built on Park’s work to make progress in a theological discussion that aims to 
overcome ideological confrontations between the two Koreas.  
 Moon and Park believed that the division of Korea worsened the social 
injustice such as suppression of freedom and economic injustice. They were 
confident that the unification of Korea would eventually solve these problems of 
Korean society. Both of them argued that anti-communism blocked all further steps 
toward unification and democratisation dialogues in South Korea and strongly 
attacked anti-communism. Park specifically criticised the majority of South Korean 
Protestant churches which she believed to be strongly wedded to mammonistic 
capitalism and American imperialism in order to enjoy their privileges under pro-
American authoritarian governments. Agreeing with Park’s criticism, Moon did not 
theoretically attack anti-communism but tried to find a practical way to overcome 
confrontations between the two Koreas and to spread unification sentiment among 
South Koreans. However, it was ironic that the more unification issues of Korea 
gained people’s interest, the more anti-communism was rife among South Korean 
society, especially among the majority of South Korean Protestant churches. Even 
though they poured their energy into softening anti-communism and to restore one 
national identity of Korea through minjung and nationalist (minjok) sentiment, 
difference and hatred between South and North Koreans became more clearly 
apparent.  
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Critical Assessment of the Theological Approaches of Conservative 
Christian Thinkers and Activists to the Unification of Korea, 
Focusing on Han Kyung-Chik and Kim Young-Han 
 
Regarding the unification of Korea, conservative South Korean Christians 
insist that communism should not be a national ideology of a unified Korea and that 
this unified Korea should instead secure the social and economic system of South 
Korea, which they believe has proven better than that of North Korea. They argue 
that South Korea should be an advanced country and that South Korean churches 
should spread the Christian gospel into North Korea in order to stimulate the North 
Korean people to transform their country by themselves. The unification discourse of 
conservative Christian leaders therefore reflects the methodology involving the 
absorption of North Korea that was implicitly planned by the South Korean 
Government under Park Geun-Hye.  
As this chapter examines the sources for the unification discourse of 
conservative Christian thinkers and activists, it is worth referencing historical studies 
on South Korean Christianity. Timothy Lee argues that one of the major reasons for 
the growth of the Korean Protestant churches is that evangelicalism became 
intertwined with Korean nationalism under the Japanese occupation and then with 
anti-communism after the division of Korea. From the early stages of Korean 
Protestantism, he states, “evangelicalism coalesced with collective interests of the 
larger society: first with Korean nationalism and then with South Korean anti-
communism”.1 Supporting Lee’s argument, church historians and theologians of 
South Korea, such as Park Myung-Woo and Kim Young-Han, have argued that 
South Korean anti-communism indeed contributed to the growth of South Korean 
churches and the development of South Korea.  
                                               
1 Timothy S. Lee, “A Crucial Factor in Evangelicalism’s Success in (South) Korea: Coalescence with 
Nationalism and Anticommunism”, Religion Compass 5, no. 11 (2011), p. 646. 
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This chapter aims to present the unification ideas of Han Kyung-Chik, a 
conservative church leader, and Kim Young-Han, a conservative Christian 
theologian who has developed a conservative approach toward unification.  
 
5.1. Han Kyung-Chik and his Hope for Unification 
 
Han Kyung-Chik (1902–2000) was a Protestant leader who reflects the rapid 
growth of the Korean Protestant churches through evangelicalism intertwined with 
Korean nationalism and anti-communism.2 Having lived under the Japanese 
occupation, Han founded Youngnak Church in Seoul in 1945, which then became the 
first Protestant “mega-church” in Korea with a membership of over 100,000 in the 
1980s. He frequently delivered sermons about communism and its threat to Korea; 
hence, he was often criticised for his strong anti-communism, which fuelled people’s 
hatred for North Korea and caused Protestant churches difficulties in working for 
reconciliation and unity between the two Koreas.3 
Han’s anti-communism was formed by his experience of the communist 
regime in North Korea and related to his vision of a new Christian nation after the 
liberation of Korea from Japan in 1945. He believed that the new country after the 
liberation should be a democratic nation that could secure the freedom of the Korean 
people, and that only Christianity could promote democracy in the nation. Han 
therefore viewed communism as an enemy of Christianity and democracy in Korea. 
However, with the rapid development of South Korean society from the 1970s 
through to the 1990s and concerned about the horrific famines that devastated North 
                                               
2 Brian Stanley, Christianity in the Twentieth Century: A World History (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2018), pp. 46-47. 
3 Yang Hyun-Hae, a church historian who teaches at Ewha Women’s University in Seoul, claims that 
Han considered communism an enemy of Christianity in Korea and emphasised national security as a 
prime goal for South Korean Christians whose country was facing the threat of North Korean 
communism. Yang argues that Han’s strong emphasis on anti-communism and political collaboration 
with authoritarian governments to promote nationwide evangelical campaigns after the Korean War 
brought about ideological conflicts and hatred among South Korean Christians for North Koreans and 
even impeded South Korean Christians’ involvement in the unification movement. See: Hyun-Hea 
Yang, “The Faith of Rev. Kyung-Chik Han and Its Logical Structure”, Studies in Religion (The Journal 
of the Korean Association for the History of Religions) 46 (2007), p. 195. 
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Korea in the early 1990s, Han started to emphasise the need for peace in the Korean 
peninsula and promoted humanitarian work for North Koreans. The following 
section examines how Han developed and moderated his anti-communism, which the 
majority of South Korean Christians shared, and his thoughts on the unification of 
Korea.  
 
5.1.1. Korean Nationalism under Japanese Occupation and Han Kyung-Chik’s 
Vision of a State of Freedom 
 
Korean nationalism developed in opposition to Japanese imperialism during 
the Japanese occupation and it became the driving agenda for the March First 
Independence movement in 1919. Korean Protestants became widely involved in the 
movement and consequently faced harsh persecution by the Japanese 
administration.4 Along with the nationwide independence campaign, Korean 
Protestant leaders founded schools to educate young students in order to instil 
Korean nationalism in the young generation, hoping they would work for the 
liberation of Korea.  
Han Kyung-Chik, who was born in Pyeong-Won, a town near Pyongyang, in 
1902, studied at a nationalist school, Osan High and Middle School. He entered 
Soongsil College to study chemistry with a belief that science would be a driving 
force in the development and liberation of Korea. However, in the summer of his 
second year of college, he came to believe that he was called to be a minister to serve 
the Korean people spiritually,5 and he decided to go to the United States to study 
theology. He studied English at Emporia University in Kansas and then entered 
Princeton Theological Seminary in 1926. On the way to the US, he had the 
                                               
4 It was reported that 3,804 Christians were imprisoned, 47 were killed and 12 churches were destroyed 
by the Japanese police. Compared to the Christian population at that time (less than 2% of the total 
population), the number of Christians who were accused by the Japanese administration of joining the 
uprising was very high (23% of the total number of the accused). See: Kyong-Bae Min, A History of 
Christian Churches in Korea (Seoul, Korea: Yonsei University Press, 2005), p. 307. 
5 Kyung-Chik Han, “My Gratitude: Autobiography”, Kyung-Chik Han, Kyung-Chik Han Collection, 
ed. Eun-Seop Kim, 10 vols. (Seoul: Kyung-Chik Han Foundation, 2010), vol. 1, p. 102.  
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opportunity to stay in Hawaii for some hours and looked around Honolulu. There, he 
visited a building of the Korean National Association and found two Korean flags 
hung across the entrance. When he saw the flags, he said, he could not stop crying 
because he had not seen Korean flags in Korea since the March First Movement and 
in Korea it was still too risky to display or own Korean national flags. He often 
recalled this experience and said that nobody who hadn’t experienced it could 
imagine how terrible it would be to live without their mother country.6  
 Upon returning to Korea in 1932, Han had three questions in mind: first, how 
they could evangelise and transform the Korean people to live by the word of God; 
second, how they could develop the economy of the rural areas and help people live 
better lives; and third, how they could achieve liberation from Japanese imperialism 
and initiate the holistic progress of the country toward a better Korea, guaranteeing 
freedom for all its people.7 Han first worked as a teacher in Soongin Commercial 
School in Pyongyang. However, he taught for less than a year because the Japanese 
authorities prevented him from teaching students. In light of this, in 1933, he decided 
to move to Sinuiju to minister at the Second Church of Sinuiju. However, he became 
frustrated with his church ministry because of the heavy surveillance and pressure 
from the Japanese administration.8 Finally, he was forced to resign from the church 
and founded an orphanage called Brinwon in 1939.  
 Upon the liberation of Korea in 1945, Han was asked to join the Sinuiju Self-
Government Association, which took over authority from the Japanese 
administration before the arrival of the Allied armies. However, the Soviet army 
advanced into the northern part of the 38th parallel and the US army into the southern 
                                               
6 He was also amazed by and admiring of the American people who enjoyed such freedoms as political 
and civic expression. After that, he considered the United States the model country that Korea should 
emulate. Ibid., p. 111. 
7 Ibid., p. 188. 
8 From the 1930s, Japan forcefully imposed imperial rule upon Koreans, manifested in such policies as 
the mandatory use of Japanese names and the Japanese language. They controlled all school systems 
and even religious organisations. Their pressure on Korean churches was at its peak when they required 
pastors and church members to worship at Shinto shrines. In spite of some pastors’ protests, most 
denominations decided to follow the order of the Japanese administration. For instance, the Presbyterian 
Church in Korea adopted Shinto worship in 1938, stating that Shinto was not a religion and did not 
violate Christian beliefs and doctrine. See: Chung-Shin Park, Protestantism and Politics in Korea, 
Korean Studies of the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies (Seattle University of 
Washington Press, 2003), p. 155. 
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part. Han was worried that the communists would govern the North and so he 
organised an anti-communist political party in 1945 with Yun Ha-young, a pastor in 
Sinuiju. The name of the political party was originally the Christian Socialist 
Democratic Party, although soon afterwards they changed the name to the Socialist 
Democratic Party to make it more popular with secular society.9 Soon after the 
communists organised regional governments, they started to persecute and arrest the 
members of the Socialist Democratic Party as they disbanded all opposing political 
parties.10 Threatened by the communists in North Korea, Han then fled to the South 
and started to promote anti-communism there. 
 
5.1.2. Han Kyung-Chik and his Anti-Communism 
 
 After he arrived and settled in Seoul, Han founded Youngnak Presbyterian 
Church with 27 other Koreans who had fled from the North. As soon as he arrived in 
Seoul, his preaching contained patriotic and anti-communist messages. He preached 
on the 1st of December 1945 that the Church should be “the spiritual shield and castle 
of a nation, the pillar of cloud that leads the people wandering in the desert…the 
shelter for the tired, and the refuge for the persecuted”.11 In Korea, according to Han, 
the Church should provide spiritual and ideological guidance for Christians against 
materialism and communism. In his view, therefore, Christians ought to contribute to 
the foundation of a new Korean government after the liberation, to mitigate 
ideological conflict between political leftists and rightists. Han argued that Christians 
                                               
9 In a television interview, he stated that he had decided to organise the Socialist Democratic Party 
firstly to stand against the Communist Party supported by the Soviet Union, and secondly to work for 
the poor population in Korea. Economic egalitarianism was a major part of the Communist Party’s 
propaganda that attracted the Korean population. It is apparent that Han was also concerned about the 
poverty of the Korean people as he ran an orphanage in Sinuiju and chose the name of the political 
party to put across his vision of humans flourishing through the Gospel and to attract the population in 
the northern part of Korea. KBS, “Living and Thinking”, (Seoul: Korean Broadcasting System 1989). 
10 H. Merrell Benninghoff, “The Political Adviser in Korea (Benninghoff) to the Secretary of State”, 
ed. US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945. The 
British Commonwealth, the Far East, Korea (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 
1945), p. 1066. 




had to respect the government because governments are instituted to punish wrong-
doers and establish order in society, as written in Romans 13:3a, which he quoted: 
“For rulers hold no terror for those who do right, but for those who do wrong”.12 
However, he believed that if the authority did not acknowledge God as its source of 
authority and in its functions, it would be corrupted and violent dictators would 
appear. Hence, it was important that Christianity was the foundation of a new South 
Korean Government. Han presented the United States as a model for the new South 
Korean Government, stating that, “amongst all the nations up to the present, the 
United States is the most blessed peaceful nation in the world”.13 In Han’s view, 
Christians should promote what he saw as the democratic virtues of Christianity 
through evangelisation of the Korean population, which he viewed as the prime 
means of politically engaging people (presuming that Christians would be the best 
citizens for a new South Korean society). 
Even though there had been conflicts between Christians and communists 
before the liberation, these did not cause severe problems because the two groups 
shared the common goal of defeating Japan and achieving the liberation of Korea. 
However, their antagonism surfaced when communists argued that Christianity was 
an import of Western imperialism and “an opiate of people”.14 Christians, in turn, 
alleged that the communists were violent and only promoting a revolutionary 
uprising against Japanese rule in order to make Korea a communist country. The 
tension between Christians and communists in South Korea worsened after the 
division of the country because South Koreans, under the United States Army 
Military Government, intended to organise a new government in the South. Rightists 
and leftists both tried to take power through national campaigns, but violence and 
terrorism drove the nation into chaos. In this deteriorating situation, the United States 
                                               
12 New International Version.  
13 Kyung-Chik Han, “Christianity and Politics”, sermon in 1946, Han, Kyung-Chik Han Collection, vol. 
4, p. 412. 
14 Lee, “A Crucial Factor in Evangelicalism's Success in (South) Korea: Coalescence with Nationalism 
and Anticommunism”, p. 652. 
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Army Military Government was anti-communist, favouring rightist politicians like 
Rhee Syng-Man and supporting evangelical Christians against leftists.15  
As a leading evangelical, Han saw communism as an enemy of Christianity 
and the new democratic nation because, he believed, communists did not believe in a 
supreme spiritual being and were only concerned with conquering the whole country. 
He attacked the communists’ materialism, insisting that they were ignorant about 
“religion, morals, and art” and even that they disparaged Korean nationalism because 
they only emphasised social class and an international network of labouring classes. 
Hence, Han claimed that, for communists, “liberation of oppressed classes is 
sufficient, even above national independence”.16 One of the communists’ goals was 
distribution of goods equally among the masses, but Han asserted that a strong, if not 
dominant, authority was essential for such equal distribution of goods to take place 
and that this would eventually lead to authoritarian governments, or even 
dictatorships. In a communist nation, therefore, people’s freedom would be 
negated.17 Han believed that even though Korea had achieved its liberation from 
Japanese occupation, there would be no difference if the country fell under a 
communist regime. 
On the 25th of June 1950, the Korean War broke out and violence devastated 
the Korean peninsula and the Korean churches. Over 400 ministers and elders were 
killed and over 900 churches were completely or partially destroyed.18 In addition to 
casualties and the loss of infrastructure, the war caused a militant backlash in both 
Koreas and engulfed the two countries in mutual enmity. North Korean communists 
attacked South Koreans as forerunners of American imperialism, while South Korea 
was rife with militant anti-communism. In South Korea, the majority of churches 
became centres for an anti-communist message. Han of course wanted Korean 
                                               
15 For a detailed historical trajectory of the anti-communism of the Korean evangelical churches and 
their relationship with the USAMG, see: Dae-young Ryu, “Understanding Conservative Christians' Pro-
American and Anti-Communist Activities in the Early Twenty-First Century”, Economy and Society 62 
(2004). 
16  Kyung-Chik Han, “Christianity and Communism”, sermon in 1947, Han, Kyung-Chik Han 
Collection, vol. 4, p. 429. 
17 Ibid., p. 433. 




churches to be a stronghold of democracy and anti-communism and believed that the 
evangelisation of South Korea would bring about economic and political 
development, as well as aiding the unification of the two countries.  
 
5.1.3. Han Kyung-Chik’s Thoughts on the Unification of Korea  
 
During the Korean War of 1950–1953, vast numbers of North Koreans fled to 
the South. In particular, 40% of church adherents in North Korea, up to 80,000 in 
number, were among the refugees.19 The churches founded by Christians who had 
emigrated to the South from the North became centres for these North Korean 
refugees. Youngnak Church was among these and Han insisted that churches should 
be shelters for people who had lost their homes and come to the South with nothing. 
Marking the 10th anniversary of Youngnak Church, Han told church members that 
God had blessed the church because they had helped North Korean refugees to find 
family members from whom they had been separated during the war, and to settle in 
South Korea.20 Youngnak Church exemplifies the phenomenon of North Korean 
refugees gathering in churches founded by Christians from the North and these 
churches becoming centres of the anti-communist movement. Non-Christian refugees 
also took refuge in churches because they were relief agents that distributed aid 
goods sent by American churches and they were seen as centres of “solace and social 
association”.21 The Presbyterian Church, in particular, grew rapidly between 1952 
and 1957 by almost 300%, increasing its number of baptised members from 231,473 
to 599,111.22 The growing number of North Korean refugees and churches founded 
by North Korean Christians meant that the majority of Protestant churches tended to 
                                               
19 Lee, “A Crucial Factor in Evangelicalism's Success in (South) Korea: Coalescence with Nationalism 
and Anticommunism”, p. 653. 
20 Kyung-Chik Han, “10 years’ Blessing of God”, (sermon, 4 December 1955), Kyung-Chik Han, Han 
Kyung-Chik Moksa Solgyo Chonjip (Collected Sermons of Kyung-Chik Han), ed. Eun-Seop Kim, 18 
vols. (Seoul: Kyung-Chik Han Foundation, 2009), vol. 2, p. 115.  




become more anti-communist; their anti-communism favoured the South Korean 
Government led by Rhee Syng-Man, and evangelical churches in the US.23  
 After the Korean War, both North and South Korea poured all their energies 
into economic reconstruction with the help of international networks through the 
USSR and US respectively. While North Korea had a large amount of natural 
resources, power plants and factories, South Korea suffered from shortages of food, 
manufacturing, power and natural resources. Therefore, the GNP of North Korea was 
higher than that of South Korea until the middle of the 1970s.24 North Korea was 
richer and stronger than South Korea for two decades after the Korean War and 
many South Koreans feared that the North would invade the South again. However, 
Rhee’s fundamentally anti-communist government manipulated South Koreans’ anti-
communism and enmity against the North and succeeded in establishing a 
dictatorship. Moreover, Rhee’s government officially proclaimed that the South 
Korean and the US army should engage in military acts to absorb North Korea.25  
 Like other evangelical leaders, Han supported unification through the 
takeover of North Korea. He insisted that South Korea needed to be a stronger nation 
in order to absorb the North. In 1955, he preached:  
Is there someone like Achan among us? Then we should confess our sins and 
be transformed. Then we can march to the North and achieve the unification. 
Are you hoping for the unification of Korea? Is the unification possible only 
through words?26  
He argued that South Koreans should confess their sins and shed their selfish desires 
in order to become sincere Christians who could transform the country and engender 
                                               
23 Ryu, “Understanding Conservative Christians' Pro-American and Anti-Communist Activities in the 
Early Twenty-First Century”, p. 68. Even though the major religious bodies, such as Catholics and 
Buddhists, upheld anti-communism before and after the Korean War, the South Korean churches were 
mostly favoured by the Rhee government and the evangelical churches in the US for promoting anti-
communism among South Korean Christians and South Korean society.  
24 Seok-Ryul Hong, “North Korea's Proposal of Economic Cooperation with South Korea around the 
Time of the 4.19 Revolution in 1960 and the Current Situation of Economic Cooperation of the Two 
Koreas”, Journal of Unification Study (2000), p. 124. 
25 Seok-Ryul Hong and Chang-Hyun Jeong, “Marking the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Liberation of 
Korea: A History of Division and the Unification Movement”, Quarterly Review of Korean History 16 
(1995), p. 48. 
26 Kyung-Chik Han, “Open the Door of Hope!” (sermon, 9 January, 1955), Han, Han Kyung-Chik 
Moksa Solgyo Chonjip (Collected Sermons of Kyung-Chik Han), vol. 1, p. 430. 
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national development and prosperity. South Korea would then be strong enough to 
protect itself and to take over North Korea. His dualistic and militant approach 
toward unification can be seen in his sermon entitled “Jehovah or Baal?” Referring to 
1 Kings 18:20-24, he argued that the three groups in the biblical story of Elijah’s 
fight at Mount Carmel against the pagan prophets of Baal exemplified the groups of 
the Korean population. 
Tracing the human history of ideology, there are people who contributed to 
secure human freedom and democracy. However, many people 
acknowledged themselves as slaves of social hierarchy and of communism 
in a modern history. Moreover, there are still many people who are hesitant 
to make the choice between these two groups… We have to make our own 
decision: Baal or Jehovah? Free human beings or slaves? I proclaim that we 
have to stand for human freedom and our God!27 
Acknowledging the Cold War era, he suggested it was time for South Koreans to 
choose whether they would belong to a capitalist or a communist country. Of course, 
for Han, choosing democratic governance and freedom for all Koreans meant serving 
God, and choosing communist governance meant serving Baal. Hence, South Korean 
Christians ought to work towards unification and one free democratic government, 
fighting communism.28  
Han suggested that South Korea should prepare for unification by securing 
economic development, a high moral standard and an established system of 
democratic governance and these developments could only be realised through 
Christianity. Hence, national evangelisation became a critical condition for the 
unification of Korea. Even after the 5.16 military coup that took place in 1961 and 
overthrew the South Korean Government led by Yun Bo-Seon, Han emphasised the 
necessity of national security under a strong leadership. He preached:  
 First of all, South Korean people have to stop street demonstrations against 
the government. The government and South Korean people should cooperate 
with each other to secure freedom and democracy in South Korea… Second, 
the government should try to develop the economy so that all people have 
                                               
27 The dualistic view of Baal and Jehovah was extensively used in the sermons of Han Kyung-Chik, 
such as: “Serving the World or God”, “Cultic Religions or Christianity” and ‘South Korean 
Democracy or North Korean Juche Ideology”. In the sermon “Jehovah? Baal?”, he contrasted 
communism and Christianity, as well as dictatorship and democracy. Kyung-Chik Han, “Jehovah? 
Baal?” (sermon, 27 November 1960), ibid., vol. 5, pp. 67-71. 
28 Ibid., p. 70. 
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their own jobs… Third, the government have to rebuild the nation and secure 
the national ideology against North Korean communism…29 
 
Han thus clearly stated that South Korea should have strong leadership in order that 
it wasn’t threatened by North Korean communists. He believed that domestic 
political conflicts might benefit the Northern communists. In the era of political 
turmoil of South Korea following the military coup by Park Chung-hee and his 
dictatorship, Han argued that an authoritarian government or even a dictatorship 
would be better for South Koreans than living under a communist regime, and he 
continuously encouraged politicians to make South Korea richer and better to live in 
than the North:  
Politicians should work hard and earnestly, and manage the economy 
effectively so that no one in the country suffer hunger, kill themselves, and all 
people are happy to live in this country…30  
 
 [The] only way to unify the two countries is to overcome communism; 
making South Korea superior to North Korea in every aspect of people’s 
lives…31 
Han’s vision of unification was not a peaceful unification acknowledging the 
equal status of the two countries, but rather a non-aggressive takeover of North 
Korea by the South through the exercise of overwhelming power. Han’s vision for 
unification did not alter, even when the governments of the North and South signed 
the 7.4 Joint Communiqué in 1972. At first, he welcomed the agreement between the 
two governments for its progress toward a unification discourse, but at the same time 
he warned that there was a possibility that communists might cheat South Koreans by 
instilling in them the delusion that communism was acceptable. He also emphasised 
that “the unification without any interference of foreign powers” should not mean 
that the UN was excluded from discourse and negotiations in the process of the 
unification of the two Koreas. He asserted that it might be difficult to overcome the 
                                               
29 Ibid., p. 71. 
30 Kyung-Chik Han, “When the River Jordan Overflows” (sermon, 15 November 1964), ibid., vol. 8, p. 
62. 
31 Kyung-Chik Han, “Emptied House” (sermon, 6 September 1970), ibid., vol. 12, p. 178. 
 
 143 
“ideological, social, and political differences” of the two countries in the unification 
process, but, nevertheless, only a free democratic political culture and state should be 
the foundation of a unified government. Re-emphasising his strong anti-communism, 
Han encouraged his congregation to promote democratic values and virtues through 
education, to evangelise people in order to instil hope for the eternal, to transform 
South Korean society in order to reduce corruption and the gap between rich and 
poor, and to always pray for the unification of Korea.32 He believed that if South 
Korea became a stronger country than the North, then the North Korean communist 
regime would collapse and the countries would be unified. 
 From 1971, when the South Korean economy began to grow rapidly, Han 
proposed South Korean missions to the North. He argued that if North Koreans were 
evangelised, the communist regime could be broken down from within by North 
Korean Christians. For practical applications of North Korean missions, he suggested 
that South Korean churches use broadcasting networks near the 38th parallel line and 
build huge cross structures that were visible across the frontier to send the message 
of the gospel to North Korea.33 For his entire life, he emphasised that Christianity 
was incompatible with communism and he believed that only Christianity could 
transform South and North Korea and bring about the unification of the two 
countries. After the 1980s, there was some change in Han’s approach to unification, 
however. He started emphasising peace in the Korean peninsula, rather than a 
militant unification effort through overcoming the communist regime in the North. In 
a television interview in 1989, he insisted: 
We should not regard the relationship between the two Koreas as 
confrontational… Rather, we have to develop a peaceful relationship with 
North Korea through dialogue and cooperation with each other. In a word, we 
have to be confident in a peaceful unification of the Korean peninsula.34  
He also argued that even communists could be accepted, but only when they 
repented of their sins and, indeed, only then could the countries truly unify.35 He 
                                               
32 Kyung-Chik Han, “New Era and Christians’ Responsibility”, (sermon, 16 July 1972), Han, Han 
Kyung-Chik Moksa Solgyo Chonjip (Collected Sermons of Kyung-Chik Han), vol. 13, pp. 229-232. 
33 Kyung-Chik Han, “Prayer for Nation and Korean People”, (sermon, August 1972), ibid., p. 270. 
34 KBS, “Living and Thinking”. 
35 Kyung-Chik Han, “New Year’s Message”, (sermon, 6 January 1985), Han, Han Kyung-Chik Moksa 
Solgyo Chonjip (Collected Sermons of Kyung-Chik Han), vol. 17, p. 399. 
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further began to insist that peace was more important than the unification of the 
Korean peninsula and that the most powerful peace movement would be the 
evangelisation of South Korea. In 1992 Han’s approach to the peace movement 
included evangelism and humanitarian work for North Koreans, such as the “Drive 




 Han’s approach to unification based on anti-communism represents the ideas 
and beliefs of the majority of South Korean Protestants after the Korean War. As 
Timothy Lee has analysed, South Korean evangelical churches grew rapidly, 
coalescing with anti-communism, and their approaches to unification consistently 
presupposed a victory over the communist regime in the North. For decades, the anti-
communism of evangelical churches and their criticism of liberal Protestants who 
worked for unification in a social and political realm deepened conflicts among 
Protestant churches and gave the impression that evangelical churches were 
impeding the unification movement among non-government organisations. Han’s 
anti-communist messages in the pulpit influenced evangelical Christians to view 
North Korean ‘communists’ as enemies of God and failed to heal their painful 
experiences and memories of the North, meaning that they occasionally expressed 
their hatred of communists in a violent way.36  
 Nevertheless, Han’s approach to unification raises some points worthy of 
remark. First, even though he strongly attacked communism, he did not have a full 
understanding of socialism and did not fully agree with it, he did think that a socialist 
                                               
36 Some young Christians who fled from the North just after the division of the Korean peninsula 
organised Seobuk Cheong-nyon dan (Northwest Young Adult Association) to attack leftist politicians 
and they killed Korean civilians they suspected of being communists. See: Lee, “A Crucial Factor in 
Evangelicalism’s Success in (South) Korea: Coalescence with Nationalism and Anticommunism”, p. 
653. It is still debatable how Han influenced the militant anti-communist Christians. However, Han 
confessed that he contributed to the foundation of Seobuk Cheong-nyon dan as it was organised in 
Youngnak Church and the members advanced to the social and political hierarchy under the Park 
Chung-hee government. See: Jeong-Ran Yoon, Korean War and Protestantism in South Korea (Paju: 
Han-Ul Academy, 2015). 
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agenda was compatible with Christianity, organising a political party in the North 
called the Christian Socialist Democratic Party. Han also later emphasised economic 
egalitarianism.37 His favouring of a socialist agenda might propose a way for 
communism and Christianity to be reconciled in Korea as a middle way for the 
unified Korea. Second, his emphasis on the human rights issues of North Koreans 
and his encouragement of humanitarian work on their behalf brought about a broader 
concern among South Koreans for those in the North. As a result, many evangelical 
churches took part in North Korean missions that included various humanitarian 
works for North Koreans and North Korean defectors, and in educational 
programmes on unification for South Korean Christians. Third, Han’s more recent 
argument that South Koreans should be spiritually transformed in order to bring 
about social, political and economic peace and prosperity in South Korea as a 
prerequisite for unification, rather than an emphasis on pushing for an enforced 
unification with North Korea, is certainly relevant in the current context of South 
Korea, where many people still suffer from memories of war and anti-communism. 
His ideas about unification through the evangelical and humanitarian endeavours of 
South Korean churches were widely shared by evangelical theologians and church 
leaders in South Korea. 
 
5.2. Kim Young-Han’s Approaches toward Unification by an Advanced 
Country  
 
 One of the common characteristics of the conservative Christian leaders of 
South Korea was their strong hatred for communism, which they defined as anti-
biblical. Further, regarding the relationship between church and state, they argued 
that the church should not uphold a political agenda and it should not participate in 
anti-state movements. The unification movement, they continuously insisted, should 
not be driven by the embracing of North Korean communists. Instead, they 
emphasised that South Korea needed to surpass North Korea politically, 
                                               
37 Kyung-Chik Han, “Faith and Doubt”, (sermon, 8 March 1947), Han, Han Kyung-Chik Moksa Solgyo 
Chonjip (Collected Sermons of Kyung-Chik Han), vol. 1, p. 62.  
 
 146 
economically and militarily. The North Koreans should also be enlightened in order 
that they could transform their society into a more democratic state, which would 
ultimately lead to the unification of Korea. However, the transformation of North 
Korea and the subsequent unification of Korea would not be possible without God’s 
providence. Believing that the Japanese occupation and the Korean War was a result 
of the sins of Koreans, they argued that Koreans should confess their sins against 
God and pray for his interference in Korean history for the unification of Korea. 
 Kim Young-Han was born in 1946 in Busan, a metropolitan city in the 
southern part of South Korea. He studied philosophy at Seoul National University 
and moved to West Germany in 1971 to continue his studies in philosophy at the 
University of Heidelberg. He wrote a thesis about Husser and Natorp and attained a 
doctoral degree in philosophy in 1974. In 1984, he earned a doctor of theology 
degree from the same university, wrote a thesis about phenomenology and theology 
and started his teaching career at Soongsil University. He was ordained as a pastor by 
the Presbyterian Church of Korea (Tonghap) in 1980 and worked with various 
research organisations for Reformed theologies in South Korea. He also worked for 
the Committee of Unification Policies of the CCK from 1994 to 1998. Like Han, he 
developed a conservative theological approach to the unification of Korea. 
 The following section aims to explain how Kim Young-Han’s theology for 
the unification of Korea developed and what its background was.  
 
5.2.1. Reformed Theology and Unification 
 
 Kim’s theological ideas about the unification of Korea are based on a 
Reformed theology,38 in particular his understanding of Calvinism. He summarised 
                                               
38 Kim acknowledged that the Reformed theology includes a variety of Protestant traditions when it 
allies with evangelical traditions: “The Reformed theology can be narrowly identified with Calvinist 
tradition but would include the theological tradition of Martin Luther and even the Methodist Church, 
the Holiness Church, the Salvation Army and some Pentecostal churches…” Young-Han Kim, A 
Reformed Theology for a Peaceful Unification of Korea: Free Democratic Unification Discourse for 
an Advanced Society (Seoul: Soongsil University Press, 2012), p. 77. Hence, the reformed theology 
Kim defines tends to be identical to evangelical Protestant theology.  
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the characteristics of Calvinism as God’s sovereignty, God’s providence and human 
history under God’s control, human sinfulness and powerlessness to achieve their 
salvation, a positive attitude toward human culture, faith in God’s calling, freedom of 
Christians, acknowledgment of God’s creation and the natural order, and 
understanding the Christian faith as a transformative power for human society. He 
argued that, “All creatures are under God’s control and God interferes in every 
activity of God’s creatures. God’s providence is so sensitive that it influences the 
whole realm of human life”.39 
Kim strongly emphasised God’s providence in human history and also tried 
to describe the positive aspects of God’s creatures. God’s creation is good and all 
creatures are created to reveal His goodness. Kim further argued that the authority 
and the governments of human society are also under God’s providence and thus 
they should be respected. Governmental authority was ordained by God and civilians 
ought to obey authority. Christians have to achieve goodness in cooperation with 
governmental authorities. However, Christians’ involvement in politics should be 
limited to religious activities, such as praying for governmental leaders and officers, 
so that God might lead them to make a better state to ensure His justice. Kim’s 
understanding of Christian involvement in politics was closely linked to the attitudes 
of conservative Christian leaders toward democratic uprisings during dictatorships in 
South Korea, such as the Rhee Syng-Man government and Park Chung-hee 
government. They criticised the protests for democracy, insisting that the participants 
did not acknowledge God’s ordinance of human authorities and that this meant they 
violated His law. Conservative Christian leaders, including Kim, argued that 
democratic movements might create disorder in South Korean society and give North 
Korean communists the opportunity to infiltrate South Korean society.  
Kim defined “a better political theology” that would stop Christianity from 
having a preference for human ideologies. He argued that,  
A political theology prevents Christianity from being identified with ruling 
ideologies, such as socialism, capitalism and even anti-communism. An 
                                               
39 “The Cultural and Ideological Characteristics of Calvinist Theology”, Studies in Systematic Theology 
19 (2013), p. 10. 
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evangelical approach is to apply the gospel messages to political situations 
using a political theology witnessing God’s interference in human 
politics…40  
He thus clearly argued that Christians should not confuse Christianity with political 
ideologies, and they should not involve themselves in political movements. He 
continuously criticised the political theology of liberal South Korean Christians such 
as Minjung theologians. Kim further criticised a political interpretation of the cross 
and articulated his own political attitude towards Christians borrowing the 
theological idea of the crucifixion, as shown below:  
A theology of crucifixion does not encourage Christians to engage in 
political activities for a purpose of the realisation of a kingdom of God. 
Rather than political movements, Christians are called to proclaim God’s 
sovereignty in political and social realms to achieve a shalom of God in this 
world… Simply, Christians should not work to gain political power, but 
should follow the teaching of the cross.41  
The cross of Jesus therefore does not symbolise a stimulation of political movements 
against the rulers of Jewish society or the colonial powers of the Roman Empire. 
Jesus shared their suffering, and the crucifixion was the climax of this suffering. The 
crucifixion and the death of Jesus brought about a revolution against the power 
structure and the virtues of Jewish society. The cross of Jesus represented the 
suffering of the Jewish people and, at the same time, it revealed God’s love for all 
human beings.42 Just as Jesus represented the suffering of the Jewish people, Korean 
churches should reflect the suffering Korean people. Kim insisted that, “Korean 
churches should be national churches that share the suffering and conflict of the 
Korean peninsula… Korean churches have to regard the divided land and its 
aftermath as a cross for Korean Christians…”43 The unification of Korea could be 
understood in the same way. The unification would not be achieved by political 
engagement, but instead through the faith of Korean people who would accept their 
                                               
40 A Reformed Theology for a Peaceful Unification of Korea: Free Democratic Unification Discourse 
for an Advanced Society, p. 51. 
41 Ibid., p. 54. 
42 “Today's Anthropocentric Theological Thoughts and Reformed Thought”, Presbyterian Theological 
Quarterly, no. 345 (June, 2013), p. 416. 
43 “Christianity and an Ideology of National Unification”, Chuches and Social Issues 1 (1989), p. 21. 
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suffering as God’s providence and be willing to share in this suffering.44 Just as Jesus 
accepted the crucifixion as his duty for human salvation, the Korean churches should 
bear the cross for the sake of the shalom of Korean people.  
 
5.2.2. God’s Providence in the History of the Korean People 
 
Kim argued that the history and historical accidents of Korea fell under the 
control of God’s providence. Therefore, the horrific history of South Korea under the 
Japanese occupation and the Korean War, which occurred five years after the 
liberation of Korea from Japan, were also under God’s providence, meaning that God 
was punishing the Korean people. Kim argued that the suffering as a colony of Japan 
was caused by the sin of the Joseon people and that the division of the Korean 
peninsula was also the result of the sinfulness of the Korean people, who fought each 
other and divided into two ideologies after liberation. Thus, the division and the war 
were punishments from God.  
The annexation of Joseon to Japan and the following 36 years’ colonial 
period, the division of the Korean peninsula after the liberation, and the 
tragic Korean War were the result of the sins of the Korean people. The fall 
of the Joseon dynasty was the result of the fraction of political leaders and 
their bloody purges. Moreover, the corruption of society and the depravity of 
social leaders weakened the foundation of the dynasty. The division of 
Korea was the result of the sins of Korean people, such as those who 
collaborated with the Japanese administration and those who passionately 
followed the Japanese policy of worshipping at Japanese shrines (Shinsa). 
Those sins are the reasons for the tragic history of Korea.45  
                                               
44 A Reformed Theology for a Peaceful Unification of Korea: Free Democratic Unification Discourse 
for an Advanced Society, p. 37. 
45 The Peaceful Unification and Christianity (Seoul: Poong-Man, 1990), p. 34. The argument that the 
horrific history of Korea, including the Japanese occupation and the Korean War, was designed by God 
has led to harsh debates in South Korean society, especially in 2014 when Park Geun-Hye appointed 
Moon Chang-Geuk, a Christian journalist, to be the prime minister of the South Korean government. 
Before the appointment, he delivered a symbolic speech at a conservative mega-church in Seoul, which 
hints at the way conservative Christians understood the general history of Korea. In his speech, he 
argued that the suffering of the Joseon people was God’s will, in order to discipline and use them for a 
better cause. He continued, “Joseon deserved occupation by Japan because the Joseon people were lazy 
and tended to depend on others’ efforts. It was the DNA of Joseon people that would be in accordance 
with communism… God divided the Korean peninsula to protect the South from communists’ influence 
using the United States as a tool for Koreans” (Hankook Ilbo, 13 June 2014). His speech caused anger 
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However, this tragedy of the Koreans was not the end of their history. Following the 
suffering of the Japanese occupation and the Korean War, South Koreans were able 
to achieve significant economic growth and the development of a democracy. This is 
another aspect of God’s providence for Koreans. Therefore, Kim argued that it is 
inappropriate to explain the division of Korea as a result of the structural sin of 
Korean society. Koreans, he continued, ought to understand the history of Korea on 
the basis of faith in God’s providence and to appreciate His guidance. They should 
not blame other countries around the Korean peninsula for the division and the war 
in the Korean peninsula. Rather, they should reflect themselves whether they lived in 
accordance with God’s guidance for Korean society.46  
Kim believed that neither anti-communism nor the Cold War system in the 
Korean peninsula was responsible for the division of the Korean peninsula and the 
Korean War. As stated above, he argued that the Japanese occupation and division 
were God’s punishments for the leading elites of the Joseon Dynasty, who exploited 
the people, and for the Korean people, who became divided and fought each other for 
ideological reasons even though God had graciously liberated them from the 
Japanese occupation. Therefore, the churches were responsible for speaking about 
the sins of the Korean people and encouraging them to confess.47 He insisted:  
We should confess that the division of the Korean peninsula was God’s 
presence with suffering Koreans through Jesus Christ, our Saviour. God 
intervenes in the history of Korea and the destiny and the future of Korean 
people is in God’s hand.48  
Thus, the cause of the division of the Korean peninsula and the Korean War was not 
the ideological factions of Koreans or the Cold War. The Korean people should 
understand the cause of the division based on an understanding of God’s providence 
for the Korean people. Therefore, unification would be realised when the Korean 
people confessed their sins before God and believed in God’s providence. Moreover, 
South Korean churches should proclaim that the current situation of the Korean 
                                               
among some South Korean people, especially non-Christians, while conservative church leaders agreed 
with his arguments. 
46 Ibid., p. 39. 
47 Ibid., pp. 36-38. 
48 Ibid., p. 33. 
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peninsula was a tool of God’s interference in human history in order to realise His 
peace in the world.49  
 
5.2.3. Ideologies in the Korean Peninsula and the Search for the Third Way: the 
Gospel of God 
 
Kim Young-Han criticised ideologies in the Korean peninsula because he 
believed that ideologies had caused factions and conflicts in South Korea since the 
Japanese occupation. Even the Korean churches had been unable to refrain from 
ideological conflicts from the 1920s onwards, when communism became influential 
among Korean Christians. The North and the South Koreans divided into two 
different ideologies, which were used as a cause for the Korean War and the militant 
confrontations between the two Koreas. In North Korea, communism became a 
national ideology and was developed into Juche ideology, which enabled the life-
long dictatorship and even the ‘divinisation’ of Kim Il-Sung. Meanwhile, capitalism 
became the grounds for the economic structure of South Korea and strengthened 
materialism and secularism, which caused economic injustice and corruption. Kim 
Young-Han argued that the Korean people needed a third way to ensure the unity of 
the Korean people, overcoming the current ideologies of the two Koreas that caused 
conflict among Koreans. He insisted that the third way was the word of God, upon 
which South Koreans should depend. Then, “human dignity, mutual reliance and 
understanding, human freedom and egalitarianism, social justice and welfare, and 
democracy” would be realised in Korea.50 This idea of the state seems to be a utopia, 
impossible by human efforts, but possible by God’s providence. The ideologies of 
North and South Korea had failed to achieve the wellbeing of Koreans, but God’s 
words would realise this. The theological approach of Kim Young-Han toward the 
unification and the role of the South Korean churches was similar to that of Han 
Kyung-Chik. Kim and Han both criticised the communism as well as materialism of 
                                               
49 Ibid., p. 142. 
50 Ibid., p. 43. 
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South Korea, which had worsened economic injustice. Kim insisted that the gospel 
of God reveals the defectiveness of socialism as well as capitalism. While socialism 
exploits human dignity for political parties and the state, capitalism advocates 
materialism, which generates human inequality and injustice in human societies.51  
According to his book, written in 1990, Kim was proposing a methodology 
of unification based on the Seung-gong idea of South Korea that was popular among 
conservative South Korean Christians. The idea of Seung-gong suggested that South 
Korea should take over North Korea so that the social and political system of South 
Korea could continue as the basic foundation for a unified Korea. Rather than Seung-
gong, however, Kim proposed Cho-gong, a Korean word that literally means 
“transcending communism”. He defined it thus:  
For many years South Korean conservative churches militantly fought against 
communism and made South Korean civilians tired of these conflicts… Cho-
gong means overcoming communism by the gospel of God and the free 
democratic ideology of Korea… We need endurance to achieve Cho-
gong…52  
Kim argued that the ideological difference between the two Koreas would be 
demonstrated by whether people were satisfied with their living conditions. He 
insisted that South Korean society should emphasise a just distribution of earnings, 
which would strengthen the democratic structure of South Korea. He further argued 
that South Korea needed to exercise ideological tolerance by guaranteeing freedom 
to engage in various political activities, even for communist parties. Even though the 
South Korean Government should allow communist parties in South Korea, they 
would not last long because it would be seen that communism had failed. Behind the 
Seung-gong idea, as mentioned in the previous chapter, was the South Korean 
confidence that South Korean capitalism was successfully rooted in its society and it 
had brought surprising economic growth to the country. Based on this confidence, 
from the 1990s South Korea started to develop diplomatic relationships with former 
communist countries in Eastern Europe, and even China.  
                                               
51 A Reformed Theology for a Peaceful Unification of Korea: Free Democratic Unification Discourse 
for an Advanced Society, p. 71. 
52 “Christianity and an Ideology of National Unification", p. 23. 
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However, Kim’s tolerant attitude toward communism in South Korea 
disappeared with the emergence of the Kim Dae-Jung government in 1998 and the 
Rho Moo-Hyun government in 2003, which propelled more liberal agendas and 
policies in South Korea. He now argued that even though the two Koreas would be 
unified in the future, communism would not be acceptable in the Korean peninsula. 
Furthermore, he upheld anti-communism, insisting that the Sunshine Policy would 
strengthen the rulers of North Korea and fail to bring about the unification of Korea. 
He strongly criticised the North Korean Juche ideology and the North Korean 
regime, stating that they hindered the unification of Korea. He insisted that the 
gospel message should be spread to North Korea in order to achieve the abolishment 
of the idolatry of Kim’s leadership.53 An effective methodology for the unification 
was to stimulate North Koreans to acquire a political voice for the transformation of 
North Korean society and international interactions with other countries. The 
unification of Korea would then be realised.  
 
5.2.4. The Unification Led by Educated Citizens 
 
Kim argued that the unification movement led by the minjung would fail 
because the methodology of the movement did not include the ‘majority’ of the 
South Korean population who had been educated and come to enjoy a prosperous life 
through the economic and social development of South Korea. Instead, he 
continuously argued that South Korean citizens should take part in the unification 
discourse. He also claimed that unification discourse should be led by the civil 
societies of North and South Korea. The governments of the North and South should 
consider the needs of Koreans and promote discussions between organisations. Kim 
argued that the South Korean Government should first concern itself with the human 
rights of the North Korean people, as well as the North Korean defectors. He insisted 
that, “The unification policy of South Korea should focus on supporting the North 
                                               
53 A Reformed Theology for a Peaceful Unification of Korea: Free Democratic Unification Discourse 
for an Advanced Society, p. 65. 
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Korean defectors. The wellbeing of North Korean defectors would be a strong 
message for North Koreans.”54 Moreover, the unification of Korea should aim to 
create progress for South Korean society, which he defined as “a unification 
discourse for an advanced society”. According to Kim’s definition of an advanced 
society, people would have the opportunity to develop their abilities, meaning they 
could work in various positions based on their abilities and characteristics and they 
could thus make society just and peaceful.55  
Kim insisted that the unification of Korea would be realised when South 
Korean society was strongly ruled by concrete principles and law and when 
education and the economy were adequately developed. He considered Singapore a 
relevant example of Seonjin Sahoe (an advanced society). As he believed that the 
development of South Korean society would be the grounds for the unification of 
Korea, he tried to advocate South Korean anti-communism as a source of 
development. He argued that anti-communism was a historical product of South 
Korean society and that it had helped the South Korean society to be a more 
democratic and economically developed country.56 Kim also related the anti-
communism of South Korea to the Calvinist idea of culture upheld and represented 
by South Korean Presbyterian churches. Kim argued: 
A Calvinist approach toward human culture enlightened Korean Christians – 
the majority of early Korean Christians were Presbyterian – under Japanese 
occupation and stimulated Christians to be involved in the March 1 
Independence Movement. The Christians in Korea fought against North 
Korean communists who started the Korean War, and they have developed 
anti-communism with which they contributed to the modernisation of South 
Korea.57  
For this reason, anti-communism was not to be blamed, but instead it should be 
regarded as a plausible basis for the development of South Korea. North Korean 
communism, meanwhile, was not acceptable within the unification of Korea as it was 
a hindrance to the development of Korean society. His idea of the unification of 
                                               
54 Ibid., p. 198. 
55 “A Theological Reflection on the Political Participation of the Korean Church”, Studies in Systematic 
Theology 16 (2012), p. 59. 
56 The Peaceful Unification and Christianity, p. 39. 
57 “The Cultural and Ideological Characteristics of Calvinist Theology”, p. 34. 
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Korea represented a widely held view among South Korean people. As shown in the 
previous chapter, more than half the population of South Korea agreed that North 
Korean communism would not be acceptable in a unified Korea and that the political 
and the economic systems of South Korea should continue after unification.58  
Therefore, what should be the direction for the unification of Korea 
according to Kim? Unification would not involve the restoration of the one nation-
state that existed before the Japanese occupation, but rather the creation of a new 
state through economic growth and social transformation.59 First, Kim, like other 
theologians, argued that the unification would be a realisation of shalom.60 The idea 
of shalom that he promoted was not critically different from that of liberal 
theologians. Shalom is a restoration of relationships: between God and human 
beings, individual human beings and nature. He argued that these relationships would 
be restored through the coming of Jesus Christ. The restoration of relationships and 
peace should be achieved by love.  
[The] peace of Christ is different from the peace of the Roman Empire, 
which oppressed the opponents using their powers. Peace through political 
and military powers generates mutual distrust and anxiety. However, peace 
through love would generate mutual trust and reliance.61  
He emphasised shalom as the wellbeing of people and as a realisation of justice. He 
argued that, “Shalom should be the rewards of God’s grace for the deficiency of 
wealth and mental despair.”62 Further, in accordance with the order of creation, 
justice should “increase the wealth of the poor and make equal distributions”63 and 
this justice would be grounds for the peace of love. According to his understanding 
of shalom, Kim argued that the restoration of human relationships could lead to 
mutual generosity and reliance that would be realised by the laws and rules of human 
society. Thus, governmental organisations and state law could be used for justice and 
                                               
58 “On the Idea of Advanced Societal, Free Democratic Unification in Korean Peninsula,” The Journal 
of Christian Philosophy 13 (2011), p. 192. 
59 “Peaceful Unification and Spirituality,” Studies in Systematic Theology 18 (2013), p. 35. 
60 A Reformed Theology for a Peaceful Unification of Korea: Free Democratic Unification Discourse 
for an Advanced Society, p. 56. 
61 Ibid., pp. 60-61. 
62 The Peaceful Unification and Christianity, p. 48. 
63 A Reformed Theology for a Peaceful Unification of Korea: Free Democratic Unification Discourse 
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peace and so, for justice and peace, people should respect the authorities and the laws 
of states.  
Regarding unification, Kim argued that the Korean people should emphasise 
humanitarian aspects in unification discourse rather than the ideological identities of 
the two Koreas. They should prioritise people’s wellbeing and the restoration of one 
identity for the Korean people. Christians should proclaim this unified Korea as “an 
example of a kingdom of God in this world”.64 Shalom in the Korean peninsula, 
being based on peace, would require the “mutual confidence and reliance” of the two 
Koreas:  
First, hatred and conflicts are existential phenomena of individual, social, 
political and even religious lives. Second, we have to understand the 
conflicts not from our sides but from others. Third, the two Koreas should 
promote mutual exchanges and understanding to relieve militant and 
political confrontations…65  
For the realisation of shalom in the Korean peninsula, Kim presented some practical 
solutions. North and South Korea should sign a peace treaty and disarm their nuclear 
weapons. Christians in the Korean peninsula should proclaim Jesus Christ in order to 
promote unification through shalom.66 Churches should pray for the reconciliation 
and forgiveness of the two Koreas and play the role of healer and reconciliatory 
agent. Christians should in this regard be voices for justice and even argue for the 
human rights of the North Korean people. They should be guarantors and work for 
the peaceful unification of Korea.67 Kim criticised liberal theologians, particularly 
Minjung theologians, because they were advocating churches for the minjung only. 
Minjung theology was an example of the way churches could be taken advantage of 
by ideologies, he claimed. Churches should represent Christ in this world, meaning 
they should serve not only the minjung, but all people. Churches should constitute 
hope for North Koreans and insist that North and South Korean society secure human 
dignity and rights.68 
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67 Ibid., pp. 72-73. 
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This discourse of unification for an advanced society represents the 
unification discourse of conservative Christians, which explicitly involves the 
absorption of North Korea through the political and economic development of South 
Korea. In the early stages of the unification movements led by South Korean NGO 
activists in the 1980s, mention of unification through absorption of North Korea led 
to heavy criticism in South Korean society. However, a recent survey of the attitudes 
of the South Korean people to unification indicated a strong abhorrence of the North 
Korean Government led by Kim Jung-Eun and a preference for the unification policy 
of the South Korean Government under Park Geun-Hye. The unification policy of 
former president Park Geun-Hye promoted unification through the absorption of 
North Korea.69 Kim’s unification discourse for an advanced society was implicitly 
based on the idea of absorption of North Korea.70 However, without the resolution of 
the hatred and conflict among Koreans, a peaceful unification and a one-nation 
Korea will not be possible. Further, the recent unification discourses about the 
absorption of North Korea are grounded on the assumption that the North Korean 
“democratic people’s republic” system would not be compatible with the South 
Korean “democratic republic” system and, therefore, absorption of North Korea is 
inevitable in the case of unification. Likewise, South Korean conservative churches 
recently launched programmes for North Korean missions, targeting South Korean 
Christians who want to take part in missionary work in North Korea. These 
programmes are regarded as preparatory programmes for the imminent collapse of 
                                               
69 In the Dresden Address, Park Geun-Hye proposed three policies to the North Korean government: a 
resolution of the humanitarian issues of North and South Koreans, establishing a humanitarian infra-
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through the absorption of North Korea. Young-Han Kim, “Critics and Evaluation of the 3.1 Declaration 




the North Korean Government and the absorption of North Korea by South Korea, 
and they aim to proselytise North Koreans.71 
 
5.2.5. Evaluation  
 
 Kim’s theological ideas about the unification of Korea epitomise the 
unification thoughts of conservative Christians in South Korea regardless of their 
denominational backgrounds. His political theology was a counterpart to the political 
ethic of American evangelicals toward political issues in the US, who valued the 
priority of inward spiritual development dominant over political action, of personal 
morality over public policy”.72 Unsurprisingly, Kim argued that the cross of Jesus 
had not been intended to create political upheaval, but nonetheless it resulted in the 
political transformation of Jewish society and later the Roman Empire. Hence, he 
continuously insisted that spiritual transformation, which would be achieved by 
nationwide evangelism, should occur prior to political movements in Korea or 
unification movements by South Korean Christians. On the basis of this 
understanding, he suggested that the modern tragedies of the Korean people, 
including Japanese occupation and the Korean War, were caused by the failure to 
achieve the spiritual transformation of the Korean people. He also pointed out that 
the economic and social development of Korea from the 1970s through to the 1990s 
coincided with significant growth in the Christian population and, therefore, spiritual 
transformation should be prioritised over the political engagement of Christians in 
achieving the unification of Korea. However, historically, South Korean Christians 
have contributed to the democratisation and improvement of human rights in South 
Korea through their political involvement. After the unification movements by liberal 
Christians in South Korea triggered the unification discourse in broader civil society, 
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conservative Christians became more aware of the influence of politically engaged 
Christians and they built alliances with the politically conservative parties of South 
Korea. Hence, Kim’s political arguments in fact contradict the actual political 
practices of conservative Christian groups in the country.  
Kim argued that the overwhelming anti-communism among South Korean 
churches was a result of the Calvinistic beliefs of South Korean Christians that 
originated from the era of Protestant reformation in the 16th century. However, he 
did not explain how this anti-communism is related to Calvinist theology. It can be 
assumed that he only looked at the fact that the majority of South Korean churches 
were Presbyterian and became centres of anti-communism. Moreover, some 
Presbyterian churches in South Korea, such as Kijang, do not agree with the anti-
communism of the mainline Presbyterian churches, while other non-Calvinist 
denominations, such as the full gospel churches and holiness churches in South 
Korea, generally uphold anti-communism. The anti-communism of South Korean 
churches has been closely related to the history of Korean Christianity since 1932, 
when the conflicts between communist Christians and others came to the surface and 
resulted in the harsh confrontations between the two Koreas. Thus, the degree of 
anti-communism of South Korean churches is more closely related to the religious 
spectrum of liberals and conservatives than to their denominational origins.  
 Kim argued that the unification of Korea should be led by citizens rather than 
minjung, defining “citizens” as “educated middle-class people”.73 Recent studies on 
the unification of Korea have a tendency to emphasise the role of civil organisations 
and the participation of citizens rather than minjung. However, they generally 
acknowledge the various aspects of citizenship in South Korea74 in order to 
emphasise the conscientisation of the common population and the movements 
towards the commonwealth of Korean society, including the peace and unification of 
Korea. Further, surveys in South Korea indicate that the older generation, those over 
60, are a mostly economically marginalised and academically uneducated 
                                               
73 Kim, “The Evangelical Approach to the Unification of Korea”. 
74 See: Tae-Seok Jeong, “The Civil Society of South Korea after ‘the Democratisation’: Where are the 
Citizens?”, Hwanghae Review 49 (2005). 
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population.75 Therefore, Kim’s definition of citizenship risks excluding the older 





As stated above, Kim Young-Han’s theological approach to unification was 
representative of the conservative South Korean Christians’ thoughts on unification. 
In particular, his belief that the incidents of Korean history were the result of God’s 
providence was widely shared by conservative Christian leaders. For instance, the 
Communion of Churches in Korea made an official comment on the issue of Moon 
Chang-Geuk in 2014 that they agreed with Moon’s argument about God’s 
providence in the tragic history of Korea, and Lee Jong-Yun, a pastor emeritus of 
Seoul Presbyterian Church, argued that Moon’s speech was based on a biblical 
understanding of God’s will.76 Hence, rather than criticising the political powers and 
the international Cold War, Christians ought to reflect on whether they lived 
according to God’s justice and to spread God’s word to other Korean people. This 
historiography of Kim and other conservative Christian leaders disregarded the 
political reformation of the Joseon people, such as the Dong-Hak Peasant Revolt and 
the liberation movements of Christians under the Japanese occupation. They were 
also discomforted by the political engagement of Christians in the democratisation 
movement and insisted that unification would not be realised by human effort, but 
instead by God’s providence. For instance, Min Kyung-Bae insisted that:  
 
The only thing South Korean churches can do for the unification is pray. We 
should pray to God to resolve the difficult issues between the two Koreas 
                                               
75 The rate of poverty among the elderly population is 53.1%, which is four times higher than the 
OECD average. See: Hyun-Yun Cho and Cheong-Seok Kim, “Elderly Poverty and Korean Politics in 
an Aging Society”, [Elderly poverty and Korean politics in an aging society] Democratic Society and 
Policy Studies 30 (2016), p. 12. 
76 Jin-Young Kim, “Interview with Rev. Lee Jong-Yun; ‘the Speech of Moon Chang-Geuk was Truly 
Biblical’”, Christian Today 13 June, 2014. 
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and also lead them to the unification of Korea. We should pray that God’s 
providence will stimulate governmental officers to have creative and wise 
ideas for peace and unification of the Korean peninsula…77 
A strong belief in God’s providence and in the vacuity of human endeavours for the 
unification process was grounded on anti-communism and distrust of the North 
Korean Government generated by the nuclear debates and military threat of North 
Korean armies.78 However, it has been proven that the conservative Christian leaders 
did not pay attention to ideological reconciliation and healing the hatred between 
North and South Koreans. Rather, they tried to emphasise that communism was anti-
Christian79 and that Christians should be warriors in order to defeat the North Korean 
communists.  
Believing in God’s providence in the history of the Korean people and that 
their horrific history was a punishment from God for their sins against his justice, 
Kim argued that the Korean people, especially South Korean Christians, should 
confess their sins and live in accordance with God’s word. Kim argued that an 
important aspect of Christian life was respecting civil law and the authorities, which 
would aid South Korea to become a developed country like Singapore and lead North 
Korea to unification with South Korea. South Korea, as a developed country, would 
stimulate the North Korean people to take their rights back and make North Korea a 
democratic country. However, it is questionable how the Gospel could reach the 
North Korean people and stimulate a desire for national transformation in them in a 
                                               
77 Kyong-Bae Min, “The Issues of the Unification of Korea Marking the 70th Anniversary of the 
Liberation of Korea: A Historial Approach to the Relationship between Christianity and Communism”, 
Korean Reformed Journal 36 (2015), p. 30. 
78  Kim Young-Han and Min Kyong-Bae heavily criticised the Sunshine Policy of the former 
governments of Kim Dae-Jung and Rho Moo-Hyun, pointing out that the policy stimulated the North 
Korean government to develop nuclear weapons and a missile system. They argued that the policy 
deluded Korean people into thinking that the North Korean government would work for the peace of 
the Korean peninsula. Kim, “Peaceful Unification and Spirituality”, p. 11; Min, “The Issues of the 
Unification of Korea Marking the 70th Anniversary of the Liberation of Korea: A Historial Approach 
to the Relationship between Christianity and Communism”, p. 25. 
79 Kim Young-Han and Min Kyong-Bae did not agree that the North Korean Christians were real 
Christians. They argued that the churches in North Korea were a governmental tool to fake religious 
freedom in North Korea because Christianity cannot coexist with North Korean communism. Kim, “The 
Evangelical Approach to the Unification of Korea"; Min, “The Issues of the Unification of Korea 
Marking the 70th Anniversary of the Liberation of Korea: A Historial Approach to the Relationship 
between Christianity and Communism”, pp. 22-23. 
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situation where North Korea is strongly controlled and manipulated by the 
dictatorship of the Kim family. Kim Young-Han simply said that this was beyond 
human imagination, but God would make it true.80  
Kim, like Han, argued that South Korea should be developed sufficiently to 
support the expense of the unification of Korea, such as developing infrastructure for 
North Korea. Kim also argued that in order to be an advanced country, which would 
bring about the unification of Korea, the Korean people should respect law and 
authority and even uphold anti-communism. However, anti-communist discourse in 
South Korean society has been widely used to criticise people who have participated 
in human rights movements and even the unification movements of the liberal 
groups. Thus, anti-communism has been used by authoritarian governments to 
suppress human rights in South Korea. Moreover, it has not been reasonably proven 
that anti-communism has contributed to the economic growth and social 
development of South Korea.  
As stated above, the unification discourse of conservative Christian leaders 
advocated a unification methodology involving absorbing North Korea in accordance 
with the governmental unification policy that was officially proposed by Park Geun-
Hye in 2014. Facing the nuclear and missile threats of North Korea, many South 
Koreans came to believe that the unification of Korea should be led by South Korea, 
adapting the South Korean political, social and economic system. However, the 
methodology of absorption of North Korea for the unification generated strong 
criticism from the North Korean Government in 2014 and might cause a series of 
conflicts and confrontations among Koreans unless people in both countries achieve 
reconciliation and heal embittered memories that have endured since the division of 




                                               





New Christian Perspectives on the Problems of Divided Korea: 
From Minjok and Minjung to Simin in Search for More Practical 
and Public Discourses of Peace in the Korean Peninsula 
 
The unification discussions based on minjung discourse and nationalism 
became transformed in the 21st century as South Korean scholars came to doubt the 
possibility of both imminent unification of the Korean peninsula as a one-nation-state 
and the various approaches toward the citizenry and citizen participation in social 
issues as an alternative subjectivity for South Korean society. South Korean society 
had achieved economic development and democratisation, in particular through the 
June Democratic Protest in 1987, through which South Koreans procured the right to 
vote directly in the presidential election. Therefore, many scholars now believed that 
South Korean people were experiencing political and social transformation 
regardless of their economic background and so they attempted to find a broader 
term to replace minjung, which refers to people who are economically oppressed and 
exploited. As Kim Young-Han articulated and as noted in the previous chapter, 
discourse about the South Korean simin (citizen) is now replacing that of minjung, 
which previously dominated the democratic and unification discourse during the 
political turmoil in South Korea, from the Rhee Syng-Man government through to 
the Jeon Doo-Hwan government. Now, even liberal theologians, especially scholars 
of Christian ethics, have a tendency to emphasise Christians’ role as citizens of the 
country in various social issues, including the unification of Korea.  
South Korean scholars have also become aware of the practical difficulties 
involved in the unification movement if it is driven by nationalist discourse, for the 
one-nation-state in particular. Kang Ryang, a senior researcher at the Institute for 
National Security Strategy, has argued that unification discourses based on Korean 
nationalism should be reined in for a practical unification process, stating, “[W]e 
have to escape from the bondage of nationalism for making a practical unification 
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policy”.1 Other scholars have agreed that the two Koreas would be better off in 
peaceful coexistence rather than unification, as the latter would cause conflicts and 
even militant confrontations insofar as the two countries would uphold their own 
unification policies for the one-nation-state in order to guarantee their own socio-
political systems.2 This discourse of “postponing unification” or “peaceful 
coexistence”3 has been widely disseminated within the academic sphere in the 21st 
century, generally because of the nuclear issues with North Korea and the conflicts 
among South Koreans regarding their different attitudes toward North Korea. 
Advocates of post-nationalist unification discourse are “searching for the peaceful 
coexistence of two Koreas rather than the unification of the one-nation-state and 
[they] propose researching how Koreans would overcome the aftermath caused by 
the division of the Korean peninsula”,4 which has been causing socio-political 
problems in both Koreas. 
For instance, Paik Nak-Cheong has argued that South Koreans do not need 
imminent unification into a one-nation-state. Instead, he has insisted that a peace 
treaty should be signed by the governments of North Korea, South Korea, the US and 
China, and then the two Koreas should develop interactions with each other, 
acknowledging and respecting each other’s governmental systems. This would be 
similar to the National Community Unification Formulas suggested by the Rho Tae-
Woo government in 1989, which pursued unification through the peaceful 
coexistence of the two countries preserving a one-nation identity. Paik insisted that 
true unification would only be possible when the North and South Korean 
populations could live together without hatred, discrimination or alienation. Hence, it 
is inappropriate to maintain that the unification would be a single event, happening 
over a short period and creating a one-nation-state in the peninsula. Rather, the 
                                               
1 Ryang Kang, “Political and Theological Understandings of the South-South Conflicts Problem in 
South Korean Society”, Journal of Korean Political Science Society 23, no. 2 (2015), p. 1.  
2 Jang-Jib Choi, Democracy after Democratisation (Seoul: Humanitas, 2006), p. 217, re-citing Jong-
Seok Na, “Democracy, Nationalism, and the Future of Nation-State in the Korean Peninsula”, Society 
and Philosophy, no. 22 (2011), p. 8. 
3 Gee-Dong Lee, “The Change of Unification Environment and『National Community Unification 
Formulas』”, Journal of the Korean Association of Northeast Asia Studies 19, no. 2 (2014), p. 190. 
4 Byung-Soo Lee, “Reflective Introspection on the Relationship between North and South Korea: 
Focusing on Nation and System”, The Journal of the Humanities for Unification, no. 48 (2009), p. 21. 
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unification of Korea may require a long period of time during which both Koreas 
make progress in human rights, economic justice and various living conditions.5 
Practically, Paik pointed out that the most important cause for the unification 
movement is “how to guarantee the prosperity of the Korean population” and 
therefore the “declaration of a one-nation-state will be subservient to the 
improvement of the living conditions of the people”.6 South Koreans are still 
struggling to ascertain how to bridge the differences between people in the two 
Koreas and they have become sceptical about imminent one-nation-state unification 
in Korea. For instance, North Korean defectors still have difficulties integrating into 
South Korean society and the South Korean population. Therefore, rather than 
unification itself, Christian theologians are now focused on achieving peace in the 
Korean peninsula through the harmonious coexistence of the two Koreas. It is thus 
generally recognised that unification theology in the 21st century has been weakened 
and diverted to alternative channels. In summary, the recent approaches to the 
unification of Korea seem to declare that the conventional unification discourse for a 
one-nation-state in the Korean peninsula is ending.  
In this chapter, I will first present the missional understanding of unification 
discourse, in particular emphasising the diaconal mission of local churches for the 
peace and unification of Korea. Second, I will discuss the development of the 
discourse of citizenry in South Korea in relation to socio-political issues, as well as 
the unification of Korea. This chapter will also examine the Christian approaches 
toward the unification of Korea from the perspective of securing peace in the 
peninsula based on the idea of citizenry. Lastly, I will present the recent approaches 
toward the unification discourse; these have challenged the conventional unification 
discourse, which was based on Korean nationalism and pursued a homogenous 
ethnic identity among the North and South Korean population. 
 
                                               
5 Nak-Cheong Paik, The Unification of Korea is on-going: A New Way for the Korean Peninsula 
(Paju: Changbi, 2006), pp. 76-77. 




6.1. Locally-driven Christian Mission for Peace and the Unification of 
Korea 
 
The unification discourse of conservative churches has broadened to the 
realms of local communities and civil organisations. Evangelical Christians began to 
build a discourse about social responsibility in the 1990s, when Christian bodies 
organised a number of NGOs, including the Christian Ethics Movement of Korea, 
which emphasised social responsibility on the part of Christians following the 
Lausanne Covenant. Facing the new momentum of the evangelical approach to the 
mission, theologians, especially those in the field of mission studies, argued that the 
missional methodology of the South Korean evangelical churches was a type of 
integral, holistic, or diaconal mission that emphasised the churches’ servitude of 
broader society, as well as their responsibility for various social issues.  
Some theologians of mission studies, regardless of their denominational 
backgrounds, tried to apply this missional discourse to the discourse of the 
unification of Korea in two directions: for South and North Koreans. At first, this 
servitude was directed toward North Koreans, who had suffered from a shortage of 
food as well as natural disasters; this led to major unification activities on the part of 
evangelical Christian groups from the early 1990s, despite suspicion from other 
conservative Christians who thought that humanitarian aid for the North Korean 
people would strengthen the communist regime in the North. Later, these groups 
tried to find a pathway to access the local community in order to promote their 
unification discourse based on holistic missional thinking. As unification discourse 
came to include various aspects of individual life within society, some theologians 
understood the unification movement as closely relating to Christian life in South 
Korean society. However, the ideas of holistic mission were generally applied to the 
local ministry rather than the national level of the church ministry.  
Yim Hee-Mo, a professor emeritus of mission studies at Hanil University 
and Presbyterian Theological Seminary, presented a holistic mission approach to 
unification that specifically emphasised the life-giving work of South Korean 
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Christians. This life-giving mission would realise the world of shalom where “God, 
human beings and nature shall live in harmony and blessing.”7 He insisted:  
The division of the Korean peninsula has caused horrendous pain for Korean 
people in the North as well as in the South, and, therefore, Christian 
missions should aim for the unification of Korea through reconciliation and 
healing of those who have been suffering. These missions can be started 
from the churches’ holistic mission for local communities.8 
In order to work in local communities for the unification of Korea, South Korean 
churches should first earn the trust of the South Korean people. There is criticism 
that the South Korean mainstream conservative churches, coinciding with the 
industrialisation of Korea, have emphasised earthly blessings and growth of church 
membership, rather than working for marginalised people. Even worse, news about 
sex scandals and misappropriate behaviours of some church leaders have frequently 
appeared in the mass media. Therefore, if South Korean churches want to be 
influential among local citizens, they have to regain their trust. The primary way to 
gain the trust of South Koreans is through servitude or a diaconal mission for the 
local and national community, which would promote shalom through the entire 
peninsula. Churches should also cooperate with other NGOs to promote peace and 
wellbeing among the Korean people, as well as all human beings. Yim has argued, 
“For the holistic mission, churches should make prophetic voices against injustice in 
society and search for a pathway to work with civil organisations for the common 
good.”9 Churches should be spaces of peace and reconciliation in the Korean 
peninsula, and thus they should invite local residents to work together for this peace 
and reconciliation, especially when trying to reconcile with those who are still 
experiencing extreme anti-communism.10  
Yim Hee-Mo and Cho Eun-Sik, a professor of Soongsil University, have 
argued that the church should pioneer and promote unification education in South 
                                               
7 Hee-Mo Yim, “Mission as Peaceful Unification Movement in the Division Regime of North and 
South Korea”, Mission and Theology, no. 35 (2015), p. 123. 
8 “The Lifegiving Holistic Mission and Strategy for the Community”, Theology for Mission 31 (2014), 
p. 234. 
9 Ibid., p. 236. 




Korean society. Churches have a significant potential to promote peace, 
reconciliation and the unification of Korea through education in local communities, 
such as through “preaching, biblical studies, seminars, summer and winter prayer 
retreat[s], and so on”.11 Cho has insisted: 
Christian churches can initiate an education of forgiveness and reconciliation 
based on the biblical teachings of peace… [The peace education] of 
Christian churches would aim to restore the relationship between human 
beings and God, as well as with neighbours, and eventually contribute to the 
unification of Korea.12  
According to Cho, peace education in South Korean churches should be locally- and 
congregationally-based, teaching Christians how to live peacefully in their 
environment from an early age in order to create a culture that emphasises peace.  
The bottom-up approach to the peace movement in South Korean churches, 
as promoted by Yim and Cho, highlights the cooperation of churches and NGOs for 
the peace and unification of Korea. First, focusing on humanitarian aid for the North 
Korean people, the evangelical churches have struggled to overcome their conflicting 
position between anti-communism and missions toward North Koreans, which is 
facilitated and accentuated by a good relationship with the North Korean 
Government. Second, facing the tension and conflicts between denominations that 
are involved in North Korean missions and humanitarian aid, some church leaders 
and scholars have argued that the NGOs should take charge of humanitarian work, 
based on a belief that specialised NGOs are better than churches, and that churches 
should focus on evangelism aimed at North Korean defectors and cooperation with 
North Korean churches. Park Young-Hwan has argued:  
[In working for unification] individual churches should cooperate with 
NGOs, and their cooperation could expand to the denominational level to 
invite the laity who have a specialty in humanitarian work and currently 
work for NGOs…While the NGOs’ humanitarian work for North Korean 
people would shorten the route to unification, the churches would be able to 
prepare for evangelising work in North Korea.13 
                                               
11 Eun-Sik Cho, “Unification Education as Peace Education”, Journal of Korea Reformed Theology 
Society, no. 15 (2004), p. 168. 
12 Ibid., pp. 174-175. 
13 Young-Hwan Park, “The Nation's Christianisation Reform and Reunion”, Theology for Mission, no. 
13 (2006), p. 230. 
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Still, there are some theologians and church leaders who argue that South Korean 
churches should only concern themselves with direct evangelism toward the North 
Korean people and who view humanitarian work as a pathway to reach and 
evangelise the North Korean population. They believe that unification movements 
are denominational or congregational issues, rather than an individual concern. The 
locally-driven unification discourse has drawn attention to the notion that unification 
and peace in Korea should be an indispensable concern for all individual Christians, 
as citizens of South Korean society, and that local churches should work with NGOs 
to promote Christian peace for South and North Koreans.  
 
6.2. From Minjung to Citizens: The Changing Subjectivity of Unification 
Discourse and Christians’ Responsibility for Peace and the Unification of 
Korea as Citizens 
 
In the modern history of South Korea, various different terms have been 
used by the government, jaeya groups and scholars to describe the common people. 
Traditionally in Korea, kukmin was widely and generally used to refer to people who 
have lived in the country since pre-modern Korea. However, the term kukmin does 
not suggest that people have political responsibility or rights.14 When the South 
Korean Government was established in 1948 and a new constitution was drawn up, 
kukmin appeared in the first chapter, article 1 (2), which states, “The sovereignty of 
the Republic of Korea shall reside with the people (kukmin), and all state authority 
shall emanate from the people (kukmin)”.15 Based on the constitution, kukmin 
therefore came to indicate people who simply reside in South Korean territory, rather 
than South Koreans with political rights and responsibilities. Thereafter, under the 
authoritarian government, kukmin was used to highlight the responsibility of South 
Koreans to serve the state with all their possessions, even their lives, and to 
                                               
14 Myung-Gyu Park, Kukmin, Inmin, and Simin: The Political Subjectivity of South Korea from the 
Perspective of a History of Terminology (Seoul: Soha, 2014), p. 61. 
15 Korea Legislation Research Institute, “Constitution of the Republic of Korea”, (National Law 
Information Center, 1988). 
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implicitly emphasise that the individuals of South Korea belonged to their mother 
country, against the inmin in North Korea. During the period of authoritarian 
governments, instead of the Korean term kukmin, jaeya scholars and activists 
preferred to use minjung, minjok and simin (citizen) because they insisted that the use 
of kukmin in South Korea implicitly reflected an anti-communist and anti-North 
Korea meaning. During the democratisation of South Korea in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, these groups began to use the term ‘citizen’ to emphasise citizens’ roles 
in the issues within their society, country and world. ‘Citizen’ generally meant a 
political and social entity who voluntarily “protest[ed] against the oppression of the 
authority of the state and work[ed] for public cause.”16  
In general, South Korean sociologists have argued that simin sahoi (the 
citizenry) and related movements began with the fall of the authoritarian government 
in 1987 and they became engaged with various aspects of the South Korean 
population and their diverse concerns. 17 Kim Ho-Ki has argued that the years 
following 1987 can be identified as an era of explosion of the establishment’s civil 
organisations.18 Before then, public movements within the South Korean population 
had supported democratisation against the authoritarian government, but after 1987 
the South Korean people organised themselves according to their political and social 
interests and expanded their influence over South Korean society. The notable 
organisations voluntarily founded by citizens were the Citizens’ Coalition for 
Economic Justice and the Korean Federation of Environmental Movements.19 The 
founding statement of the Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice stated: 
We cannot leave the task of economic justice on the shoulders of politicians 
in the National Assembly as well as those in governmental offices. It is us 
                                               
16 Park, Nation, People, and Citizen: The Political Subjectivity of South Korea from the Perspective of 
a History of Terminology, p. 240. 
17 Some scholars in the fields of South Korean politics and sociology disagree with the statement that 
civil movements began with the diminishing of the power of the militant government in the second 
half of 1980. Park Young-Shin has argued that the civil movements of South Korean people can be 
traced to the 4.19 Revolution against the Rhee government and have played a powerful role in the 
history of South Korea, with dynamic power able to overthrow the political authorities. Young-Shin 
Park, “The Forgotten Story: Civil Society and Civil Religion”, Phenomena and Cognition: The 
Korean Journal of Humanities and the Social Sciences 24, no. 1-2 (2000), p. 69. 
18 Ho-Ki Kim, “The Structure and Change of Civil Society, 1987-2000”, The Korean Society 3 (2000), 
p. 71. 
19 Ibid., p. 71.  
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the citizens’ task...we will start the movement for economic justice and 
equity. The movement is for the simin (citizens), by the simin and of the 
simin. Some people might ask why not minjung. We would respond that 
those we encourage to join in our cause are not only the oppressed minjung 
but also all individuals who have good intentions for our cause.20   
Therefore, rather than the terminology of minjung, which highlighted the economic 
inequality in South Korea, or minjok, which was used to emphasise the homogeneity 
of Koreans, these groups emphasised the meaning of simin, especially voluntary 
participation in social and political issues and the possibility of a global network for 
the unification of Korea in particular.21 Jeong Tae-Seok, a professor of Chonbuk 
National University, argued:  
While the minjung movement’s agendas were long-term issues such as neo-
liberalism, economic injustice, labour and unification of Korea, the civil 
movements emphasised a wider range of issues regarding women’s rights, 
ecology, the marginalised, education and social welfare…22  
 
Regarding the unification movement, it was an important task for social 
activists and scholars who were studying the unification of Korea to spread the 
unification discourse among the South Korean population and to interpret the 
division and unification of Korea from a different perspective from the conventional 
theory, which regarded the division of Korea as a product of the Cold War and 
ideological conflicts among Koreans after their liberation from Japanese occupation. 
For instance, in a book published in 2006, Paik Nak-Cheong, a professor emeritus at 
Seoul National University, disagreed that the division of Korea was a result of the 
Cold War and that it primarily created harsh confrontations between the new North 
Korea and South Korea. Rather, he translated the division and its aftermath as a 
backlash against the expansion of the global economy, especially capitalism. Thus, 
the division of Korea and its aftermath were paradoxical consequences of the 
                                               
20 Park, Nation, People, and Citizen: The Political Subjectivity of South Korea from a Perspective of a 
History of Terminology , pp. 242-243. 
21 Ibid., p. 289. 




expansion of capitalism in the world. Therefore, Paik argued that we need a new 
perspective on the division of Korea:  
[Rather than] viewing the division of Korea as North Korea versus South 
Korea…it is important to view the division as a polarising system of the 
specific groups who have benefited from the division of Korea and the mass 
population who are oppressed and manipulated under the division system of 
the Korean peninsula.23  
Hence, the North Korean people are not the enemy of South Koreans, but instead a 
potential ally against a small group of people and a system that manipulates the 
entire Korean population. 
Along with these endeavours on the part of South Korean activists, Paik also 
tried to find a way to expand the unification discourse among the South Korean 
population after the democratisation of Korea. Like other scholars of sociology, such 
as Kim Ho-Gi, he tended to use the terminology of simin rather than minjung from 
the mid-1990s, saying that he could not find notable differences between minjung 
and citizens after the democratisation of Korea. Therefore, he insisted that all citizens 
should be involved in the unification dialogue and movement since the division of 
Korea had a negative impact upon South Korean society. Although some were 
critical of his arguments, he maintained that social issues, such as gender equality, 
economic injustice, ecological exploitation and even democratic development itself, 
are closely related to the division system of the Korean peninsula.24 He argued, 
“[T]he South Korean society is still hungry for democracy… As long as the division 
of Korea continues as a governing phenomenon in the Korean peninsula, neither 
North Korea nor South Korea can accomplish democracy in their countries.”25 
                                               
23 Paik, The Unification of Korea Is on-Going: A New Way for the Korean Peninsula , p. 81. 
24 Paik and other scholars argue that the division system of the Korean peninsula has been influencing 
the social system of South Korea. First, facing militant confrontation with North Korea, it has been 
mandatory for South Korean young men to complete military service for two or three years, based on 
which they will get extra points when they apply for governmental jobs. This policy has raised gender 
equality issues and the Constitutional Court has announced that the policy violates the South Korean 
constitution. Second, as stated in previous chapters, South Koreans were forced to stay silent on political 
and economic injustice for the sake of national security against North Korea. Third, competing with 
North Korean communism, the South Korean governments have driven economic development plans 
that have brought about rapid economic growth, but also created chaebol and economic inequality. 
Similarly, the democratisation of South Korea has been delayed under authoritarian governments that 
have suppressed the movement in favour of national security against North Korean communists.  
25 Paik, The Unification of Korea is on-going: A New Way for the Korean Peninsula, pp. 64-65. 
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Therefore, the unification of Korea is essential for resolving the social issues in 
South Korea, as well as in North Korea. However, it is clear that the unification of 
Korea will not take place in the near future; therefore, it would be dangerous to put 
aside all social issues until unification is accomplished. Moreover, as the social 
issues in both North and South Korea were created by a global system grounded on 
capitalism, Paik has insisted that unification should be regarded as a process that 
begins to transform the global economic system. He has argued: 
The unification is the middle way between the short-term task of Koreans to 
develop their living conditions in each other’s country and the long-term task 
to transform the global governance, which would guarantee well-being of the 
global population. Therefore, the human rights movements, anti-depravity 
movement, preserving nature movement, and gender and economic equity 
movements can be seen as the elements of the “relevant unification of 
Korea”.26 
On the basis of this understanding that the unification movement consists of all 
discourses on the development of the living conditions and daily life of the South 
Korean population, Paik encouraged more citizens to participate in the unification 
dialogue and movement. As he pointed out, the Sunshine Policy and the 6.15 
Presidential Meeting between Kim Dae-Jung, the president of Korea, and Kim 
Jeong-Il, the leader of North Korea, created the momentum for South Korean civil 
society to organise a variety of NGOs for the unification of Korea. The most popular 
agenda for the form of unification discourse suggested by civic organisations was the 
discourse on peace in the Korean peninsula and northeastern Asia, as well as the anti-
nuclear movement. With the military threat of North Korea and the development of 
its nuclear weapons programme, as well as the militant confrontations between North 
Korea and the US that began when the North Korean regime started its nuclear 
weapons program, social activists insist that securing peace in the Korean peninsula 
is a more pressing agenda to pursue in Korea than unification itself. Therefore, since 
the mid-1990s, the peace movement of South Korean civil organisations has been 
                                               
26 Ibid., p. 97. 
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replacing the conventional unification movement that aimed to establish a one-
nation-state in the peninsula.27 
Similarly, from the mid-1990s, some South Korean theologians argued that 
peace in the Korean peninsula was the primary and imminent task of the South 
Korean churches. Rather than viewing the unification of Korea as an end in itself, 
they regarded the unification of Korea as the final and essential condition for peace 
in the peninsula and believed that peace should be an urgent call for Korean churches 
in the context of the Korean peninsula. Lee Moon-Sik, a director of the South-North 
Korean Sharing Movement, emphasised: 
[P]eace is more important than unification of Korea… We are the people of 
God yearning for the realisation of God’s kingdom on Earth, therefore we 
should proclaim peace rather than the unification of Korea.28  
This was indicative of a notable shift in theological discourse about the unification of 
Korea. The unification theology proposed and developed by the theologians of South 
Korea was becoming a theology for peace and unification that added ‘peace’ to the 
conventional ‘unification theology’. Shin Ok-Soo, a professor of systematic theology 
at the Presbyterian University and Theological Seminary, insisted:  
Today’s unification theology aims at theology for peace and unification of 
Korea because peace is a prerequisite and a method for the unification of 
Korea, as well as the final purpose of the unification of Korea. Moreover, the 
theology of the peace and unification of Korea is searching for a way to 
realise a true peace in the daily lives of human beings in addition to the 
abolition of the division of Korea.29 
Kim Jeong-Hyeong, a visiting professor at the Presbyterian University and 
Theological Seminary in Seoul, insisted that the South Korean churches should 
develop a new theological approach to the unification of Korea, regarding it as a 
condition for peace in northeast Asia, as well as the world. He defined this new 
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the Unification of Korea: Transformation from Hatred and Exclusion toward Embrace and 
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29 Ok-Su Shin, “A Study on the Theology of Peaceful Unification in Light of Kingdom of God 
Theology”, Mission and Theology 35, no. Spring (2015), p. 17. 
 
 175 
theological approach to peace and unification as a contextual peace theology for the 
divided Korea.30 Just as Paik argued that the division of the Korean peninsula was 
extensively related to the life of Korean people, ideas about peace in the Korean 
peninsula included various aspects of South Korean society, particularly the social 
justice issues of South Korea. For instance, Kim Jeong-Hyeong, sharing the theology 
of shalom with other theologians, argued that true peace means not only a state 
without a war, but also one that is without personal, societal or cultural violence and 
that requires restorative justice, as expounded by the Hebrew prophets in Isaiah 2:4 
and Micah 4:1-5.31  
A notable example among the theologians pioneering the theology of peace 
in South Korea is Yoo Kyung-Dong, who has spoken about the Christian realism of 
Reinhold Niebuhr, Christian peace and the unification of Korea. Yoo Kyung-Dong 
earned a PhD from Vanderbilt University in 2000 and wrote a thesis on the Christian 
realism of Reinhold Niebuhr as theological grounds for the unification of Korea. In 
his thesis, he argued that human nature is replete with sinfulness and that “ideals and 
actions frequently conceal selfish interests, and the pursuit of justice may mask a 
ruthless application of power”.32 Therefore, human beings need a realistic moral 
guideline that emphasises the selfless love of God and human obedience to God’s 
love, humbleness and tolerance of others. He saw Niebuhr’s theology as providing an 
opportunity in the Korean context that would encourage Koreans in both the North 
and South to acknowledge the limitations in their politics that were influenced by 
selfish interests, to criticise their tragic history of division and the Korean War and to 
                                               
30 Kim argued that the traditional theology of the mainline South Korean churches, such as the 
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pursue “ideological tolerance” and a deeper knowledge of God’s providence in the 
peninsula.33 From his early years studying Christian ethics, he has developed the 
pessimistic view that the politics of the North and South Korean governments, or the 
ideologies of each country which will be unable to reconcile sufficiently to result in 
the unification of Korea. Rather, he believes that the selfless love and generous spirit 
of Christianity must be essential grounds for peace and the unification of Korea. 
Therefore, Christians in both Koreas, as disciples of Christ, as well as citizens of 
both countries, must play a responsible role in this process. Hence, citizenship, peace 
and Christian responsibility are critical ideas in his theology for the peace and 
unification of Korea. 
Firstly, Yoo has criticised the traditional Christian theologies of the ‘just 
war’, as they have also been used to justify wars begun by ostensibly Christian 
countries, such as the Iraq War started by the US. Christian theologians have 
acknowledged the necessity of a government protecting its inhabitants and 
harmonising individual interests through the exercise of governmental authority, 
which is believed to be granted by God. Further, according to just war theory, the 
leaders of states have the right to launch wars against external threats under strict 
conditions. Yoo, however, has argued that even though just war theories provide 
strict guidelines for engaging in wars, they were actually intended to prevent wars in 
the belief that justice in the world would never be achieved without peace. Yet these 
theories are abused, even by Christian states, to justify wars against “so-called evil” 
enemies.34 Behind the notion of the ‘just war’ is human nature: human beings are 
born yearning for power. Yoo has articulated this based on an understanding of 
Christian realism: 
The tradition of realism was based on the pessimistic belief that human 
beings are naturally selfish and greedy for power. This human nature 
emanated into international relationships; therefore powerful and wealthy 
countries are regarded as the most important grounds for building up 
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international relationships. Moreover, all countries are pouring their energies 
into creating national power and wealth.35 
Creation of national wealth and power as the primary objective of countries has 
caused conflicts and even wars in human history. Even in the post-modern world, 
people are seeing that governments of countries both explicitly and implicitly fight 
each other in order to possess more power and wealth. The international 
organisations represented by the United Nations have been unable to control conflicts 
in the world because of the interference of powerful countries such as the US, Russia 
and China.36 Under these conditions, who can be the agents to bring peace to the 
world? 
Yoo maintained that citizens of the world should work together “regardless 
of their citizenship, religions and ethnicity”37 for peace in the world, and that 
Christians should actively engage in peace movements, overcoming their national 
and ethnic boundaries. He also suggested that Christians should redefine the role of 
the state and the relationship between the church and the state. In this, he borrowed 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s idea of “orders of preservation”, which he explained as the 
idea that the church and the state should be partners in preserving world peace and 
the new possibilities of God’s providence in this world for the wellbeing of all 
creatures. Hence, the state should exist insofar as it contributes to “prevent[ing] the 
divisions and conflicts, the destruction of God’s creatures in this world”.38 
In addition to political conflicts, globalisation and the global market system 
are also causing serious problems. Neoliberalism is overwhelming the world with the 
growth of global markets, which in some cases exploits labourers and the natural 
environment of underdeveloped countries. In this, Yoo presented peace as more than 
the mere dormancy of war and conflict. He argued that peace in the modern world 
should be redefined to ensure the wellbeing of individuals. It should be a 
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“humanitarian peace” that enhances the rights of individuals that have been 
manipulated by statist authorities and the international market system. Hence, Yoo 
emphasised “civil peace”: a peace movement initiated and driven by civil society. He 
insisted, “The peace strategy by civil society is for grassroots peace, which would be 
achieved by the alliance of individual citizens around the world rather than 
international diplomacy and national politics”,39 which are controlled by 
governments and global companies.   
According to Yoo, in the global context, which is full of injustice, violence 
and manipulation, Christian pacifism should not be ideological, but instead it should 
yearn for realistic change in the world through the holistic life of individuals. The 
peace and unification of Korea is not only a calling, but also a responsibility of 
individual citizens. Christians should be apostles of peace and take action to protect 
peace in the world. In particular, “the freedom of Christians is the freedom of 
service, and the true Christian equity should be measured by God”.40 Thus, churches 
have to work to advance Christian peace in the world, especially in Korea, through 
their service to improving human rights in South Korean society, because Christian 
faith and life should not be separated from each other, but should instead transform 
the society to which Christians belong.  
Yoo Kyung-Dong has argued that South Korean churches should take part in 
civic movements because Christian theology encourages human beings to “have 
existential transformations by engaging God in trinity to live ethical lives”.41 Yoo 
summarised that “churches are part of society and their movements should emphasise 
realistic practices”.42 Therefore, South Korean churches, he insisted, “should be 
responsible for critically and practically analysing the history of Korea and Korean 
Christianity and acknowledge their responsibility to restore their holistic social ethics 
for Korean society”.43 From this perspective, he criticised indigenous South Korean 
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theology for failing to overcome the barrier of a literalistic interpretation of the Bible 
and for favouring church growth rather than social justice. Yoo insisted that South 
Korean Christian theology has not appropriately presented practical solutions to the 
socio-political issues of South Korea. Similarly, the Minjung theology of South 
Korea could not overcome the terminological boundaries of minjung or theologically 
embrace the non-minjung class of South Korea. Moreover, the majority of South 
Korean churches have had a tendency to favour personal salvation and holiness and 
to withhold from public responsibility. South Korean churches have not developed a 
theology for social ethics; they have instead tended to adopt traditional Confucian 
ethics in churches and generated ethical issues such as “sexual discrimination, 
hierarchical church governance, hypocrisy, excessive emphasis on patriotism and 
veneration for old people”.44 As a result, they have been unable to move beyond a 
missiological approach toward the North Korean population and build a more 
practical and appropriate theology. 
Yoo emphasised realistic approaches toward the unification of Korea and 
issues regarding power dynamics in particular. He argued:  
Even if the civil societies allied for peace, their influence would be closely 
related to power issues on the global stage, as well as the power of civil 
societies. Just authorities practice just power. Therefore, the peace would be 
improved by just global authorities sustained by moral states, which would 
be legitimised by their citizens. Therefore, citizens are expected to have 
political sensitivity.45 
He insisted that unification and peace in the Korean peninsula realistically depend 
upon the power dynamics between countries that have an influence on Korean issues, 
such as the US, Japan, Russia, China and the Koreas, as well as their diplomatic 
sensitivity. However, the citizens of these countries have the right to select or protest 
against their authorities, as well as to require their political leaders to make just and 
moral decisions; therefore, these citizens are expected to have the ability to discern 
who should be their leaders. Citizens are conscious of political and social issues and 
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have the ability to organise their power to transform their society through legitimate 
civil rights.  
Therefore, Yoo suggested that the simin,46 rather than the minjung, would be 
able to achieve unification for a state that would improve human rights, freedom and 
democracy more than the divided Korea. To energise these democratic discourses 
and movements among Korean people and lead a unification of the people of two 
countries, rather than a political unification, Yoo insisted that the people of both 
countries need to organise their influence over the state. This, he argued, is the power 
and role of the Korean simin.47 He continued, “[T]he civil societies can be an 
outstanding facilitator in the peaceful unification of Korea and achievement of 
grassroots peace in the world…”.48 This global network of citizens in various 
countries would be the best solution to addressing the limited role of the UN and 
diplomatic confrontations between countries at various stages. He defined the action 
of civil society as “civil peace movements”,49 which would be an alternative to the 
diplomatic and political engagement of states that has caused regional and global 
tension.  
The unification of Korea, Yoo insisted, should focus on the restoration of 
true humanity and human rights by establishing a commonwealth for desperate 
people through the loving relationship of the inter-trinitarian life of God. This means 
the unified Korea should be a commonwealth active in achieving mutual respect 
between individuals and ethnic and cultural groups and mutual reliance through the 
political engagement of citizens.50 Regarding the postponement of unification 
discourse in South Korea, Yoo has insisted that it would be too late to start building 
such a commonwealth after the unification of Korea. Hence, South Koreans, 
especially South Korean Christians, should act as seeds for the commonwealth of 
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“life and love” for the unification of Korea and they should develop a culture “where 
people respect life and freedom in the public sphere of Korea”.51 As stated above, 
building a commonwealth of “life and love” should take place prior to the unification 
of Korea, and South Korean Christians should work towards this task as citizens of 
South Korea and yearn for the realisation of this commonwealth in North Korea as 
well.  
 
6.3. Christian Anti-nuclear Discourse – Chang Yoon-Jae and Noh Jong-
Sun 
During the Cold War era, when the US army brought nuclear weapons to 
South Korea for potential use against the USSR, China and North Korea, social 
activists in South Korea argued that the nuclear weapons of the US would threaten 
peace in northeast Asia and insisted that they should be withdrawn from the Korean 
peninsula. At that time, they were only concerned about the nuclear weapons of the 
USSR and the US and their activities resulted in the withdrawal of US nuclear 
weapons from South Korea; the South Korean Government, in 1992, proclaimed that 
they would never obtain nuclear weapons. The South Korean Government also 
suggested that the North Korean Government should join in this policy.52 In spite of 
the proclamation of the South Korean Government and the joint denuclearisation 
declaration of the two Koreas in the same year, however, the North Korean 
Government restarted nuclear weapons testing in 1994.  
With the development of the North Korean nuclear weapons programme and 
military tension between the countries in northeast Asia and the US, some 
theologians began to speak out about the nuclear issues in Korea. Lee Man-Yeol 
posited that nuclear issues in the Korean peninsula were not rooted in the national 
policy of North Korea to occupy the South and make the peninsula a communist 
state; rather, the nuclear issues were the result of the policy of countries that already 
                                               
51 Ibid., p. 299. 
52 “The North Korean Assembly Approved the Denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula”, Hankyorae 
6 February, 1992. 
 
 182 
possessed nuclear weapons, such as the US, China and Russia, which prevents other 
countries from developing nuclear weapons. Lee insisted:  
I am offended by the nuclear weapons in North Korea simply because they 
are nuclear weapons, not because the weapons are possessed by North 
Korean communists. Likewise, I do not agree that South Korea needs to 
possess nuclear weapons against North Korea. For the same reason, I would 
argue that the US, the UK, Russia and China should abandon their nuclear 
weapons. Nuclear weapons will cause the extinction of human beings and 
nature on Earth.53 
Similarly, some liberal theologians have appealed for nuclear weapons to be 
removed from the Korean peninsula and the world in order to achieve peace. Their 
recent arguments can be summarised as calling for the imminent abolition of nuclear 
weapons and nuclear plants throughout the world, especially in South Korea, where 
nuclear plants are located within highly populated areas. Chang Yoon-Jae, a 
Professor of Christian Ethics at Ewha Women’s University in Seoul, is regarded as 
the leading theologian speaking about the Christian perspective on nuclear issues in 
Korea through a Christian theology of peace and ecology. He studied at Union 
Theological Seminary in New York City and wrote his doctoral dissertation about 
late 20th century Christian theologies regarding the issues of capitalism, socialism 
and ecology in 2003. He studied the liberation theology of South America, which, he 
argued, is still relevant in the post-modern world in which neoliberal capitalism is 
rife: “[the] theology of liberation [liberation theology] is now more urgent than ever, 
as the so-called ‘triumphant capitalism’ aggravates poverty, oppression, and 
suffering around the globe”.54  
Having argued for the importance of liberation theology in recent years, 
Chang emphasises a meaning of “liberation” that refers to the story of exodus in the 
Old Testament. After his studies in the US, he continuously researched peace and 
nuclear and ecological issues in South Korea, and suggested there should be three 
kinds of exodus for South Koreans: an exodus from pseudo-peace towards a new 
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peace; an exodus from a world threatened by nuclear weapons and plants to a world 
of new light; and an exodus from a world of destruction to a new Earth. He argued: 
The Cold War continues in the Korean peninsula with a risk of a war which 
would cause over one million causalities within a day, and six million in a 
week… We have lived in a state of pseudo peace…we have to join in an 
exodus from the status of suspended war toward an eternal peace… 
Secondly, we have to depart from the threats of nuclear plants and 
weapons… Once we consider nuclear weapons a problem, we should also 
avoid nuclear power plants. They cannot coexist with Christian faith… 
Thirdly, we are facing the challenges of climate change caused by 
“carbonate civilisation”… Churches should try to find answers to how 
human beings can coexist with each other and even with other creatures on 
this Earth… The civilisations built on carbonate energy and nuclear energy 
will continue to destroy nature with human greed. They are not to be 
justified!55  
Chang’s criticism continues in his article evaluating the preliminary conference for 
the WCC assembly in Pusan in 2014. In this, he posits that even though the 
Ecumenical Call to Just Peace was proposed by the participants to balance justice 
and peace in order to overcome the traditional just war theologies of Christian 
churches, it did not clearly embed criticism of the sins of the global powers and their 
neoliberalism, which have exploited the weak in the world. Moreover, the document 
did not include a relevant theology for human flourishing in the era of “climate 
collapse”. Although the WCC opposes nuclear weapons, they acknowledge the need 
for nuclear plants as a peaceful use of new technology. However, Chang is certain 
that nuclear energy and weapons cannot coexist with the Christian faith56 because 
they are the fruits of human greed and the selfishness of global powers.  
Chang argued that fraudulent pacifism deceives people in the post-modern 
world, where global capitalism and liberalism are overwhelming. Even though there 
are no global wars and people call this peace, it is not peace according to biblical 
teachings. Shalom in the Bible means an active peace based on God’s justice, where 
the weak, such as widows and orphans, are preferentially provided with care. Shalom 
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ensures “social integrity where all individuals feel happy”.57 Christians are 
responsible for implementing God’s justice in the world, even when such movements 
include protests against the global system or powers that create a “peace” through 
oppressing the cries of the poor. 
Jesus calls us to the fight for realising peace in this world. He calls us to be 
trouble makers in the place where fraudulent peace dominates and 
encourages us to engage good fights for making peace… It is a fight for the 
peace of shalom: the just peace based on economic justice.58  
Similarly, the peace and unification of Korea should be based first on economic 
justice for all Koreans, as we can learn from the case of the unification of Germany. 
The German people who lived in what was East Germany during the Cold War era 
arguably still suffer from economic inequity compared to people in the former West 
Germany. This example, therefore, is a fraudulent peace and unification that benefits 
only a small population who have significant control of the world economy. The 
unification of Korea, however, should be achieved for the peace of the world. It is 
thus necessary for Christians in the world to work together through “international 
alliance and ecumenical cooperation, and even discuss and work together with 
people of different religions”.59 
Like Chang Yoon-Jae, Noh Jong-Sun, a former Christian Ethics professor at 
Yonsei University, directly addressed the nuclear issues relating to the Korean 
peninsula, arguing that the problem of nuclear weapons should be solved sooner than 
any other issues in the peninsula:  
Nuclear issues are not more important than the issues related to the 
minjung’s life and the economy of North and South Korea. The daily lives of 
the Korean population of both Koreas are more important than nuclear 
weapon[s]... Hence, we should be cautious even about the possibility that 
nuclear problems might result in a war and destruction of Korean society…60  
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He insisted that the security of the people in both Koreas is far more important than 
having nuclear weapons in the peninsula. Hence, the governments of both Koreas 
and of the US should seriously consider the security of the common population of 
both Koreas rather than overemphasising nuclear issues of North Korea. First of all, 
South Koreans should acknowledge that North and South Koreans share the same 
destiny and therefore South Koreans should embrace North Koreans, even though the 
North Korean regime is continuing its nuclear tests and developing missile 
technology, and they should search for a way to unify the North and South Korean 
economies.61 The US should also sign a peace treaty with North Korea, develop a 
diplomatic relationship with the North Korean regime and then move towards the 
withdrawal of all kinds of nuclear weapons from the Korean peninsula and the wider 
world.62   
However, Noh does not agree with Chang in the sense that he believes that 
nuclear energy can be used for peace in the Korean peninsula. His doctoral 
dissertation was about the Donghak Peasant Revolution against Japanese 
colonisation in the late 19th century and he maintains that the violence against unjust 
and “unbearable oppression both by the ruling class and the colonial powers”63 is 
acknowledged in the Bible, especially Joel 3:10, which states, “Beat your 
ploughshares into swords and your pruning hooks into spears. Let the weakling say, 
‘I am strong!’”.64 According to Noh’s understanding of just revolution against an 
unjust ruling class and colonial power in the current situation of the Korean 
peninsula, the South Korean and North Korean people are not enemies, and they 
should instead achieve a peaceful economic commonwealth against two unjust 
colonial powers: America, which through various military-industrial complexes 
profits from the military tensions between the two Koreas; and Japan, which is trying 
to expand its influence over the Korean peninsula with a resurgence of Japanese 
patriotism. In relation to nuclear energy, the security and peace of the country can be 
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maintained through energy security, as well as military security, particularly against 
Japan, which has sufficient plutonium stored for nuclear weapons and missile 
technology. Therefore, according to Noh, for practical purposes, rather than 
abolishing all nuclear energy plants in South Korea, South Koreans should find a 
peaceful way to use nuclear energy against the potential colonial power, Japan,65 and 
the unification of Korea should be realised by peaceful processes through the 




As described above, the recent unification discourse emphasises the roles of 
citizens and the subjectivity of socio-political changes in national as well as global 
realms. Against the authoritarian government, which propagated a state-centred 
national identity among the South Korean population against the North Korean 
regime, the jaeya people tried to discover the subjectivity of minjung and minjok who 
were able to bring about changes in the social and political system of South Korea, as 
well as the continued division of the Korean peninsula where harsh confrontations 
between the two Koreas continue. Liberal Christians of South Korea developed 
minjung theology and maintained that God’s justice requires peace (shalom) for 
minjung, and that the unification of Korea should build momentum to ensure 
minjung’s prosperity in the Korean peninsula. However, after the June 
Democratisation Protest, scholars of politics and sociology advocated the possibility 
of the simin exercising their own agency in South Korean political and social realms. 
As a result, many NGOs were founded in the early 1990s for direct engagement in 
social and political issues, as well as unification movements. Christian groups in turn 
searched for ways to illuminate the public role of Christian citizens in South Korea 
regardless of their theological background. Yoo argued that Christian citizens in 
Korea and the countries relating to the division of Korea, China, Russia, Japan and 
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the US, should engage practically and politically in the unification discourse by 
influencing authorities to ameliorate the harsh confrontations of the Korean 
peninsula and bring peace to the land. However, it is still uncertain how the Christian 
citizens of these countries could persuade the common citizens to pursue peace in the 
peninsula for reasons other than the national interest of their home countries. 
Moreover, the potential for North Korean people to become subjective citizens who 
ally and work with South Korean citizens and citizens of the wider world must be 
doubted.  
As the military tensions in the Korean peninsula have become aggravated and 
North Korea has developed its nuclear weapons, the conventional unification 
discourse has been eroded and a discourse that focuses on achieving peace in the 
peninsula is now replacing the unification discourse in South Korea. Hence, it is 
generally recognised that the traditional unification discourse is now in decline. 
Scholars have been losing interest in the unification of Korea, and therefore it is now 
difficult to find a relevant and effective unification theology among South Korean 
theologians. Scholars have argued that peace in the peninsula, as well as in 
northeastern Asia, is the most important and urgent factor, and Christian citizens are 
required to work for peace in the peninsula and the world using practical methods 
such as political engagement. While Yoo Kyung-Dong emphasised Christian 
citizens’ role in the peace and unification of Korea, Chang and Noh asserted that all 
nuclear weapons should be withdrawn from the peninsula and the world. From an 
ecological perspective, Chang argued that the division of Korea was due to the greed 
of human beings and it now runs alongside a critical risk of the destruction of human 
beings and nature. Chang further criticised global capitalism and neoliberalism for 
creating economic injustice and fraudulent peace. He pointed out that unification and 
peace should be based on God’s justice, which preferentially takes care of the poor in 
the world. Agreeing with Chang, Noh argued that nuclear weapons should be 
abolished throughout the world, but also asserted that nuclear energy and plants 
should be maintained for the security of the Korean people against the potential 
expansion of Japan. Chang and Noh strongly criticised global capitalism and 
neoliberalism, which they insisted were manipulating North and South Koreans. It 
could be presupposed that they preferred a socialist system to capitalism. However, it 
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is debatable how they would persuade South Korean commoners of this as they still 
believe socialism is equivalent to communism.  
Searching for a middle way between the strong discourse of missions to 
North Korea that neglect the North Korean regime and religion and humanitarian aid 
for North Korean population, NGOs are regarded as surrogates for humanitarian aid 
for the North Korean population. To broaden the unification discourse to reach the 
laity, theologians and church leaders have combined holistic mission and unification 
issues, arguing that Christians, as citizens of South Korean society, should promote 
peace and reconciliation in the daily context and that local churches can work with 
NGOs for the common good, including the peace and reconciliation of Korea. The 
bottom-up unification and peace discourse of South Korean churches has evolved 
with the development of civil society in South Korea. It suggests that Christians, 
especially the population who migrated from Northern Korea before and after the 
Korean War, are prepared to work for the unification of Korea in their local 
community, softening their militant hatred against North Korean communists.  
Due to the noticeable differences between the North and South Korean 
population, South Koreans have become sceptical about pursuing unification through 
establishing a single nation-state in the Korean peninsula. The unification discourses 
that emphasise peace and diversity among the two Korean populations therefore 
suggest that the unification of Korea should be put aside until these differences are 
overcome and the two countries can achieve economic and political development; 
this is a realistic approach toward unification given the current situation of the 
Korean peninsula. However, it is debatable whether these approaches toward 
unification can sustain the necessity of unification. They depend upon the 
supposition that the development of the two countries and an acknowledgment and 
overcoming of the differences in the Korean population are likely to eventually lead 







Memory, Justice and Reconciliation in the Divided Land 
 
The church discourses about the peace, reconciliation and unification of 
Korea have emphasised, first, who is responsible for the division of Korea and the 
Korean War; second, who would arguably be able to lead these discourses and 
movement in South Korea; and third how to achieve the peace and unification of 
Korea through either political socio-political methods or evangelical approaches. 
However, I have argued that these theological approaches by South Korean 
Protestant churches have not provided an effectual theological basis for changing the 
landscape of South Korean society in the 21st century. As has been suggested, the 
conservative camp in the South Korean churches still strongly uphold anti-
communism and they argue that the North Korean communist regime will collapse as 
a result of the evangelisation of North Korea. However, the unification they seek is 
territorial and political assimilation, rather than a unification of the populations of the 
two Koreas, and a unification that is achieved by defeating the North Korean 
communist regime, for which conservatives yearn, might cause conflict and even 
terrorism in the peninsula since the core population of North Korea are also hostile to 
South Korea.  
For the above reasons, many liberal theologians, especially those representing 
NCCK, have been pursuing peace and reconciliation for the two Koreas, as stated in 
the 88 Declaration. However, as assessed in chapter 2, their unification movement 
has raised a question relating to justice and ideological issues in South Korea, mostly 
with regard to the evangelical sector of the South Korean churches. The problem is 
that anti-communism, strengthened and propagated by authoritarian governments 
after the division, and implicitly reinstated by conservative governments in the 21st 
century, was grounded on the fabrication and manipulation of people’s memory in 
the Cold War era and developed into anti-North Korean sentiment in the 21st century. 
South Korean anti-communism has also caused a fabricated identity of the South 
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Korean people to be developed, as well as a fabricated Christian identity of South 
Korean churches.  
Based on the above, any endeavour to search for truthful memory and 
reconciliation can be considered a Christian duty and it must be preliminary to the 
peace and unification of Korea. Ironically, unification discourse has also primarily 
come to be an internal rather than an inter-relational issue with North Korea. Here, I 
will argue that reconciliation is a process that would lead to unification by 
establishing a more truthful memory for South Koreans, who have been manipulated 
by an authoritarian government to express anti-communism and anti-North Korean 
sentiment. The people who lived through the Korean War and the harsh militant 
confrontation of the two Koreas were victims as well as victimisers of North Koreans 
during the Korean War and their South Korean neighbours under authoritarian 
governments. The churches have failed to protect them from the traumatic memory 
of horrible violation, and from becoming transgressors who yearned for retributive 
justice against North Korean communists, both during the Korean War and under the 
authoritarian governments in South Korea.   
This chapter will first outline the manipulation of memory and its influence 
on the unification of Korea, and it will then explain how reconciliation would 
proceed in South Korea, from a Christian perspective, to create grounds for the 
unification of Korea by focusing on the theological approach of Miroslav Volf.  
 
7.1. Memories of the Korean War and the Division of the Korean 
Peninsula 
 
I was in a taxi on my way to church in Seoul in September 2016 when the 
taxi driver, who was about 60 years old, shouted when he heard the news of the 
nuclear test by North Korea: “The evil North Korean scumbags should be eliminated 
and the regime brought down! Why don’t the US and South Korean armies strike the 
North Korean nuclear facilities? The North Korean communists never change!” As I 
sat in the passenger seat, many questions arose in my mind: why did he define North 
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Koreans as evil; did he fight against North Korean soldiers during the Korean War? 
Impossible. He appeared to be in his early 60s and so the Korean War began either 
when he was a baby or before he was even born. So how did he come to hate North 
Koreans? His idea of the North Korean people and their regime could not be based 
on personal experience as he was not supposed to meet North Koreans due to the 
National Security Law of South Korea. Instead, this image will have mostly 
developed from education and mass media, which has been controlled by the South 
Korean government for many years. Unsurprisingly, his negative and hostile attitude 
toward North Korea is common among the older generations of South Korea, who 
still believe that anti-communism is the national ideology of South Korea and the 
essence of South Korean identity.  
 
7. 1. 1. Anti-communism: Manipulating the Memory of the South Korean 
People 
 
Anti-communism was used as a measure to define the true identity of South 
Korean people in the political realm, beginning with the establishment of the South 
Korean government in 1948. The authoritarian government divided South Koreans 
into “pure kukmin” and “impure kukmin” for the purpose of oppressing people who 
opposed the political right and the Korean War; this justified the government 
propaganda that communists were betrayers of the nation of Korea and could not be 
legitimate members of the state of South Korea.1 As stated in chapter 1, the state 
propaganda about anti-communism was rife in South Korea after the division of the 
peninsula, and it became a tool by which to manipulate the memory of the South 
Korean population. For instance, families of the victims and the surviving victims of 
the genocide during the Korean War, especially those who were killed by the South 
Korean army, police and armed gangsters who worked for the South Korean rightists 
                                               




and even by the US troops, tried to overcome their trauma by “forgetting the 
memories” of the genocide. As Noh Young-Seok has argued: 
The families of the victims of genocide performed by the armies and police of 
their mother country tried to survive by standing on the side of the state of the 
South Korean regime who killed their family… Because anti-communism 
dominated the country and it was impossible to resist the ideology or escape 
from it, the survivors of the genocide and their families, as well as the 
families of the killed, erased the traumatic memory and adjusted their 
understanding to accept the official ideology and memory of their state. Even 
worse, they tried to believe and officially testified that their fathers and sons 
were killed by North Korean armies…2 
Thus, the survivors and families of the genocide carried out by the South Korean 
army and police during the Korean War struggled to “purify their identity” by 
fiercely fighting against North Korean armies for the remainder of the war and 
working for South Korean authoritarian governments after the war ended.3  
After the Korean War, the authoritarian government in South Korea began to 
closely monitor the mass media.  They kept social activists and even college students 
under strong and constant surveillance in order to find the Bbal-gaeng-i (a Korean 
term used to disparage communists). Even in the 21st century, the governments of 
Lee Myeong-Bak and Park Geun-Hye attempted to divide South Koreans into “pure 
kukmin” and “impure kukmin”, undertaking surveillance of social activists who 
worked against the government and attacking liberal politicians from rival parties 
through online posting activities and social media. For instance, the ROK Cyber 
Command and National Intelligence Service operated special teams with a focus on 
posting negative comments and fake news about liberal politicians during the general 
elections of 2012 and 2016, as well as the presidential election of 2012.4 
                                               
2 Yong-Seok Noh, “Study of the Mechanism of Local Population's Recognition of State and Its Power 
Focusing on Genocides” (Youngnam University, 2005), p. 196, cited in Dong-Choon Kim, “War and 
Violence of State and the Social Trauma of South Korea,” in A Historiography of Social Trauma of 
South Korea: From the Korean War to the Lobourers' Uprising in Ssang-Yong Motor Company, ed. 
Dong-Choon Kim and Myung-Hee Kim (Seoul: Critical Review of History, 2014), p. 39.  
3 Ibid.; Jung-Gi Choi, “The Civilian’s Suffering in the Period of Korean War and the Demarcation 
between Citizen and Non-Citizen: In Regard to the Survey Report About Regional Civilian Victims in 
the Period of Korean War,” Journal of Modern Social Science 14 (2010), p. 94. 
4 According to an official report by the ROK Department of Defence to the president’s office before 
the general election in 2012, they claimed they would prevent the influence of Jongbuk and 
contamination of “pure citizens” by liberals through social media and online media, and they would 
publish positive comments and news about the ruling party and the government, comprising more than 
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Conservative governments and their supporters, who are mostly over 50, are still 
prone to considering political liberals equivalent to North Korean communists who 
will harm the national identity because they resist conservative governments and are 
pursuing dialogue with the North Korean regime.  
As the authoritarian government promoted anti-communism, this state 
propaganda became rife in various areas of South Korean society. Lee Ha-Na, a HK 
research fellow at the Institute of Korean Studies of Yonsei University, has argued 
that the governmental propaganda of anti-communism presented communism as an 
evil that threatened humanity, capitalism, democracy, economic growth and the 
unification of Korea. She has pointed out, for instance, that 1950s and 1960s films 
related to the Korea War and ideological conflicts between communism and 
capitalism mostly portray North Korean communists as inhumane “bastards”.  
A North Korean sergeant in the film, Unidentified Warriors (1966), tortures 
and kills his father. Moreover, in a movie entitled The Third Area (1968), a 
young North Korean immigrant who works for the Association of North 
Korean Immigrants in Japan denied his mother and tortured her for his own 
safety… Both films were exemplary anti-communist movies and were 
successful in South Korea.5  
In a society like Korea, which has a strong sense of family bonds, Lee has argued 
that such films highlight the hatred of North Koreans.6  
In addition to anti-communist discourse in politics and mass media, the 
government in South Korea also put in place and enacted an anti-communist 
education programme, through which they manipulated the history of South Korea 
and instilled anti-communism in the minds of students. This educational programme 
of anti-communism was officially initiated with the establishment of the South 
Korean government in 1948.  From 1955 Rhee’s government intensified the 
educational programme through the Department of Culture and Education, which 
supervised education, athletics and all realms of culture, such as arts and music. 
                                               
60% of their total comments on social media and online news websites. Soo-Hyung Kim, “Official 
Documents Released, “Kim Gwan-Jin Led Cyber Command to Interupt the General Election”,” MBN 
28 December, 2017. 
5 Lee, “Anti-Communist Discourse and Politics of Affect”. p. 212. 
6 Ibid., p. 212.  
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Anti-communist textbooks were widely used in classrooms and anti-communism was 
the main subject of ethics classes.7 Through this anti-communist education, young 
students in South Korea came to develop a hostile and negative view of North 
Koreans. One church member of Youngnak Church explained how he was educated 
in anti-communism during the years of the military regime in South Korea: 
For me, nothing but evil existed in North Korea. While I was at primary 
school, disastrous scenes of North Korea were painted. Those made the 
strongest impression on my mind. North Koreans were embedded in my 
perception as monsters and I believed that human qualities did not exist in the 
Communist Party.8 
The South Korean government officially instructed public schools to show films and 
documentaries in order to educate school children about the “brutality” of North 
Korean communists. Likewise, when I was in primary school in the mid-1980s, the 
school frequently showed the students anti-communist films about the Korean War 
and the civil war between communist armies led by Mao Zedong’s Chinese 
Communist Party and the armies of Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang. I was struck by 
the bloody scenes and the brutality of the communist armies, who were shown to kill 
Korean and Chinese civilians indiscriminately, even those who were completely 
unrelated to either army.  
The authoritarian governments also taught the dangers of anti-governmental 
demonstrations led by students at South Korean universities and colleges. The 
authoritarian governments indicated that such movements would be beneficial to 
North Korean communists, who would invade the South and communise the entire 
peninsula. One example of the anti-communist media sources used in primary 
schools was the death of Lee Seung-Bok, a child who was killed along with his 
family by a North Korean special forces team that had infiltrated the South on special 
duties. In a film re-enactment, the soldiers brutally kill Lee’s mother and siblings, 
and then the small child screams, “I hate communists!” before he is stoned to death 
by the soldiers. The only established fact is that Lee and his family were killed by 
                                               
7 Gun Cho, “The Organisation of Ministry of Culture and Education and Anti-Communist Policy in 
the Era of Establishing the First Curriculum,” History and Education 22 (2016), p. 179. 
8 Chung Yoube Ha, “Migration Old and New : Accepting Diversity in Creating a Catholic Community 
in Youngnak Presbyterian Church” (PhD, University of Edinburgh, 2009), p. 81. 
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North Korean soldiers; the details of the story are arguably invented.9 However, the 
story was propagated by the media under the instruction of the government and it 
was reproduced in various formats such as books, cartoons, television documentaries 
and even films.  
As human memory is reconstructed by each rememberer, who will include 
his or her emotions, as well as those of other members of society, and because anti-
communism has been broadly developed within the emotional realm of the South 
Korean people,10 it can be argued that the anti-communism instilled by the 
authoritarian government of South Korea has been manipulating the memory of the 
people, especially relating to their identity and that of the neighbouring North 
Koreans. The issue of negative emotions and attitudes toward North Korea has 
recently arisen among the younger generation who, with the end of authoritarian 
governments, were not taught anti-communism at school. For the last ten years, there 
have been various issues with North Korea: nuclear issues, the ICBM programme 
and several attacks on South Korean soldiers and civilians, such as the Yeon-Pyeong 
incident. Furthermore, the governments of Lee Myung-Bak and Park Geun-Hye 
intensified people’s hatred for North Korea by defining the North Korean regime as a 
“primal enemy of South Korea” (Ju-jeok), and mass media exaggerated the conflict 
between the two Koreas. Exposed to mass media and cared for by an older 
generation who were educated in anti-communism, the younger generations of South 
Korea now regard North Korea as an “annoying” neighbour state rather than a state 
of the same ethnic identity as South Korea,11 one with which they could unify, as the 
table below indicates. 
 
                                               
9 The incident was first reported by the Chosun Newspaper; the reporter wrote that Lee said, “I hate 
communists” before he was killed by North Korean soldiers. Jong-Dae Kim, “The Epilogue of the 
Coverage of Kim Jong-Dae, a Reporter of Media Today: There Was Not Chosun Newspaper Reporter 
at the House of Lee Seung-Bok on 10 December, 1968,” MAL, November 1998, 
10 Lee, “Anti-Communist Discourse and Politics of Affect”. p. 234.  
11 The most recent national survey reported that only 20% of respondents in their 20s answered that 
North and South Koreans are one nation, while 47.2% answered negatively. Ju-Hwa Park, Min-Kyu 
Lee and Won-Bin Cho, 2017 the National Survey of the Opinions of South Korean People Regarding 
Unification of Korea. Research Paper of Korea Institute of National Unification. Edited by Ki-Woong 





7. 1. 2. Manipulation of the Memory of North Korean Defectors  
 
As memory is related to identity and legitimacy to live in a community, North 
Korean defectors are prone to manipulating their memory of what they experienced 
in North Korea when they first encounter anti-communism as a “consensus on the 
identity of South Korean citizens”12 and anti-North Korean sentiment among the 
South Korean population. The research of Lee Hyeon-Ju into the internal and 
external conflicts faced by North Korean defectors in South Korea highlights the 
anti-communist sentiment of South Koreans toward North Korean defectors. On 
interviewing South Korean workers at facilities engaging with North Korean 
defectors, Lee discovered that all the interviewees were influenced by their anti-
communist education and this continues to have a significant impact on their 
personal relationships with North Korean defectors. For example, she related an 
interview with a South Korean counsellor at Hanawon, a governmental facility 
helping North Korean defectors settle in South Korea:  
Although she spent the most time and proximity with talbukja (referring to 
North Korean defectors) out of all the interviewees, she showed the strongest 
resistance to considering talbukja her friends and colleagues. She related in 
an interview that she was also educated in anti-communist rhetoric, and the 
aversive behaviour to North Korean identity seemed to have been intensified 
during the time she spent as a counsellor at Hanawon.13 
                                               
12 Hyeon-Ju Lee, “May I Call You North Korean? Negotiating Differences and Imagining the Nation 
in South Korea,” (PhD, University of Hawaii, 2012). p. 70.  
13 Ibid., pp. 65-66. 
Ages 
Affirmative to Same 
Ethnicity of Two 
Koreas (%) 
Neutral (%) Negative (%) 
19-29 20.5 32.4 47.2 
30-39 25.1 30.7 44.1 
40-49 29.8 35.1 35.1 
50-59 36.2 34.7 29.1 
Over 60 47.3 26.1 26.6 
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The prejudice of South Koreans toward North Koreans is intensified by the mass 
media, which portray North Korea negatively and depict North Korean defectors as 
desperate and helpless. Yoon Hwan-Cheol, the director of the Future Foundation of 
Korea, has said that North Korean students who have escaped the North will not talk 
about their home in North Korea. It seems that they try to forget the good memories 
they have of their time in North Korea because if anyone says good things about the 
North, he or she will be presumed to favour North Korea and be accused of being 
Jongbuk (a collaborator with the North Korean communist regime). Yoon has 
explained that North Korean defector students try to portray North Korea as 
negatively as possible and to condemn the North Korean communist party.14 When I 
worked for Youngnak Church, which has a fellowship of North Korean defectors, I 
met some of them; I felt that they were unwilling to talk about North Korea and 
portrayed their home in the North very negatively. South Koreans want them to 
testify that North Korea is a kind of hell where human beings cannot enjoy basic 
rights or even survive.15 Even though these people escaped from North Korea 
seeking freedom and human rights in South Korea, they may still be nostalgic for 
their hometown where their families continue to live, and they may indeed hope that 
one day they will return to their hometown to live with their families. However, 
South Koreans do not understand such nostalgia. The North Korean defectors that 
Lee interviewed insisted that South Koreans do not know or do not want to know that 
North Korea is “a place where people live everyday lives just like in South Korea”.16 
Rather than urging North Korean defectors to assimilate to South Korean culture by 
manipulating or forgetting their memories of their homes in North Korea, Lee argued 
that South Koreans need to be educated about the “North Korean culture and society” 
                                               
14 Yoon, “Unification and North Korean Defectors.” 
15 In South Korea, it can be risky to positively represent the North or even insist that the North is 
suitable for living. In 2014, Shin Eun-Mi, a Korean-American freelance writer who published a book 
about her travels in North Korea, was deported by the South Korean government because she 
presented an interview with a North Korean who said that they were happy with Kim Jung-Eun’s 
governance at a free discussion event. The prosecutors’ office claimed that she violated the national 
security law, which prohibits exaltation of the North Korean regime. Jung-Yun Kim, “Coverage Note: 
Should Shin Eun-Mi Be Deported from South Korea?,” Seoul Broadcasting System (SBS), 
http://news.sbs.co.kr/news/endPage.do?news_id=N1002776369&plink=ORI&cooper=NAVER. 
16 Lee, “May I Call You North Korean? Negotiating Differences and Imagining the Nation in South 
Korea.”, p. 178. 
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by North Korean defectors in order to achieve the common goal of the unification of 
Korea.17 
Encountering the negative sentiment toward North Koreans and the 
segregating attitude of South Koreans toward North Korean defectors, some North 
Korean defectors also conform to the hostile attitude toward North Korea and anti-
communism of South Korea by manipulating their memory of the North. They 
become passionate advocates of anti-communism and anti-North Korean sentiment. 
Many actively engage in political activities for the conservative government and 
criticise citizens who protest against the conservative government’s policies on social 
issues.18 Some North Korean defectors manipulate their personal history so as to 
intensify the anti-North Korean sentiment of South Koreans and people around the 
world. For instance, Shin Dong-Hyuk escaped a North Korean prison camp in 2005; 
his dramatic story was told in a book, Escape from Camp 14,19 published in 2012. 
However, he recently admitted that his central life stories in the book were untrue. 
He fabricated the stories in order to dramatise his escape from North Korea and to 
trigger human rights movements against the North Korean regime.20 When 
challenged by difficulties settling into South Korean society and tested in order to 
identify their nation-state identity, some North Korean defectors choose to become 
warriors for anti-communism and to collaborate with the conservative government 
and NGOs against South Korean liberals who seek peace and reconciliation with the 
North Korean regime.  
                                               
17 Ibid., p. 178. 
18 For instance, the Companion of North Korean Female Defectors participated in demonstrations and 
condemned the families of the victims of the Sewol incident who had criticised the government for 
failing to engage in appropriate rescue activities, which resulted in over 300 casualties. The female 
defectors argued that the families were Jongbuk and that their “anti-state” demonstrations would 
benefit the North Korean regime. Woo-Hyun Sun, “North Korean Defectors as Another Source of 
(South-North and) South-South Conflicts: In Connection with Political Technological Views 
Regarding North Korean Defectors as Objects of Political Manipulation,” Studies in Philosophy East-
West 78, no. September (2015), p. 30. 
19  Blaine Harden, Escape from Camp 14: One Man’s Remarkable Odyssey from North Korea to 
Freedom in the West (Penguin Books: New York, 2012). 
20 Sang-Hun Chae, “Prominent North Korean Defector Recants Parts of His Story of Captivity,” The 






7. 2. Truthful Memory and Justice in the Korean Peninsula 
 
As explained in chapter 1 and the above section, human memory is 
constructed based on the circumstances and even the emotions of the rememberers 
and their collective memory, leading to a strong possibility that it doesn’t so much 
reflect the truth as the political influence of the community. Hence, the question of 
just remembrance becomes important to collective and even personal memory. 
Miroslav Volf has argued that memory should be faithful so that it can lead to 
reconciliation and forgiveness, while Ricœur has insisted that memory should 
emphasise the voices of victims in order to bring justice to a community. Yoo 
Kyung-Dong has focused on the importance of “a just social structure with which the 
members can correct false memory and share the memory equally”,21 which will take 
place when civilians support just governments to seek the truth hidden in the past 
that is protecting some privileged groups of people, including the authoritarian 
regimes. Therefore, remembering is not only a matter of cognitive activity, but also 
of the just behaviour of individuals and the community to which they belong. Hence, 
our memory of wrongs leads us to possible behaviours for justice: retributive justice 
which aims to punish our trespassers and restorative justice to search for new 
relationship with our trespassers. If we have a confidence that the latter is in 
accordance with Christian imperatives, we should ask why and how we can reach 
restorative justice through reframing our memories.  
 Volf has argued that our journey to eternal rejoicing with God and even our 
transgressors will begin with “remembering trustworthily”. In his book, End of 
Memory,22 he presented a theological approach to memory, in particular the memory 
of wrongs, by referring to his personal experience in the former Yugoslavian army 
where he was persecuted. He noted that we are obliged to truthfully remember in 
                                               
21 Kyoung-Dong Yoo, “Collective Memory and Christian Ethics,” Korean Journal of Christian 
Studies 106 (2017), p. 222. 
22 Miroslav Volf, The End of Memory : Remembering Rightly in a Violent World (Grand Rapids, 
Mich.: W.B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 2006). 
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order to forgive by God’s grace and eventually forget the memory of the wronged 
with an eschatological vision of God’s final judgement. As he articulated, we should 
all acknowledge that our memory is vulnerable and hence easily distorted, and that 
even the past can be “imagined” rather than reconstructed. In a violent world or 
society on a small scale, people are constantly attempting to remember bad 
experiences. These bad memories or traumatic memories of individuals and the state 
can lead to “ideological manipulation” and even “the distortion of reality”.23 When I 
was a child at primary school, I often sang with other schoolchildren on the 25th 
June, the anniversary of the day the Korean War broke out:  
 
Alas, how in the world can we forget the day when enemies of our state 
invaded our land? Our land was covered with our blood shed by our bare 
hands! Now, we shall take revenge on our enemies! We will chase our 
enemies to the end of the earth and exterminate them all. Glory to our nation 
and our people!  
By singing this militant song, we tried to remember the Korean War in the hope that 
such a terrible war would not break out again. In this way, the following generations 
were taught not to forget what former generations experienced because we want to 
protect our children from the repetition of war with the enemy state: North Korea. 
Since we believe that the inhumane war was instigated by North Korea and the 
genocide and economic devastation that followed the war were caused by North 
Korean communists, the memory of the war is reconstructed into various violent 
behaviours and hostile attitudes toward North Korea; these behaviours and attitudes 
were intensified and encouraged by the South Korean authoritarian governments and 
even the conservative churches to emphasise retributive justice against North 
Koreans.  
 Miroslav Volf asserts that, “There can be no forgiveness without 
remembering rightly [truthfully], and there certainly cannot be reconciliation without 
remembering well.”24 Memory in such cases is not simply a matter of a single 
                                               
23 Esteban Lythgoe, “Social Imagination, Abused Memory, and the Political Place of History in 
Memory, History, Forgetting,” Ricœur Studies 5, no. 2 (2014) p. 39. 
24 Miroslav Volf, “Remembering Well in a Violent World”. Keynote speech at The Kyung-Chik Han 
International Conference on Peace and Reconciliation, 2010, Seoul. 
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person’s clarity of mind and recollections, but also of the community and even the 
state influences on remembering – what we may call collective or national memory. 
However, as with the cases presented above, memory is distorted and abused for 
personal and communal purposes. Volf states that “…the memory of their own 
persecution…led them (the persecuted) to exaggerate dangers that do exist and 
overreact with excessive violence or inappropriate preventive measures so as to 
ensure their own safety.”25 In many cases, such exaggerations and deepened hatred 
toward the “transgressors” took place when the victims believed that the violation 
was carried out only by said “transgressors”, who were also held responsible for 
every incident during the violation. This is exemplified by the victims of the 
genocide carried out by South Korean troops and police during the Korean War, 
where the survivors tried to believe that it had actually been carried out by North 
Korean communists. Even after the Korean War, South Koreans believed that anti-
government movements during the era of the authoritarian government were led by 
North Korean communists who wanted to invade the South and unify the peninsula 
as a communist country. Even the movements to secure labourers’ rights in South 
Korea were regarded as collaborating with North Korean communists. Fake news 
about these incidents was created and distributed by the authoritarian government to 
secure their regime. Hence, our memory should be truthful because only truthful 
memory can be just and provide the grounds by which to achieve justice. As Volf 
stated, “[R]emembering is now a matter of doing something rather than simply being 
affected.”26  
Desmond Tutu has acknowledged that truthful memory could lead to 
forgiveness and reconciliation in South Africa, where the black people suffered 
apartheid. The Truth and Reconciliation Committee’s role has been to unearth 
perpetrators’ violations of human rights – not to punish them but to forgive them for 
the purpose of restorative justice.27 For Volf, truthful memory is a “redemption of the 
                                               
25 Volf, The End of Memory : Remembering Rightly in a Violent World, p. 33.  
26 Ibid., p. 68. 
27 Steven Gish, Desmond Tutu : A Biography, Greenwood Biographies (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood 
Press, 2004), p. 149. 
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past”28 through which a victim can reach healing and the perpetrator can find a way 
to repent. A truthful memory can also pave the way to reconciliation between parties 
and unity of a community. In the case of North Korea, South Koreans blame North 
Korea for what they did during the Korean War and for the militant conflict between 
the two Koreas.  
In the memory of the majority of the South Korean population, there is 
nothing good about North Korea, and this negative sentiment towards the North puts 
pressure on North Korean defectors to relinquish their nostalgia for their home. 
However, North Koreans are also victims of the wars and confrontations between the 
two Koreas. Kim Yong-Bok pointed out that approximately three million North 
Koreans were killed by US bomb attacks and they still suffer trauma from the war.29 
Applying the ninth commandment, which prohibits false witness against our 
neighbours, Volf argued, “[T]hough truthful memory is vitally important in its own 
right, remembering truthfully is part of the larger obligation to speak well of our 
neighbours and thereby to sustain and heal relationships between people.”30  
As Volf argued, remembering is not a matter for the past, but for the future; 
he noted that we should consider “what we do in our memories, how we see 
ourselves in the present and how we project ourselves into the future”.31 Referring to 
Tzvetan Todorov’s idea of the exemplary value of memory, Ricœur and Volf have 
argued that memory of a traumatic past will not continuously hurt us, but it should 
contribute to our wellbeing. Volf insists that, “[E]xemplary memory pushes us 
beyond the concern for our own well-being by helping us learn lessons from the past 
so as to apply them in new situations,”32 and Ricœur wrote that the major concern of 
exemplary memory suggested by Todorov was not seeking truth. Rather it seeks  for 
the good for future, as he explained, “…[E]xtract from traumatic memories the 
exemplary value that can become pertinent only when memory has been turned into a 
project… If the trauma refers to the past, the exemplary value is directed toward the 
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future.”33 Nonetheless, Volf and Ricœur have maintained that Todorov’s ideas are 
unable to provide frames of “justice and injustice” or “victims and victimizers” in 
this world of complexity. 
Ricœur argues that, “the duty of memory is the duty to do justice…[and it is] 
justice that turns memory into project”; he presented three points on the work of 
memory as it relates to justice: first, justice through memory is to “an other more 
than self”; second, the duty of memory is to maintain the feeling that “we are 
indebted to those who have gone before us for part of what we are”; and third, the 
“moral priority belongs to the victims”.34 During the manipulation of memory 
conducted by the South Korean government after the Korean War, the moral priority 
of war mourning and memory was aimed at commemorating the South Korean and 
UN soldiers who were killed in action during the war. The stories of “heroes” of the 
Korean War were disseminated through mass media that was printed and distributed 
in schools. In this regard, however, there might arise a question: who were the 
victims of the war? Therefore, the first step in the use of memory for justice is to 
listen and speak for the victims of the war and the division of Korea. As Ricœur 
maintained:  
To be sure, there are no longer manipulation[s] in the sense defined in terms 
of the ideological relation of the discourse of power, but in a more subtle 
manner in the sense of an appeal to conscience that proclaims itself to be 
speaking for the victim’s demand for justice.35 
Who were the victims of the war? Generally, South Koreans have long believed that 
the South Koreans were victims of the war and the North Korean communists were 
war criminals. Even South Korean Christians have insisted that churches were 
destroyed and a vast number of Christians were killed or kidnapped by the North 
Korean army during the war.  
Nonetheless, South Koreans should recognise that North Koreans were also 
victims of the Korean War. Kim Byung-Ro researched North Korean sources on the 
aftermath of the Korean War and analysed the number of war victims. He concluded 
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that 1.2 to 1.3 million North Korean people were killed or went missing during the 
Korean War, and the total number of casualties in the war constituted 13-14% of the 
total population of North Korea at that time. The ratio of war casualties to total 
population in North Korea was three times higher than in South Korea.36 Moreover, 
after the Korean War, social classification in the North was changed so as to give 
higher social status to war victims; consequently, the war victims and their families 
constituted the higher middle class of North Korean society. This means that the core 
and ruling population of North Korea have a strong hatred for South Korea and the 
US, and therefore most of them have never withdrawn support from the North 
Korean regime in spite of the devastating famine in the early 1990s.37 Therefore, the 
voices of the war victims and their families in North Korea should be considered in 
building truthful memory, justice and reconciliation. Kim has noted that:  
It is understandable that some people in South Korea want to punish the 
people who were responsible for the Korean War as war criminals. However, 
it would be very dangerous to provoke serious confrontations and conflicts 
between the two Koreas. Therefore, the issue of the responsibility for the 
Korean War should be left in the hands of future historians as we prepare for 
the reconciliation of the two Koreas.38 
In the sense that reconciliation is projected for the future, North and South Koreans 
should acknowledge that they are both victims of the Korean War and the division of 
Korea, and that their common enemy is war and violation.  
For many years, the fact that North and South Koreans were all victims of the 
war has been concealed or downplayed in South Korea. After the Korean War and 
through the political turmoil, the authoritarian governments tried to hide the truth of 
the genocides conducted by the South American military and police and even the US 
armies, insisting that the genocides were simply an operation to annihilate 
communists in the peninsula and the victims of genocides were not “innocent” 
civilians, but communists and their collaborators. Therefore, under the authoritarian 
governments, the surviving victims and their families could not speak out or even ask 
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the governments to re-investigate their cases, worrying that their families and 
decedents might be considered Bbal-gaeng-i and discriminated against in schools, 
offices and even in social communities.  
There have been many commissions established to investigate a truthful 
history of unjust violations by South Korean governments since the inauguration of 
democratic governments in 1994, such as the Kwangju Democratic Uprising in 1980. 
In particular, in 2004, the South Korean government under president Roh Moo-Hyun 
inaugurated the Commission for Investigations of Past History for Truth and 
Reconciliation, which was intended to discover a truth of crimes by the state against 
innocent civilians.39 The committee investigated cases involving individuals, such as 
the case of Cho Bong-Am, a politician who was sentenced to death under the Rhee 
Syng-Man government for advocating unification through peaceful methods. It also 
investigated genocides like the 4.3 Incident in Jeju and the Nogunri Bombing Attack 
by US aircraft against South Korean civilians. The commission found witnesses in 
the form of surviving victims and governmental documents and concluded that the 
South Korean military, police and even right wing ‘gangsters’ massacred innocent 
civilians before and during the Korean War. In spite of the official report from the 
commission and accounts from the surviving victims and their families, however, 
many South Korean people, especially those who support the conservative political 
parties, insist that the massacres and genocides were a military operation and even 
some of the surviving victims are not innocent civilians but Bbal-gaeng-i. As they 
remember it, the South Korean state was always right and the state protected South 
Koreans from the attacks of North Korean communists; therefore, the crimes of the 
authoritarian governments can be justified by anti-communism. The surviving 
victims and their families still suffer discrimination by people who continue to 
strongly believe in anti-communism.  
Anti-communism is an ideology that has long been manipulating people’s 
memory and their sense of morality relating to various types of violence of their 
                                               
39 For a detailed history of the various commissions of South Korean governments to discover the 
truth of history, see Chan-Ho Eom, “Settlement of Past History and Healing of History,” Studies in 
Humanities 33 (2012). 
 
 206 
state, led by authoritarian governments against their neighbours. Governments and 
civil society should continuously investigate state actions against innocent civilians 
in the name of anti-communism and try to collect the memories of surviving victims 
and their families for an authentic modern history of Korea. The current South 
Korean government has suggested legislation that enables the government to prohibit 
any kind of undermining of the honest history of the violations in the name of anti-
communism and discrimination towards the surviving victims and their families. 
These efforts would certify that the truth of history and people’s memory should not 
be fabricated or manipulated by ideologies, and encourage South Korean populace to 
realise that the restorative justice can be sought by right remembering: first, both 
South Koreans and North Koreans are the victims of the war and backlashes during 
the division of the peninsula, and second, the common enemy is war and violation 
which distorted their daily lives, and third, end of the Korean war and militant 
confrontations between two Koreas will be a ground for restorative justice for people 
live in the peninsula.   
 
7. 3. Seeking for Reconciliation in the Divided Korea 
 
Truth and memory have been distorted by mass media, education and 
governmental propaganda; added to which the older population does not want peace 
between the two Koreas, instead hoping that the North Korean communist regime 
will collapse and the South will take over the North. Due to economic difficulties, 
the younger generation of South Koreans are also becoming less interested in the 
unification of Korea and they believe that North Koreans are enemies, not friends. 
Therefore, in order to promote the recovery of truthful memory regarding North 
Korea, South Korean Christians should be encouraged to build a reconciliatory 
attitude toward North Koreans, and to find the best way to encourage the younger 
generations in South Korea to engage in a new movement for the reconciliation and 




7. 3. 1. Theology of Reconciliation in Modern Christianity and the South 
Korean Context 
 
One of the major teachings of the Christian Bible is reconciliation; this is 
particularly prevalent in the New Testament. The classical Christian understanding of 
reconciliation refers to reconciliation between God and human beings, as well as 
reconciliation between human beings. Using the biblical understanding of the 
Catholic Church, Daniel Philpott insists that reconciliation is “a concept of justice 
that involves a restoration of right relationship, animated by mercy and a resulting 
state of right relationship, characterized by peace”.40 In general, Philpott’s definition 
of reconciliation includes the consideration of relationship, mercy, peace, justice and 
forgiveness for the process and finalisation of reconciliation. Reconciliation 
highlights the biblical teaching of love and justice, which are regarded as being 
contrary to one other. Nicholas Wolterstorff insists that justice cannot be separated 
from love; rather, “justice requires love”.41 This love is “agapic” or universal, divine, 
presented by God through Jesus Christ; it honours the inner glory of all human 
beings made in the image of God and is exemplified by us carrying out acts of 
justice.42 Volf has also suggested that we could achieve justice and reconciliation 
through communal memory: “Communities of sacred memory are, at their best, 
schools of right remembering – remembering that is truthful and just, that heals 
individuals without injuring others, that allows the past to motivate a just struggle for 
justice and the grace-filled work of reconciliation.”43 
Reconciliation also involves various dimensions: reconciliation in political 
realms or wider communities, such as states or ethnicities; reconciliation in social 
dimensions that aims to establish just social structures and relationships; and 
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reconciliation through individual transformation in wider collective communities.44 
Ada María Isasi-Díaz outlines the religious, social and civic virtues of reconciliation, 
arguing that, “virtues involve the disposition and actual competence to accomplish 
moral good: the virtue of reconciliation leads to actual reconciling behaviour”45 in 
religious, societal and civic realms, including for citizens around the world.46  
Assessing the different approaches of theologians to reconciliation, Leah 
Robinson argues that it is generally maintained that searching for truth, justice, 
repentance and forgiveness should be preceded by reconciliation, even though such 
virtues would be applied according to the context. She maintains: 
The overall result of the contextual nature of the ideas of truth, justice, 
forgiveness, and repentance place the idea of the theology of reconciliation 
on a sliding scale, which moves between the poles of liberating tendencies 
(truth and justice) and reconciling tendencies (forgiveness and repentance).47  
She places NCCK’s unification movement in the category of movements that have a 
reconciling tendency, which emphasises forgiveness and repentance to achieve 
peace.48 Therefore, the unification movement of the NCCK has been strongly 
criticised and challenged by the evangelical churches of South Korea, partly because 
of the pronounced anti-communism of South Korean society and partly because the 
NCCK emphasises the repentance of South Korean churches for their hostile 
behaviour toward North Korea and vice versa. The majority of South Korean 
Christians believe that North Koreans are the villains behind the division and the 
Korean War, and that just punishment should be made to the North Korean 
communist regime; they want to exclude “North Koreanness” from the unification 
discourse.  
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In general, however, North Koreans and South Koreans are both victims and 
victimisers of the war and the militant conflicts between the two countries, except in 
the case of the apparent instigators of genocides that took place after the division and 
during the Korean War. Unlike apartheid in South Africa, where there was a clear 
violation by the government and the white population against the black population, it 
is difficult to define the wronged and the wrongdoers in the Korean context. 
Assessing modern history in South Korea, there have been many cases where victims 
of war became victimisers in later conflicts between the two countries due to a belief 
that their actions were best for the state. For instance, some of the South Korean 
soldiers sent to Vietnam killed civilians there without question because they believed 
that the civilians were communists, and later, in 1980, they killed South Korean 
civilians in Kwangju for the same reason. South Korean Christians were no different. 
The Seobuk-Cheongyeondan (North West Young Adult Union) was organised by 
young adults who escaped from the north-western part of North Korea after the 
division of the Korean peninsula; many of them were Christians. Their property had 
been seized by the new communist government in the North and they had to escape 
North Korea. Most of the members of the Union escaped North Korea and became 
extreme anti-communists. They were recruited by the South Korean anti-communist 
government after the peninsula’s division and placed in the South Korean police and 
military. More than 500 Seobuk-Cheongyeondan members were sent to Jeju Island in 
1948, where communist parties were organising and preparing a military revolt.49 
These Seobuk-Cheongyeondan members sent to Jeju Island killed not only the 
communist rebels, but also Jeju citizens. The brutality of the Union was revealed 
about 60 years later, but they insisted they had been working for the democracy of 
South Korea and that their actions were just, contrary to all the available evidence.  
 
7. 3. 2. Miroslav Volf’s Memory for Reconciliation through the Lens of 
Christian Tradition 
                                               
49 The National Committee for Investigation of the Truth about the Jeju April 3 Incident, The Jeju 4.3 




Volf has argued that the Christian tradition could provide a lens through 
which we can remember appropriately to ensure the redemption of our past memory, 
which will eventually pave the way to forgiveness and reconciliation with 
transgressors. According to him, the lens of Christian belief could also contribute to 
Christians yearning for reconciliation in the Korean peninsula where hatred and 
manipulated sentiment is rife. As he argues, memory is not only an issue of the past, 
but also one that will influence our future: the more important challenge for us in 
remembering our past is not what we remember, but what we do with our memories 
that will impact the future. The basic Christian convictions, from which Volf builds 
up the final redemption of memories of transgressions, forgiveness and reconciliation 
are summarised as follows:50 
• God created the world and human beings with God’s love; 
• God might want human beings to live together in God’s justice and love, not 
only for individual pleasure or prosperity; 
• God reconciled with human beings through the blood of Jesus on the cross 
and God wants human beings to also reconcile with each other through the 
sacrifice of Jesus; 
• Human beings will have eternal life after their life on Earth; 
• Time is irreversible and God will reveal the truth of transgressions and 
accomplish God’s justice; 
• God might want to save the transgressors who confess their sins and yearn for 
salvation, and the transgressed, to make them reconcile with each other and 
with God. 
Volf, as a theologian, referred to the biblical traditions of Christianity for the purpose 
of the internal healing of memory.51 First, he explained that the memory of 
transgressions could be integrated into our lives, which means that we can attribute 
meaningful aspects of memory to our lives. In accordance with an eschatological 
belief in the end of history, the new world begins and we will be delivered from evil. 
Secondly, we believe that we will be given a new identity, new hope and possibility 
and a new relationship with God through Jesus Christ. Third, we confirm a new 
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possibility in God’s promise. Then, we can anticipate a new relationship with those 
who trespassed against us.  
While Ricœur presented the memory and voices of victims as moral criteria 
for just memory, Volf has tried to find an exemplary and just memory and a 
“framework for remembering” through biblical tradition. He explained: “At least for 
Christians, ‘exemplary’ in its primary sense refers not to the memory of any given 
wrong suffered, but specifically to the memory of the suffering and deliverance of 
God’s people and God’s Anointed.”52 With a truthful memory, Volf argued, a 
community can reconstruct its true identity, searching for its wellbeing and that of its 
members and the Christian tradition through the Bible; this can constitute grounds 
for a new project involving the transformation of a memory of wronging or trauma 
into a hopeful future. Volf insists that Jews and Christians share “four formal 
features” of their sacred memory according to the biblical stories of Exodus and 
Passion: identity, community, the future and God. According to Volf, through rituals 
such as the Passover Seder, Jews commit to their sacred identity by recollecting the 
sacred memory of the past, while Christians hold Holy Communion for the same 
purpose: “in remembering Christ, they remember themselves as part of a community 
of people who have died and risen together with Christ and whose core identity 
consists in this spiritual union with Christ.”53 He adds that the sacred memories of 
the two groups are “essentially communal memory” that has been shared and 
transmitted through generations, and that these sacred memories also concern the 
future, as Jews believe that the Exodus is not only a past event, but also the future 
deliverance of their community. The story of Exodus and the Passion of Jesus Christ 
deliver valuable lessons about correct remembering: 
Remember wrongs so that you can protect sufferers from future injury, 
remember them truthfully so as to be able to act justly, and situate the 
memories of wrongs suffered into the narrative of God’s redemption so that 
you can remember in hope rather than despair.54  
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Volf further maintains that God is the main actor in their sacred memory, in that He 
has intervened in the affairs of humankind and given His promise.55 Hence, Volf 
urges his readers to reshape their frames of remembering into four simple questions: 
“who we are, where we belong, what we expect, and what or who we ultimately 
trust”.56 Volf refers to the truthful collective memory of all human beings as a sacred 
memory that allows for the remembrance of crucial events and construction of 
reliable narratives; for example, the life, passion and death of Christ, which is 
perhaps the most important collective memory and narrative of Western society, as 
well as much of Eastern society, particularly Korea. Likewise, Volf argues that the 
story of Jesus Christ is not only the story of Him or of the Israelites, but indeed that 
of all human beings. This memory helps us rediscover our identity for the benefit of 
our future(s), and also our relationship with God, given that the Incarnation of Christ 
was, for Christians, the unique, final, most personal and universal revelation of God 
to all of us.57   
Through the Passion of Jesus Christ, we, struggling between truthful 
remembering and searching for retributive justice against our transgressors, can 
discover a third way: forgiving. The story of the Passion of Jesus Christ provides an 
anticipatory memory that teaches us that Jesus died for all human beings despite evil-
doers and that God cares and loves our transgressors too. South Korean Christians 
are victims of the war and of the division of Korea and some of them are even 
victimisers who killed and persecuted innocent civilians during the war, as well as 
under the authoritarian governments.58 However, the story of the Passion of Christ 
teaches us, firstly, “to extend unconditional grace…[even to our wrongdoers]”; 
secondly, that “we must affirm as valid the claims of justice”; and thirdly, “to aim for 
communion”59 even with our wrongdoers in “a community of love.”60 In this way we 
can move on to declare that our memories of war and hatred of North Korean 
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communists do not control our lives, expecting that at the final judgement all the 
truth of transgressions will be disclosed and sinners will be redeemed and 
transformed, and we only need to seek a new relationship with our former enemies.  
Volf also explains that even if we forgive wrongdoers and forget their 
transgressions, our identity will not be renounced. We believe that our memories are 
like pieces of puzzle and we cannot imagine our identity without a small piece of 
memory. Volf, however, encapsulated that even though we may renounce our 
memories, especially a memory of being wronged, our identity will not be 
renounced: “If our identity is made and remade of gathered fragments, the non-
remembrance of suffered wrongs will not violate our sense of identity”,61 because 
our identity in God is retained by faith. Thus, South Korean Christians who believe 
that anti-communism is a pole by which to maintain their belief and Christian 
identity come to realise that their identity is in God in faith and they are indeed 
obliged to forgive the North Korean communists who have been considered the 
enemy of South Koreans and South Korean Christians.  
 
7. 3. 3. Reconciliation as a Christian Responsibility 
 
 The North Korean regime has shut itself away from the outer world because 
of a fear that the regime will be threatened by “American imperialism and 
capitalism”, which it experienced as aggressive during the Korean War. The South 
Korean churches have no choice but to work towards the reconciliation of the two 
Koreas within South Korea first, because without reconciliation with our estranged 
neighbours we cannot reconcile with God. As Jesus taught: “If you are offering your 
gift at the altar and there remember that your brother has something against you, 
leave your gift there in front of the altar. First go and be reconciled to your brother; 
then come and offer your gift” (Matthew 5:23-24).62 Furthermore, the discourses of 
the peace, reconciliation and unification of Korea have come to reflect the issues of 
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South Korea herself more than inter-relational issues with North Korea. In this 
regard, there are three factors the South Korean churches could pursue, as outlined 
below.  
First, the churches should proclaim that they embrace North Koreans as their 
neighbours, so that South Koreans no longer want to exclude North Koreans and 
other communists through violation, assimilation, subjugation, indifference, 
abandonment, ignorance and judgment.63 Anti-communist and anti-North Korean 
sentiment among South Koreans are products of the identity war against North Korea 
that has been ongoing since the establishment of the South Korean government in 
1948, and this was intensified by fear of the Korean War and the subsequent 
confrontations between the two Koreas, as well as governmental manipulation of 
memory. In her examination of Belfast in Northern Ireland, Geraldine Smyth pointed 
out that:  
Where communities have been structured around the boundary demarcation 
of insider and outsider, where the other is perceived as ever-encroaching 
threat, the boundary itself becomes the repository of identity and culture is 
driven by fears for security.64 
Fear and yearning for their own security have driven South Koreans to search for a 
pure and exclusive communal identity; they have searched for ways in which South 
Korea could defeat their enemies in North Korea and occupy the North. However, 
securing peace by eliminating North Korean communists is not possible; we have 
witnessed historically that violence and war sow the seeds of further violence and 
war. Therefore, if we want to secure peace, as Moltmann represented with a simple 
phrase that is hard to achieve – to develop “creative love”65 – we have to ask, “How 
can we remove the enmity of our enemy” and “make them part of our own 
responsibility” for “common security and lasting development”?66 Christians in 
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South Korea are called to embrace our neighbours in the North because embracing is 
a manifestation of our struggle for justice and truth, as well as God’s hope that we 
will love our neighbours.67 Further, the hope for a pure identity is nothing more than 
an illusion. South Korean society is becoming multi-ethnic and multi-cultural; 
therefore, if South Koreans are supposed to embrace “otherness”, then why not 
include North Koreans in these “others”? We are called to the struggle of embracing 
our neighbours despite the current relationship of enmity. The only possible way to 
embrace them “with…equality and reciprocity at its heart”, Volf suggests, is 
“through self-sacrifice, even if self-sacrifice is…a necessary via dolorosa in a world 
of enmity and indifference toward the joy of reciprocal embrace”.68  
 Anti-communism, an ideology instilled by the authoritarian government since 
the division of the peninsula, has been overwhelming the conservative South Korean 
churches and they still strongly sustain the militant anti-communism even in the era 
when peaceful negotiations continue between South Korea, North Korea and US. 
This ideology of anti-communism is more than a theory against communism and 
North Korean Juche ideology, it is a touchstone for the identity of the people in 
South Korea and the majority of South Korean churches have actively propagated 
this anti-communism to the congregation. In their understanding, true Christians 
should be anti-communist and loyal to their government, particularly when it 
strongly upholds anti-communism. Timothy Lee argued that the exceptional growth 
of the South Korean protestant churches was due to their zeal for evangelism, 
nationalism and anti-communism,69 which was also assessed in chapter 3. It is also 
true that the more conservative churches have achieved significant growth in church 
numbers, as well as church memberships, with the propagation of nationalism and 
anti-communism. In many cases, their nationalism has simply been regarded as 
statism or patriotism. South Korean churches should ask themselves how this truthful 
identity can be compatible with their belief in South Korean anti-communism, which 
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has long been manipulating people’s memories and even their social lives, and is 
used to justify the unjust activities of their state, including genocides against innocent 
civilians, to secure the authoritarian regime. As Volf argues, the communal memory 
of Christians of the biblical teachings reveals their truthful identity, which is related 
to God and for whom Jesus Christ shed his blood on the cross to bring about God’s 
forgiveness through God’s unconditional love. Therefore, he insisted that we 
remember truthfully in order to forgive, forget and achieve communion with our 
enemies – North Korean communists in the Korean context – in God’s justice and 
love.  
Secondly, South Korean churches should seek justice by prioritising the 
memories of surviving war victims and their families and helping them to tell the 
truth about the violations of the state, in particular about the genocide of civilians in 
South and North Korea and separated families in the two countries. Listening to the 
voices of victims of the war and division will constitute an important step toward 
personal healing, inviting more people to search for the truth about the war and 
division, allowing for further recognition of the horrendous aftermath of the Korean 
War. Rather than commemorating the war in a national realm that often overstates 
the memories of individuals and particular localities70 and provokes enmity against 
the state’s enemy, we should appeal to the voices of victims in order to recognise the 
importance of peace in the Korean peninsula and the world.    
Thirdly, South Korean churches should share memories of the war and the 
division of Korea with the younger generation, who might not know about the war 
and its aftermath. As explained in previous chapters, the younger generations of 
South Korea do not care about unification and are not interested in North Korean 
issues. The memories of war and division held by the older generations have been 
manipulated by the authoritarian governments to secure their regime and this 
memory has made younger generations consider North Korea an enemy that does not 
share a common nationality. Nowadays, many young people do not even want the 
unification of Korea, in contrast to the era of the military governments of Jeon Doo-
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Hwan and Roh Tae-Woo and the first civil government of Kim Young-Sam, when 
colleges and universities were centres of student movements for democracy and the 
unification of Korea, which, it was believed, would end violations in the Korean 
peninsula. Nonetheless, the younger generations can be invited to share in the 
truthful memories of the victims of the war and division, to learn who their enemy is 
and what they can do to address the problem of the divided Korea. After researching 
memory activities and conducting an examination of white audiences at indigenous 
cultural performances in Canada, Campbell stated that:  
Recollection is often publicly expressed and shared among those who do not 
share a past. Thus, when people remember, they often direct the imaginings 
of appreciators who may not share a past with them but who become 
participants in recollective activities...and create bonds of membership.71  
One example that is relevant to this issue of sharing the memories of victims with the 
younger generations in South Korea is the Pyeong-hwa Nabi (Butterfly of Peace) 
Network, through which younger students engage with the issue of the sex slaves of 
the Japanese military during the era of the Japanese occupation. The students attend 
“Wednesday Demonstrations”, which are held every Wednesday in front of the 
Japanese Embassy in Seoul, in order to listen to the voices of victims of sex slavery 
and to acknowledge responsibility for sex slavery, the history of which was 
manipulated and distorted by the Japanese government. It can be suggested therefore 
that this memory of the victims has become a collective memory shared by younger 
students, and hence it has become their responsibility.72 Likewise, sharing the 
memories of victims of the Korean War and the division of Korea with younger 
generations will evoke feelings that they are also responsible for the peace, 
reconciliation and unification of Korea; indeed, unless the younger generations are 
encouraged to engage with these aims, they will not be achievable in the future. As 
Moltmann argues: 
There is never lasting peace in history just for the present generation, it arises 
out of responsibility for justice between generations… Therefore, peace in 
history is never a state with which one can be content, but is always a way 
                                               
71 Campbell, Our Faithfulness to the Past: Reconstructing Memory Value, pp. 72-78. 
72 Na-Young Lee, “Rethinking Korean Women's Movement of Japanese Military Sexual Slavery: 
Overcoming Cultural Trauma and Constructing Empathetic Audience,” Society and History 115 
(2017), p. 99. 
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one must take in order to create time for humankind and make possible life of 
generations to come.73 
Indeed, the younger generation in South Korea are not interested in the 
unification of Korea and related issues. Recent surveys indicate that the majority of 
younger people do not want unification and they do not even consider North Koreans 
part of the same nation. However, I would argue that their image of and ideas about 
North Korea and unification are not static; they are malleable, and may be 
particularly impacted if they are educated about the modern history of Korea and 
they interact with North Korean people. I interviewed six athletes from the South 
Korean ice hockey team, which united with the North Korean ice hockey team for 
the Pyeongchang Winter Olympic Games in 2018.74 Most of the interviewees were in 
their 20s and all of them were born in Korea. I asked them what images they had of 
North Koreans before they met the North Korean athletes.  
H75: My image of North Koreans was that they were poor and their leaders 
extensively manipulate their people. They are Bbal-gaeng-i. I do not know 
what Bbal-gaeng-i means. 
P: I also thought they were poor. The country is a nuclear problem maker.  
HD: Beggars. 
The images of North Korea that the young athletes had were not favourable and even 
seemed very patronising towards North Koreans. Some scholars have identified this 
view, held by South Koreans about North Koreans, as a type of “Orientalism towards 
North Koreans”.76 H explained that she was afraid when she heard that the North 
Korean players would share flats with the South Koreans because of her negative 
perception of North Koreans. Their ideas about North Korea seemed to have been 
formulated in the last ten years under the conservative governments that re-promoted 
anti-communism, and it seemed they had insufficient education about the modern 
history of Korea and North Korea. However, when they were training with the North 
                                               
73 Moltmann, Creating a Just Future : The Politics of Peace and the Ethics of Creation in a 
Threatened World, p. 41. 
74 Ladies' Ice Hockey Team Athletes of South Korea for 2018 Peyongchang Winter Olympic Games, 
interview by Hoon Song, 16 March, 2018. 
75 Initial of the last name of the interviewees. 
76 Hyuk-Beom Kwon, “A Critical Assessment of Unification Discourse- How to Understand the 
"Differences” between Two Koreas,” in The Korean Peninsula and the Issue of the Unification ed. 
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Korean athletes, they came to feel greater proximity toward the North Korean 
athletes than other team members who had been born in other countries and were 
originally from countries such as the US and Canada. They came to believe that the 
North Korean athletes were no different from other women in their 20s, and they all 
agreed that they enjoyed mingling with the North Korean players.   
Even though these athletes became familiar with their North Korean 
counterparts, their experience was limited to sport, and therefore they did not agree 
that unification was appropriate because they were worried about the confusion that 
would arise in the process. They valued peace and security more than unification. 
Relating to North Korean issues, the younger generation seem to care more about 
universal humanitarian virtues such as justice, human rights and egalitarianism, 
rather than sympathy for a “same nation sentiment”. Therefore, the cause of the 
unification of Korea should pursue the virtues of universal human dignity, and just 
remembrance should be part of the goal of unification.  
Lastly, South Korean churches, I suggest, should rethink their campaign in 
their North Korean missions, which has long been promoting anti-communism, anti-
North Korean discourse and the “reclaiming” of North Korean territory to rebuild 
churches in the North. The conservative camp continues to argue that the unification 
of Korea should be “evangelistic”, or based on the teachings of the gospel; this 
strategy is labelled Bok-eom Tongil. Yet gospel messages in such a land of division, 
conflict and hatred should be those of love, forgiveness and reconciliation, as stated 
above, and their messages to the congregation about North Korea should be 
consistent with this. Missions to North Korea should promote healing, reconciliation 
and peace for the two states, as well as human dignity and justice in the Korean 
peninsula. The unification of Korea is not a process of rebuilding the churches in the 
North that have been destroyed under the communist regime, but rather a way to 
reveal truth and realise “abundant peace” in the peninsula, as Jeremiah predicted 
would happen after the unification of the peoples of Israel and Judah.  
 




The vision in the Old Testament of the unification of the people of Israel and 
the Judean people has frequently been referred to by Korean theologians, as well as 
pastors of Protestant churches in South Korea. While conservative church pastors 
prefer the stories of the reconstruction of the Temple in Jerusalem after their return 
from Babylon, liberal theologians have developed their theological approaches 
toward the unification of Korea based on the vision of Ezekiel depicted in Ezekiel 
chapter 37.77 Even though the historical context of Koreans and Israelites are 
different, they have explained that just as the people of Judah and Israel were 
liberated from the powerful kingdoms and unified according to the vision, North and 
South Koreans will be liberated from the foreign influence of China, Russia, the US 
and Japan and then they will realise the unification of the two Koreas. As secular 
historians have argued, the history of Korea indicates that Koreans still suffer from 
the oppression and bondage of foreign intervention. I also argue that people in the 
peninsula still suffer from the oppression of ideologies.  
Jeremiah prophesised that the Israelites and Judeans would be unified and 
restored to the Davidic kingdom, but he put more emphasis on truthfulness for the 
unification of the two nations. According to this prophecy, God indicated that 
healing, peace and truth would emerge with the restoration of the kingdom: “Behold, 
I will bring to it health and healing, and I will heal them; and I will reveal to them 
an abundance of peace and truth” (Jeremiah 33:6).78 The word “heal” is also used in 
                                               
77 In Ezekiel chapter 37, verses 15 through to 22, it is quoted that: “The word of the LORD came 
again to me saying, ‘And you, son of man, take for yourself one stick and write on it, “For Judah and 
for the sons of Israel, his companions”; then take another stick and write on it, “For Joseph, the stick 
of Ephraim and all the house of Israel, his companions.” ‘Then join them for yourself one to another 
into one stick, that they may become one in your hand. ‘When the sons of your people speak to you 
saying, “Will you not declare to us what you mean by these?” say to them, “Thus says the Lord God, 
‘Behold, I will take the stick of Joseph, which is in the hand of Ephraim, and the tribes of Israel, his 
companions; and I will put them with it, with the stick of Judah, and make them one stick, and they 
will be one in My hand.’” ‘The sticks on which you write will be in your hand before their eyes. ‘Say 
to them, “Thus says the Lord God, ‘Behold, I will take the sons of Israel from among the nations 
where they have gone and I will gather them from every side and bring them into their own land; and I 
will make them one nation in the land, on the mountains of Israel; and one king will be king for all of 
them; and they will no longer be two nations and no longer be divided into two kingdoms.” (New 
American Standard Bible). 
78 New American Standard Bible.  
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Jeremiah 19:11 to mean “restoring to the original state” from broken pieces, or 
“repairing”. Moreover, the restoration of the kingdom would reveal peace and truth. 
In a broken land full of conflict, where people’s memories have been manipulated, 
healing, peace and truth cannot be separated from each other, and the restoration or 
unification of the land shall follow them, according to the vision of Jeremiah.   
  As argued in the previous chapters, the unification discourse has been based 
on nationalist and minjung sentiment that North and South Koreans are one nation 
and unification is the indisputable goal of the Korean people. As pointed out by 
Kwon,79 the unification discourse has not allowed for criticism of unification itself. 
Therefore, there has been insufficient discussion about why the two Koreas should be 
unified in relation to the methodologies of Korean unification. Through recent 
discourses about peace and unification in Korea, a critical and fundamental question 
has arisen: is the unification of the two Koreas essential for the Korean population in 
the two Koreas? Do they really need unification? Recent discourses about the 
unification of Korea aim to emphasise that unification is needed to ameliorate 
universal humanitarian virtues in the Korean peninsula that have been challenged by 
the division of the area. Liberal theologians have argued that unification would 
contribute to promoting peace, human rights, welfare and equality. However, it can 
be argued that the development of humanitarian virtues in the Korean peninsula is 
possible without the unification of Korea.  
Unification requires processes such as reconciliation and healing of the 
memories of the Korean people; without unification, we cannot end the manipulation 
of these memories and stop victimising the Koreans who have suffered from the 
division of Korea. The ideologies of each state – South Korean anti-communism and 
North Korean Juche ideology – both involve manipulating memory, sentiment and 
even social life. In particular, separated families in South and North Korea are the 
ostensible victims of the ideological conflict and division of the two Koreas. The 
division of Korea will also produce more victims due to ideological and military 
                                               
79 Kwon argued that unification discourse in South Korea has been abused for political purposes and 
operated as an ideology. All discourse against the unification of the Koreas was challenged as anti-
unification and anti-national. Kwon, “A Critical Assessment of Unification Discourse- How to 
Understand the “Differences” between Two Koreas,”, p. 173. 
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confrontations between the two parts. Therefore, the loss caused by the division of 
Korea is not “imaginative, but existential, [and] shall be ended by the unification of 
Korea.”80 The division of Korea has increased the sorrow of the people, who were 
unjustly persecuted by the military government, and it has been viewed as imprudent 
to search for the truth and offer compensation for their suffering because some 
conservatives have argued that this would benefit the North Korean communist 
regime. The wrong-doers insist that there was nothing wrong with what they did to 
innocent people. The older generation, who were educated in anti-communism under 
authoritarian governments, do not want to believe the emerging truth, and instead 
argue that the victims of political oppression were in fact communists. In this 
situation, the voices of the victims of the Korean War and the division have been 
ignored. The memory of a community should speak for victims, but in South Korea, 
the older population, whose memories have been manipulated by political power, 
aggressively express their hatred for victims due to their indoctrinated belief that 
they are North Korean communists. Hence, only the unification of Korea will fix this 





In this chapter, I discussed the ways in which the memory of the South 
Korean people, as well as South Korean Christians, has been manipulated by a statist 
ideology of anti-communism, which has defined South Koreanness and South 
Korean Christianity for many years. This manipulated memory has justified crimes 
against innocent people and created strong fractions and hatred of North Koreans, as 
well as among the South Korean population, rather than contributing to sustaining 
peace and bringing reconciliation in the Korean peninsula. Therefore, as Volf argues, 
                                               
80 Ji-Hyun Im, “From a Historiography of a Nation toward a Historiography of Human Beings,” in 
The Issues and Tasks of the Unification Discourse of the Korean Peninsula, ed. The Committee of 




churches can provide a lens of sacred memory highlighting the Passion of Jesus 
Christ and teaching us about true identity in God’s hand.  
The Bible teaches us love, forgiveness, reconciliation and peace. As 
Christians, we have to seek these virtues in this violent world. In a context of violent 
conflict, and for the people who experienced a terrible war, it is difficult to accept 
that they ought to seek love, forgiveness, reconciliation and peace with the people 
who were (and are perhaps still thought to be) their enemies. People tend to seek 
revenge against those who wronged them, but this is how evil wins. Volf stated that, 
“To triumph fully, evil needs two victories, not one. The first victory happens when 
an evil deed is perpetrated; the second victory when evil is returned”;81 in this regard 
Volf has borrowed words from the apostle Paul: “Do not be overcome by evil, but 
overcome evil with good” (Rom. 12:21).82 South Korean churches should not 
exclude North Koreans and search for retributive justice against them. If they do so, 
the memory of war and the confrontations between the two Koreas only contribute to 
shaping a new Cold War system around the Korean peninsula and impeding the 
people’s movements and discourse of the reconciliation and unification of Korea. As 
I have argued by referring to Volf, Christians are obliged to remember truthfully in 
order to forgive and eventually forget in faith in God as God wants us to reconcile 
with our enemies and live with them in a communion of justice and love. Therefore, 
we should realise that we are obliged to embrace North Koreans as our neighbours, 
even when it seems impossible to overcome evil with good through love, forgiveness 
and reconciliation. God, as a generous giver and lover, showed us true love through 
the passion and death of His only begotten Son. Paul also proclaimed that: “The Son 
is the image of the invisible God, the firstborn over all creation… For God was 
pleased to have all his fullness dwell in him, and through him to reconcile to himself 
all things, whether things on earth or things in heaven, by making peace through his 
blood, shed on the cross.” (Colossians 1:15, 19-20).83 God reconciled Himself with 
all creatures through the blood of the crucified Jesus, and He wants us to resemble 
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82 New International Version Bible. 
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Him and be reconciled with each other. It could be argued that we are unable to be as 
generous as God. However, as Volf maintained, through Jesus Christ, we have a 
“new possibility, and new life into which each of us is called to grow in our own way 
and ultimately a new world freed from all enmity, a world of love.”84 
 
                                               





The thesis has argued that two ideological approaches – ethnic nationalism 
and anti-communism – have provided the two primary models of unification 
discourse among Protestant Christians in South Korea. However, the thesis also has 
articulated that neither of them has provided an effectual theological basis for the 
efforts of the reconciliation and unification of Korea in the changing landscape in 
21st century which anti-communism and anti-North Korean sentiment is still 
powerful.  Therefore, an alternative approach is necessary to encounter manipulated 
memory and sentiment against North Korea from a Christian perspective., This 
approach suggests the importance of remembering rightly, which can then lead to 
forgiveness and forgetting of the memory of wrongs.  
Chapter 1 described the reasons and processes by which anti-communism 
overwhelmed the socio-political sphere in South Korea by manipulating the memory 
of South Koreans, and how the conservative governments and the majority of the 
South Korean population came to believe that unification would occur through the 
collapse of the North Korean communist regime and a strong anti-communist stance. 
During the Cold War era, which was characterised by harsh military confrontations 
between North and South Korea, as well as between the US, China and the USSR, it 
became impossible to sustain the hope of unifying the Korean peninsula through 
military methods, and the authoritarian government sought to sustain the division of 
the peninsula and maintain their regime, while propagating that the unification of 
Korea was the national goal of South Korea. Instead, they argued that South Korea 
needed to be highly developed in order to win the ideological war against the North 
Korean regime and to eventually take over the North. Therefore, for the sake of state 
security, but primarily the security of the authoritarian regime, the economic 
development of South Korea was at the forefront of the Cold War against North 
Korean communists, and the democratisation of Korea and the individual rights of 
the South Korean people were given little consideration. Overshadowing their hope 
for democratisation and reconciliation with North Korea, the South Korean people, 
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even South Korean Christians, were concerned about state security and economic 
prosperity due to their fear of a possible re-invasion by North Korean communists.  
The South Korean fear of the North Korean communists was encouraged by 
the authoritarian South Korean government, and the hatred of North Koreans among 
the South Korean population deepened. This hatred was violently expressed toward a 
number of social activists working against the authoritarian government and pursuing 
the development of South Korean democracy. Political and social movements that set 
themselves against the South Korean authoritarian government, as well as civil 
unification and peace movements, were suspected of working for the benefit of North 
Korean communists. However, in spite of threats from the authoritarian governments 
and the danger of persecution, Protestant social activists and scholars engaged in 
unification and peace movements, believing that the unification of Korea would 
bring a true democracy to Korea. They proposed ethnic nationalism, which focused 
on the Korean people’s awareness of the need for an independent Korean nation 
against Japanese colonialism during the era of Japanese occupation. They criticised 
the statist nationalism propagated by the authoritarian governments as a form of 
nationalism consequent upon the division of Korea, which excluded the North 
Korean communists. Instead they argued that the ethnic homogeneity of the nation 
and people in both Koreas was unchangeable and the most important common 
criterion for building a common identity for the unification of Korea.  
Chapter 1 also traced the development of the Minjung theology of the liberal 
Protestant churches. The Minjung theology became the basis for the socio-political 
engagement of South Korean liberal churches in the democratisation of Korea. They 
believed that the democratisation of Korea should be realised for the wellbeing of the 
Korean people, especially those who had been manipulated politically, economically 
and culturally, and that democratisation in South Korea would not be possible 
without the unification of the two Koreas. In the following chapters, the thesis also 
clarified that Minjung theology became the grounds for the unification discourse of 
liberal Protestant churches in South Korea.  
This thesis has shown that the South Korean Protestant churches, regardless 
of their theological positions, strove for the unification of Korea on two ideological 
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models: ethnic nationalism and anti-communism. Chapter 2 noted that the liberal 
churches attempted to interact with North Korean church leaders through the WCC 
and they made ecumenical efforts towards the peace and unification of Korea, with 
their unification discourses based on ethnic nationalism and Minjung theology. The 
chapter showed that the group initiating this ecumenical approach toward unification 
comprised theologians and Christians living in foreign countries. This group 
explained that they were on the borderline between North and South Korea with 
regard to state identity, meaning that they would not be bonded by the political and 
theological boundaries of either of the two Koreas. Even though most of them were 
born in Korea, they had already obtained citizenship in foreign countries, and had a 
legitimate right to travel to North Korea and meet North Koreans. Their meetings 
with North Korean Christians revealed the existence of Christianity in North Korea, 
which surprised South Korean Protestants. As the Foreign Residing South Korean 
Christians’ meeting with North Korean Christians took place in various areas, the 
NCCK leadership asked the WCC to facilitate conferences with North Korean 
Christians represented by the KCF, and they published statements through these 
conferences. The statements acknowledged the ‘evil’ of the division of Korea, which 
had been caused by the leading countries in the Cold War system, and they declared 
that Christians of both Koreas should cooperate to achieve peace and the unification 
of Korea. However, the statements also included reference to very sensitive political 
issues, such as the US troops in South Korea and the human rights violations by the 
authoritarian government in South Korea. The issues discussed in the statements 
were also a concern for liberal Christians, who had pursued socio-political 
campaigns for the democratisation of Korea for many years. The chapter further 
noted that these liberal Christian approaches toward the unification of Korea were 
criticised due to the manipulated collective memory of the South Korean people in 
relation to anti-communism. Some of the liberal theologians and pastors who 
pursued direct dialogue with North Korean Christian leaders were accused of 
carrying out “anti-state” activities by the South Korean governments.  
Chapters 3 argued that, comparatively, the conservative churches developed 
their unification discourse based on a strong anti-communist identity, believing that 
unification meant taking over the formerly Christianised land that was now occupied 
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by North Korean communists, who were identified as the enemies of the Korean 
nation, as well as of Christians. Conservative church leaders strongly emphasised 
national evangelisation and criticised North Korean communists, who, they argued, 
persecuted Christians in the North and were even trying to cause the destruction of 
Christianity in the Korean peninsula. Reflecting their vision of national 
evangelisation and unification, they understood nationalism as a statist nationalism 
that was more concerned with statist security against North Korea. Many leaders of 
the South Korean Protestant churches were immigrants who had escaped from the 
North before or during the Korean War. This fear of the possible invasion of North 
Korean communists was shared among the South Korean population, but it was 
intensified from the pulpits of the South Korean Protestant churches, many of which 
were founded by immigrants from the North by leaders that were quite influential 
within Christian communities. Therefore, for conservative Christians in South Korea, 
the primary and most important condition for the unification of Korea has generally 
been the collapse of the communist regime of North Korea, which, they believe, will 
be realised by the power of God and evangelistic work among North Koreans. This 
scenario is generally called “Bok-eom Tongil (evangelical unification or unification 
through evangelism)”.  
However, as South Koreans could not enter North Korea or even meet North 
Koreans without governmental permission according to the South Korean national 
security law, conservative Christians believed that they could bring about the 
unification of Korea through prayer campaigns and a variety of broadcasting 
projects, such as the Far East Broadcasting Company Korea, which aims to 
disseminate the Christian message to communist countries, including North Korea. 
They also hoped to reach North Koreans in various foreign locations and therefore 
passionately engaged in mission work in China and Russia where North Korean 
defectors were trying to find safe shelter. Along with these various evangelistic 
methods, the conservative churches initiated humanitarian aid for North Koreans in 
the early 1990s, when North Koreans were suffering from devastating famines, and 
they began to run programmes for North Korean defectors in South Korea. In these 
humanitarian works, the conservative churches sought interactions with North 
Koreans, believing that such work would provide the seeds for evangelisation and the 
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social transformation of North Korean society to secure human rights and freedom of 
religious activities. Chapters 3 illustrated that the humanitarian works of the 
conservative churches created a momentum for cooperation with liberal churches in 
South Korea and also showed that the conservative Christians began to question how 
the evangelical approach could work in harmony with the socio-political engagement 
of churches for the unification of Korea.  
 Chapter 4 focused on theological approaches toward the unification of Korea 
from liberal Christian thinkers such as Moon Ik-Hwan and Park Soon-Kyung. In 
spite of the strong anti-communism and statist nationalism in South Korea, liberal 
Christians upheld an ethnic nationalism that was widespread among scholars and 
social activists, especially in terms of unification discourse. They differentiated the 
statist nationalism propagated by the authoritarian governments from the nationalism 
that the Jaeya people were proposing, critiquing that statist nationalism was a basis 
for the division of Korea, while maintaining that the broader-based nationalism of the 
Jaeya people provided grounds for the future unification of Korea. Park Soon-Kyung 
proposed a nationalist unification theology that emphasised the national homogeneity 
of North and South Koreans regardless of their ideological differences. She argued 
that the ideologies of Christianity and North Korean Juche share common ideas 
about the wellbeing of human beings against capitalism, the basis of which is human 
greed. With a limited suspicion of communism, Minjung theologians also pursued 
the unification of Korea from the perspective of ethnic nationalism, criticising the 
statist nationalism of the authoritarian government, as well as anti-communism 
among South Korean churches, for contributing to the division of the Korean 
peninsula.  
Moon Ik-Hwan, an Old Testament scholar, Presbyterian pastor and social 
activist, believed that the churches should energetically engage in socio-political 
movements for the democratisation and unification of Korea. Moon argued that 
North Korea should be more concerned with human freedom and South Korea 
should achieve a more egalitarian society so that the two countries could together 
create a social and political system that would form the basis of a unified Korea. 
Emulating Moon’s proposal, some theologians in the liberal camp argued that a 
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socialist economic and political system would be an alternative to the present system 
of South Korea and it would constitute a middle way between the North and South 
Korean socio-political systems. Moon also searched for a path that would make 
unification discourses more popular in South Korean society so that more people 
became concerned about the problem of the divided Korea. However, the chapter 
concluded that his efforts fell short because his visit to North Korea and meeting 
with Kim Il-Seong led to extensive criticism by the churches as well as South Korean 
society and it ultimately weakened the unification movements of liberal Protestant 
churches.  
Chapter 5 outlined the theological basis for the unification discourse of 
conservative Christians. Reverend Han Kyung-Chik, for example, was a pastor in 
Sinuiju, a city near the border between Korea and China, who had experienced the 
Japanese occupation, as well as communist governance. The two life lessons Han 
learnt were that, first, communists were anti-national and anti-Christian, and, 
secondly, living under a dictatorship was better than living in a colonised country. 
Therefore, for him, the idea that North Korea could occupy South Korea and force 
South Koreans to live under a communist regime was unimaginably terrifying. 
Therefore, he argued that South Korean churches should be strongholds of anti-
communism and national evangelisation as well as being at the forefront of the 
unification of Korea. In later years, he launched the Loving Drive for Sharing Rice 
campaign which aimed to support North Korean people suffered shortage of foods 
caused by the great famine and this project became a flint fire of humanitarian works 
of South Korean protestant churches in spite of the criticisms that the humanitarian 
works would prolong the communist regime in North Korea. Kim Young-Han, a 
conservative theologian, has articulated that the unification should be driven by 
citizens, who intellectually educated and are able to sustain social legitimacy of 
South Korea different from minjung who are in favour of North Korean communists. 
Kim believed that South Korean should be highly developed to absorb North Korea. 
However, this chapter concluded that the theological approaches of Han and Kim 
based on anti-communism fell short because unification without reconciliation of the 
two Koreas or the redemption of hostile attitudes toward North Koreans would not 
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bring justice and peace in the peninsula and they have not provided theological basis 
for reshaping Christians longing for reconciliation and unification of Korea.  
Chapter 6 proposed that since the division of Korea the subjectivities of the 
unification of Korea have changed according to the social milieu. Following the 
division, the South Korean conservative churches argued that the unification 
discourse and movement in South Korea should be led by the South Korean 
government, as unification meant a political integration of two governments and only 
the South Korean government had the authority to talk with the North Korean 
communist regime. The liberal churches, however, believed that the unification of 
two Koreas should be led by South Korean commoners, and in particular the minjung 
who had been exploited economically, politically and culturally.  
With the development of democracy in South Korea, particularly after the 
June Uprising in 1987 in which South Koreans succeeded in a constitutional 
revolution that secured direct presidential election, the rights and responsibilities of 
the common people gained emphasis. Chapter 6 argued that scholars of sociology 
and political studies became concerned at a theoretical level with the subjectivity of 
“Simin (citizens)” in the South Korean context, with an awareness of citizens’ 
potential autonomous and organised power to bring about socio-political change. 
Based on the idea of citizenry in South Korea, a number of civil organisations were 
set up to engage with social, economic and political issues. Citizens could organise 
themselves into movements for peace and unification between the two Koreas, and if 
there was a possibility that North Koreans also could organise their own civil society 
organisations, this would signal remarkable changes in the relationships between the 
populations of the two Koreas. Scholars argue that the citizens of both Koreas could 
theoretically overcome the sensitivities of political and diplomatic confrontations, 
achieve social interactions with each other and push their governments to pursue 
peace and unification. Due to the fact that the division of Korea is not only a matter 
for the two Koreas, but also for citizens around the world, Yoo Kyung-Dong further 
argues that citizens in the countries surrounding the Korean peninsula should ally to 
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elect authorities that would contribute to the peace and reconciliation of Korea.1 
Christians in particular should engage with socio-political issues because they are 
also citizens of countries.  
Chapter 6 also argued that unification discourses are being eroded in South 
Korea. Despite the continuing hope for the unification of Korea among the South 
Korean population, it appears that the realistic possibility of unification is declining. 
Generally, scholars argue that the unification of the two Koreas is not an imminent 
goal of the Korean population because the people have now lived with division for 
over 70 years and each country has developed its own governance. Hence, creating 
one nation-state would be very difficult. Moreover, the last two decades in the 
Korean peninsula have been marked by hatred and military confrontations caused by 
nuclear issues. It is thus argued that the peaceful coexistence of the two countries is a 
more imminent and practical goal than unification itself, and indeed unification 
discourse in South Korea is being eroded by peace discourse. Scholars such as Choi 
Jang-Jib and Paik Nak-Cheong argue that unification discourses and governmental 
unification policies have been causing conflict among South Koreans, as well as with 
the North Korean government, because they have experienced difficulty in proposing 
a governance system that could form a middle way between North Korean 
communism and South Korean capitalism. It was thought that the North and South 
Korean governments would agree to develop a kind of confederate governance, like 
the United States, after unification, but recently scholars such as Paik have promoted 
the idea of the two Koreas developing their relationship like the countries of the 
European Union, whose members have secured freedom of travel across other 
member countries and share the same currency. Then, they argue, people would want 
more than “union” and hope for the unification of the two countries. South Korean 
churches are now also developing theologies of peace in the Korean peninsula, rather 
than theologies for unification. However, the chapter concluded that even though the 
unification of Korea could be delayed by the difficult situation of the Korean 
peninsula, with peace becoming a more urgent goal, churches still need to develop 
                                               




theologies for the unification of Korea, as this way they will gain social awareness, 
be able to explain why the eventual unification of Korea is just, and redress the 
manipulation of memory and hatred among Koreans.  
Following the critical assessment in chapters 2 to 6 of the previous 
unification discourses and movements of South Korean Protestant churches, in that 
they have not been providing effectual approaches toward the problems of divided 
Korea according to the changing landscapes of the Korean peninsula in the 21st 
century, chapter 7 proposed a third and very different approach towards unification. 
This was grounded in a specifically Christian theology of justice, memory and 
reconciliation particularly referring Mirosalv Volf’s End of Memory which pursued 
remembering rightly to forgive by God’s grace, and then forget. The divided 
attitudes of South Korean people toward North Korea and the North Korean 
population also disclosed that the problems of the divided Korean peninsula have 
generally become an internal issue among South Koreans rather than an inter-
relational problem with North Korea. As argued in the previous chapters, chapter 7 
clearly analysed that there have been two different understandings of justice among 
South Korean churches regarding North Korea. The majority of South Korean 
people, especially those who lived through the Korean War and the authoritarian 
government that instilled anti-communism as a state ideology, still think that there 
should be just punishment of the North Korean communists for the Korean War and 
the division of Korea. Likewise, for conservative South Korean Protestant churches, 
justice toward North Korea means retribution, which would result in God’s 
punishment of the North Korean communists who caused the war and brutally 
oppressed human rights in the North. For liberal Christians in the South, however, a 
restorative justice is preferred, as this would resolve the Han of minjung who have 
been oppressed and manipulated by the ruling authorities and their supporters who 
sustained and have benefited from the system of division. They pursue the wellbeing 
of minjung in the peninsula through the peace and unification of Korea and argue 
that the unification will bring peace to North-East Asia, where a new Cold War 
confrontation is building between the US and Japan on one side, and Russia and 
China on the other. Peace would mean not only an existence without war, but also a 
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situation of shalom in which all people could enjoy human flourishing and God’s 
justice.  
Justice, love and reconciliation in the relationship with North Korea have 
been always contradicting each other in the South Korean context. While the liberal 
churches emphasised the reconciliation of all Koreans, criticising anti-communism as 
evil, the conservative churches emphasised the need for God’s “justice” to be enacted 
upon North Korean communists and argued that reconciliation would only be 
feasible when the North Korean communists repented of their sins. I have argued that 
justice in the relationship between North and South Korea should be built on truthful 
remembering, not manipulated memory, sentiment against North Koreans, or even on 
ideologies which have evolved around ‘political and social powers’. For a long time, 
the memory of the backlash against the division of Korea, including the Korean War, 
shaped a deep hatred of North Koreans, and the authoritarian government 
manipulated memory and established anti-communism as a statist ideology in order 
to sustain the regime. Anti-communism has concealed the fact that the South Korean 
government, army and police killed innocent civilians and that North Koreans were 
also victims in the Korean War. Seeking retribute justice against the North Korean 
regime for the Korean War would invigorate the North Korean population whose 
land was devastated, and whose families were killed by US and South Korean armies 
and South Korean rightist gangsters, therefore I argued that seeking justice of the 
Korean war should be a process toward restorative justice which would contribute 
reconciliation of Korean populations in both Koreas.  
I also argued that manipulated memory and negative sentiment toward North 
Koreans has shaped the national identity of South Koreans against North Koreans. 
Even those in leadership in the conservative churches, which comprise the majority 
of South Korean churches, have argued that true Christians should be anti-
communists. Meanwhile, the Christian approach to unification based on nationalism 
and minjung theology has caused fractions among the South Korean population and, 
ironically, it has weakened the need for unification, since it sees unification as a 
means to democratise the two Koreas and disregards human rights issues for North 
Koreans. Those seeking justice should first take the step of seeking truth and 
 
 235 
overcoming ideological blocks, and then we will come to know that justice should 
not involve retributive justice against North Korean communists, but instead 
restorative justice against war, violation and hatred, bringing peace, love and 
reconciliation to the Korean peninsula and the world. The chapter proposed that a 
truthful Christian identity, rather than an identity built on statist or national 
ideologies and manipulated memories, would be a further step towards reshaping the 
Christian vision for reconciliation. As Volf argued in his book, End of Memory, 
Christians share their communal biblical memory of Israel’s escape from slavery in 
Egypt and the crucifixion of Jesus, which are not simply past stories, but also 
embody a memory and belief that God will deliver them when they are put in danger 
because God is love and God’s grace reaches all creatures. Likewise, the chapter 
argued that the sacred memory of the Christian community helps us to rediscover our 
identity for a better future in relation to God and Jesus Christ who died for the love 
of all human beings. This Christian identity will break down the ideological blocks 
that still remain within South Korean society and contribute to reshaping the 
Christian longing for the reconciliation and unification of Korea. Therefore, chapter 
7 also suggested that the South Korean churches, especially conservative churches, 
should try to dialogue with North Koreans at various civil stages to search for a 
proper shared understanding, rather than looking them as targets of evangelism.  
Reflecting upon the manipulated memory of South Korean soldiers and the 
victims of the Kwangju Democratisation Uprising in 1980, Han Gang, a writer and 
the Man Booker International Prize winner of 2016, assessed how the manipulated 
memory of anti-communism devastated people’s lives in a small city in South Korea: 
Some memories never fade away. Even though time passes, the memories of 
Kwangju are becoming clearer while other memories are eroded… I heard 
about a platoon of the ROK army who were sent to Vietnam. They killed all 
the civilians in a rural village. Women, children, old people… Soldiers 
summoned them to the community building and burnt them alive. After the 
war, they returned to Korea and received rewards from the government. 
Later, some of them came to Kwangju to kill us. Their memories of the war 
in Vietnam were not eroded; they still powerfully controlled their behaviour.2 
                                               
2 Gang Han, A Boy Is Coming (Seoul: Chang-Bi, 2014), p.141. The novel was translated into English 
under the title, Human Acts.  
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At the time this thesis was begun in 2014, anti-communism and anti-North Korean 
sentiment were rife in South Korean society, largely due to the North Korean nuclear 
issues and people’s weakening confidence in the national homogeneity of the two 
Koreas. Fractions, tensions and hatred toward North Korea were widespread in South 
Korean society. In this changing landscape, ironically, the unification discourse had 
come to be an internal issue for South Korea rather than an inter-relational one with 
North Korea. Therefore, some academic attempts are needed in the future that will 
consider how to define a new Korean identity based, not on ethnicity and ideology, 
but on common values for a better and more hopeful future of people living 
peacefully in the peninsula and in neighbouring countries. Christianity has a 
potentially distinctive contribution make to the construction of these shared values. 
As the thesis has emphasised, truthful memory, justice and reconciliation from inside 
the South Korean Christian communities and then South Korean society are 
essential. The reconciliation and unification of two Koreas requires procedures of 
appeasing each other’s hatred. South Korean Christian communities, the majority of 
whom still uphold pronounced anti-communist and anti-North Korean sentiments, 
could illuminate that process through remembering rightly to forgive by God’s grace 
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